

“SELF” & “NATURE”

**AN ANALYSIS APPLYING A READING OF FREUD
AND HEGEL**

1990

SCHOOL OF PHILOSOPHY
UNIVERSITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES

RODERICK WEST

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE	1
INTRODUCTION	13
HEGEL	14
FREUD	41
CONCLUSION	65
POSTSCRIPT	99
BIBLIOGRAPHY	102

PREFACE

The contemporary texts of Environmental Philosophy concerned with the progressive destruction of the environment, have concentrated upon the problem of formalising a new "Ethic". The Ethic is seen as a means of providing a "way of being" which would result in the protection and preservation of the "natural" environment and with it, human life itself.

This Ethic should perhaps more accurately be seen as a reformulation of the notion of "Self". How can we structure identity so as to ensure the protection of what is now considered to be "Other" than "Self", the environment? The concentration upon the concept of "Self" is unquestionably the correct orientation of the problem, for it is the "Self" which is the perpetrator, or more simply, the agent, of destruction. But where the central debate of environmental philosophy has been concerned with reformulating a normative conceptualisation of the "Self", the focus in this instance will be directed at the very concept of "Self" and how this conceptualisation affects our relationship to the environment. How is the notion of "Self" conceptualised, what constitutes "Self" and what are the unavoidable by-products of "Self"? From an understanding of the subject of the debate, a more enlightened conversation may be possible.

To understand the relationship between "Self" and environment, it is not sufficient to solely consider the concept of "Self", for it is the relationship which is of principal concern. The relationship in question can accurately be characterised by two interdependent, overlapping and mutually dependant notions, "power" and "desire". In their various manifestations they form the basis of environmental degradation.

Immediately we are struck by the pivotal locus of the whole enterprise. "Power" and "desire" are not independently operating entities, but expressions of a subject, the "Self". What is it about the concept of "Self" which drives it toward mastery, control, domination, and the insatiability of desire? Further, why is it that the "environment", as that which is not "Self", that which is posited as being "Other" to "Self", figures so prominently in the constitution of "Self", and fulfils the role as receptacle for the "Self's" demands? It is in these concepts of "Self", "power", "desire", and the "Other", that we may be able to find an alternate way to conceptualise an understanding of the destruction of the natural environment.

In the development of the analysis the postulation of various oppositions will be unavoidable due to their implicit conceptual existence. Undoubtedly the primary opposition is that of "Self" and "Other". This can alternatively be formalised as "Subject" and "Object". The other primary opposition will be that of "culture" and "nature". In addition those of: "mind" and "body"; "masculine" and "feminine"; "sex" and "gender"; the "particular" and the "general"; "transcendence" and "immanence"; among others, will also find expression.

It will be argued that the additional hierarchical oppositions, are products of the primary opposition of "Self" to "Other". For the "Self" to secure its existence, to reach a state of self-certainty as a separate autonomous entity, it must continually posit an "Other". These "Others" are not absolute, just as the "Self" is not. The "Other" is merely an instrument necessary for the "Self" to attempt to concrete its identity.

On this journey, which to a large part will be self exploratory, it will be necessary to accept that "Self" examination may be threatening and may even highlight the need for therapy. We must suspend attachment to common securities and openly venture upon a trail, which may at first seem self contradictory, self defeating and possibly unacceptable. To facilitate this, the first step must be to dispense with the use of terms, which although considered commonplace, are never the less, restrictive and theory laden.

In the critique, the term "Self" will come to designate something other than that which it is commonly held to refer to. "Self", is not the fixed *a priori* atom or essence of the individual, as it commonly appears in Western¹ thought. In Norman O. Brown's words, "*The world is a stage, the Self a theatrical creation.*"² Following this line, Goffman suggests that as a performed character, it is not an organic thing that has a specific location. "Self" does not relate to an ontological absolute, but to the transcendent conceptual creation and creator of the Western way of conceptualising reality. Not only will it be seen to construct Western "culture"³, but it too will be seen as a concept posited by the appropriations of Western "culture". The term relates purely to the Western construction of the **concept**, not to some imagined ontological reality. As Ernst Tugendhat suggests in "Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination", "*For my part (when I look into "my self") I see nothing at all there.*"⁴ Indeed it is possible to find evidence from the history of philosophy itself, which suggests that the conceptualisation of "Self" and "Self Consciousness" has a relatively limited existence. In Homer's "Odyssey", we do not find any references to the actors' self-conscious or reflective thoughts as we do in, say, the works of Shakespeare, the only references are to their actions.

The problem of grasping an ontologically certain "Self", is the parallel problem to that of finding the elusive homunculi in the discipline of philosophy of mind. In postulating the core of our being as an unchanging "Self", or soul, we are drawn into an infinite regress, a metaphysical black hole.

¹ Where the term "Western" is used this designates that mode of being which may alternatively be characterised by the terms "European", "modern" and "civilised". The reason "civilised" is included in the category "western" will later become clear.

² Brown, N., *Love's Body*, New York: Vintage Books, 1968, p. 90

³ The use of the term "culture" in this context should be avoided but has been used for literary simplicity.

⁴ Tugendhat, E., *Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination*, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1986, p. 8

In probing the depths of this "black hole", we find that what we thought to be a certain ontological entity is but a "house of cards". Although empty and fragile, most of the usual methods that attempts to dismantle it, only add to its stability. It is as if the only option we have of dismantling the "house", is to build another. Unfortunately, we defeat our own aim. It initially appears that the game of house building is the only one we have.

It will be assumed that the concepts of "Self", "Self identity", "Self Consciousness" and ego are identical and interchangeable. Although there may be instances where subtle differences in meaning are important, for the most part, they all fundamentally refer to the way we conceptualise our being as separate autonomous entities.

In order to highlight the **conceptual** nature of various concepts used throughout the analysis, inverted comas will be employed. Although this practice may perhaps become irritating, it will at least continually remind us that our rhetoric refers to concepts, not ontological entities.

It has not always been the case that the meanings of concepts of "Self Consciousness" are as quickly accepted as they are in contemporary texts. Philosophers from Descartes to Hegel thought that in this concept they had found the principle necessary to ground the whole of systematic philosophical enterprise. Today, the notion is more often seen as a self-evident ontological element of reality, rather than an important philosophical discovery. P.F. Strawson reflects the contemporary acceptance of the notion as an ontologically absolute, unchanging, universal, a historical reality, *"it (the Self) is one of those concepts which . . . is part of the massive central core of human thinking which has no history."*⁵ From the perspective of a "subject", of a being who conceptualises themselves⁶, the notion of "Self" appears as an undoubtable philosophical truth. Indeed to doubt the existence of the "Self" as existing absolutely, is to doubt our very own being as we commonly believe it to be.

When we use the term "Self Consciousness", it is normally accepted that this refers to the consciousness of our Self, of our true identity or being. It is on this first and decisive fallacy that a great deal of consequential erroneous hypothesizing is framed. When we reflect upon consciousness, we are not actually becoming aware of our essence or Self. Rather it is in the activity of self-reflection, that we conceptualise and posit a "Self". The "Self" is thus not an autonomous atomistic entity, but a construction of reflective thought.

Along with the problematisation of the concept "Self", there has been a corresponding ambiguity imposed on the differentiation of the terms "Consciousness" and ""Self Consciousness". It appears there has been a progressive merging of the meaning of the terms to the extent that to be

⁵ P.F. Strawson, The Category of Self, p.284

⁶ As will be argued, it is not necessary to add in this instance *"who conceptualises themselves as an autonomous self"*, as even in the reflective act of conceptualisation, a self has already been posited.

conscious, is frequently seen to be the essence of "Self Consciousness". "Consciousness" and "Self Consciousness" denote vastly differing modes of existence. It may be that it is in the very differentiation of the meaning of these terms, that we find the origin of the disruption of environmental harmony.

Consciousness may be seen as the essence of pure experience. Although it has been doubted, it is possible to be conscious without having an identity as "Self". Experience does not presuppose or posit a **subject** of experience. The "subject" of experience is the product of reflective alienating thought. In order to move from a state of consciousness to one of "Self Consciousness", necessitates the first and decisive movement of alienation. For consciousness to reflect upon itself as consciousness, it must alienate a part of its being, a part on which to reflect. Just as in the metaphor of the mirror we become other to our self, in order to see our "Self", in "Self Consciousness" we must become "Other" through alienation, in order for us to be conscious of our consciousness. Where Consciousness does not experience division or opposition, "Self Consciousness" must necessarily in order to exist. That which is "before" consciousness, is actually **of** consciousness, contrarily that which is "before" "Self Consciousness", is that component of consciousness alienated and posited as the **object** of consciousness. This first expression of alienation is also the fundamental act of negation upon which all others rest.

At this stage it is worthwhile to offer an alternate terminology for "consciousness" and "Self Consciousness", in order to clarify the significant and essential difference between them. The concepts of "Participating" and "Non-Participating" consciousness, which apply to Consciousness and "Self Consciousness" respectively, have been adopted from those used by Morris Berman in "The Re-enchantment of the World", with only minor re-working. Where "Consciousness" as a participating enterprise is unreflectively absorbed in itself, "Self Consciousness", does not participate in its "object", it separates itself in the act of differentiation. "Self Consciousness" is not actively aware of itself, but is rather conscious of its alienation, it does not participate in what it essentially is. It conceptualises its being as an independent entity cut-off from the material world. In contrast, "participating consciousness" is the **experience** of the material world, conceptualisation of difference is absent.

Although these are two distinct ways of being, they exist at different times in the same individual. We experience participating consciousness at those times when we are immersed in an act of consciousness, when we participate in the moment, or when experience is merged as a psychic unity. The consciousness we experience when we are lost in deep thought or engrossed by a spectacle, are clear examples of participating consciousness. Alternatively, non-participating consciousness is apparent when we are reflectively aware of our separation or differentiation from the object of our thought. Indeed, it is only in "Self Consciousness", that an object could be said to have any existence as an "object". Non-participating consciousness is the scientific consciousness of alienation, in which the experience of

consciousness, is "Other" to our being. It is this form of being which *"insists on a rigid distinction between observer and observed"*.⁷

In the absence of a clear articulation of evidence, which supports the ontological existence of the "Self" as conceptualised, terms that tacitly imply that existence, must be avoided. Rather than use the term "Self Consciousness" which automatically implies the existence of a "Self", it is preferable to utilise the terms "non-participating consciousness", "reflective consciousness", or "alienated consciousness". That is, consciousness which reflects upon consciousness and which produces the differentiation of experience. The term "Self Consciousness" or "Self", will be used in those instances where reference is made to the concept.

It must also be kept in mind that when the concept "Self" is used to refer to cross-cultural revelations of ways of being, these expositions must be seen as imposing the Western constructed concept upon those people. They are "whig" anthropologies, they are not infallible or "objective". When philosophers and anthropologists discuss alternate constructions of "Self" or ways of defining "Self", this is from the subjective position of the Western subject. The bias of the Western way of being, is so committed to the expression of "Self", that it imposes the construct onto other peoples' way of being, regardless of whether that imposition is warranted. The subjective nature of Western analysis cannot avoid positing a subject, be it narrowly defined, more broadly defined or defined via relations.⁸ This projection normally takes place without reviewing or explaining what the concept refers to. Its meaning and objective reality is so quickly accepted that objections are at best dismissed as trivial.

The terminology "ways of being", must also be clarified as it will inevitably be frequently used. Rather than falling into the trap of conceptualising differences, as difference in the conceptualisation of "Self", it is necessary to use an alternate term which does not carry with it the heavy ideological luggage of "Self". The term "Self", as we shall see, is pregnant with meaning from which it cannot be divorced. In response, the term "ways of being" is an attempt to avoid the parameters of Western thought and the burden of acceptable literary expression. To avoid metaphysical railroading, as innocent an expression as is possible, is necessary.⁹ Compliance with pre-existing meaning and the acceptance of certain presumed ontological absolutes, is not the road to salvation.

⁷ Berman, M., The Reenchantment Of The World, New York: Bantam Books, 1984, p. 3

⁸ Where it is obvious that "ways of being" are different to our own, we still assert the existence of a subject, but differentiate it from our own way of being by suggesting, for instance, that their "Self" incorporates "nature"; that they as "selves", identify with "nature", or that relations are the constitutive element of their subjectivity. It would also be possible to argue coherently that they have no concept of "Self", and do not consider themselves to be autonomous independent subjects.

⁹ It must be accepted never-the-less that this too, is itself merely a conceptualisation.

Although it could be argued that the preceding analysis is erroneous, as it is not necessary to be aware of "Self" for the "Self" to exist. That is, we do not need to be "Self-conscious" for the "Self" to exist, this proves to be a vacuous assertion. To assert that the "Self" always exists whether or not we are conscious of it, allows the justification of the assertion that an amoeba or rock, has a Self. Clearly this conclusion would be unacceptable to the proponents of the ontological certainty of "Self".

There are thus two options in regard to the concept "Self". Either, it is ontologically certain, existing *a priori*, outside of experience. That is, it is a "real" entity in the world, not merely an illusory figment of the imagination only existing in the mind, which does not refer to an actual "thing in the world". The other alternative, which will be argued for, is that it is merely a concept that has no existence outside of its conceptualisation. That is, it is a product of a system of signification, a sign that has no referent.

Just as the use of the term "Self" must be avoided when we are not referring to that **concept** constructed by Western experience, likewise we must avoid using the term "culture", when we are not referring to the concept created by the Western way of being. "Culture", is once again not an absolute given, it does not necessarily exist for all consciousnesses. The concept "culture" is an expression or by-product of "Self Consciousness". It is a construction of the reflexivity of the way of being which finds expression as "Self". "Culture" is postulated as the Self's transcendent expressions. The notions of "Self" and "culture" are interdependent and coexist.

It is the collective of reflective subjects, which defines itself as "culture" via opposition to "nature". "Culture" arises or is formulated concurrently as an opposition to that which is "natural". Thus, "culture" can be seen as a manifestation of the strivings of the way of being which conceptualises itself as a transcendent "Self", over the lower form of existence, which is absorbed in immanence. The opposition of "culture" to "nature", is not an absolute ontological opposition, but is a construction of a particular way of being. The reality of the relativity of "culture", to a particular way of being, will be unequivocally established in consideration of other ways of being in which the opposition is absent. This will similarly be apparent in respect of other oppositions.

To clarify this difficult conceptual issue of the relativity of "culture", we can perhaps consider it in more concrete terms. There are commonly postulated two determinants. They are the pivotal terms of the opposition of "culture" and "nature". One is presumed to be the physical biologically given structure present at birth. The other, "culture", is seen as that which is transcendent over that which is "natural"; it is imposed upon the physical form and it is this that separates humans from the rest of reality. The concept is a postulation that allows the expression of superiority via differentiation. It is equally possible to understand human existence as the outcome of a natural program. Although it may be argued that this is a crude form of materialism, it is not intended to be. The point is that the opposition of "culture" to "nature" is

a theoretical postulation resulting from the self-reflective necessity of identity via mastery. The opposition is secondary. The conceptualisations are not conscious manifestations, but as will be argued, are constructs of the Freudian "unconscious". It is via conceptualisation, that the unconscious can elevate that which is "human" over that which is mere "animal".

The long history of Western philosophy itself has been permeated by the desire or drive to construct oppositions. These oppositions have primarily been intended to elevate us over the animal in order to concrete our difference from the rest of reality. Many attempts have been made to express what it is that makes us special; what it is that makes us separate and different. These speculations have attempted to depict what it is which makes us more than mere animals, what it is that gives us a separate identity as "humans". Philosophy has played the additional role of offering models that we can follow so that we can be truly "human", so that we can accurately express our "Self", our identity, our essence. In all these meditations little thought has been given to the possibility that it is the conceptualisation of identity itself that makes us different. But to offer this as an option does not entrench a **real** difference, rather only a **conceptual** one. The supposition of difference quickly dissolves and we are left with the terror that we are indeed animal, that we are "nature". From this the basis of our terror is revealed; that we exist as the experience of what we consider to be the "Other", we have no certain identity.

Here again we must clarify the ambiguity inherently present in the common use of another term. When using the word "human", we do not normally refer to the actual basis or fundamental meaning of the term, but a conceptualisation that has been projected upon it. "Human" here is not the category of animal properly called human, but the theoretical construct of the Western way of being. It is the sense of "human" which designates difference, opposition, superiority and transcendence, with which we are concerned. Although what is human can properly be seen as merely a category of the one thing¹⁰, it has come to signify difference and transcendence. Its meaning has been appropriated to offer identity from the "Other" via superiority in transcendence. It is a position of mastery, control, and dominance. It is more than that which it is not. It is not only different, separate and autonomous, but is the focus of power and identity. Heidegger also recognised the tacit meaning manifest in terms that refer to the animal, human. To try and overcome the common misconceptions which terms such as "man" conveys; he supplanted it with the term "Dasein". Although this term will not be used as it too now carries the luggage of Heidegger's philosophical ideology, it is never the less crucial to deconstruct the content of the term. This will ensure that our use of the terms does not presuppose unwanted meaning. In addition, the deconstruction will disclose the ways and means

¹⁰ It is necessary to note that some literary oddities will result in attempting to avoid the use of terms such as "nature", which implicitly imply opposition. This highlights that our very thinking is moderated by the logic which the language of Western identity allows.

which the subject appropriates meaning upon hitherto innocent terms, in an attempt to attain certainty of Self in the position of mastery.

The meaning of two final terms, "transcendence" and "immanence", must be clarified. To be transcendent, is not merely to be spiritual. It is a position of superiority, of separation from the material or natural world, and reflection upon that world. It is a position of dominance over and above the material world. As the Oxford Dictionary of Current English suggests; to be transcendent, is to be of supreme merit or quality; existing apart from. It is of particular importance that it is not only a notion of simply separation in an alternate state, but is a status of superiority, dominance and power. In contrast, "immanence" is to be part of, to be absorbed into, to be immersed in or to merge with. In a state of immanence, difference is absorbed and dissolved, power is dissipated.

These various dualisms constitute more than mere oppositions. They are important hierarchical oppositions in which power and desire are articulated. It is through these dichotomies that it is possible for power and desire to be enacted. For the "Self" to attain the position of mastery that it desires, it must subordinate a "slave" in an inferior position.

It is important to stress the point that even though Western philosophers consider their assertions to be universal, they are relative to a particular way of being. Although the authors in question from Hegel through Kojève to Freud, Brown and perhaps even Derrida, articulate their doctrines as having applicability to all human existence, they do not and cannot, for they are the work of a self-reflective subject.

What has become apparent in the prior rudimentary deconstruction of terms such as "Self", "culture" and "human", is the emergence of a complimentary set of concepts also central to the analysis and inherently embodied within the primary concepts. These concepts of "opposition" and "difference", will later give rise to the further concept of "negation". Inherent in the concept of identity, as expressed via "Self" and "culture", is that of opposition and difference, and inherent within that concept is that of "negation". It is within this latter notion that we will find the clearest articulation of the relationship of "Self" to environment.

Negation will be seen to operate in two primary modes. First, it can be seen as the essence of domination, mastery and control. It strives to negate or annihilate that which it is not. Secondly, it will be seen as the essence of desire. The expression of the power of the negative fuels the insatiability of the desire to incorporate that which the "Self" is not, into its own identity.

It will be argued that if it is accepted that the concepts of "Self" and "Self Consciousness" are defined by opposition, then the conceptualisation of existence as an autonomous subject, necessarily entails negation, and from it, domination and desire. Although this may suggest to some philosophers, who are committed to the notion of the human subject as entailing an absolute non-dialectical ontological opposition between what it is and what it

is not, that the project to avoid the destruction of the environment is futile, this feeling of futility, is but a product of that dogmatic position. As has been suggested, and as will be argued, there are alternatives to the conceptualisation of "Self" as it appears in modern Western metaphysics, or rather, there are alternative "ways of being" to that which presupposes the conceptualisation of "Self".

We can approach the question of the relationship of "Self" to the environment from the opposite direction to that which suggests that inherent within the concepts of "Self" and "Other", are those of difference, opposition, negation and thus power and desire. In this case, if we accept that the relationship is characterised by the operation of the forces of power and desire, and then ask what are the constitutive elements necessary for the operation of these, we find similar notions are entailed. For power and desire to exist there must be a relation between two entities. For these two entities to be autonomous, there must be difference and opposition. In order for difference and opposition to be maintained, the negation of the "Other" must be perpetuated. Further, for power or desire to be articulated, a subject must be postulated which is within a position of superiority and transcendence.

To understand how the rhetoric of the paper in regard to the analysis of the development and conceptualisation of "Self" applies to the relationship of the "human" to the environment, two basic premises must be observed. The first is that the "Other", or not-self refers to the environment or "nature". That is, where not specifically noted, the term "the "Other"" may be translated to "the environment" or "nature". Secondly, the relationship of "Self" to "Other" is interchangeable with, and carried over into, the relationship between collective humanity's identity as expressed by "culture", and "nature".

It will already be obvious that the analysis will borrow part of its theoretical footing from the extensive commentary of contemporary feminist critique. Although their research refers to the suggested domination of women by men, it can to a large extent be unproblematically applied to the domination or subordination of "nature" by humans.

Indeed it is one of the central emerging debates of feminist critique that also applies to environmental philosophy in a similar but slightly modified form. The issue in question is that of the "sameness" and "difference". Do we stress that we are part of "nature", that we are the same as "nature", or more correctly, that there is no real differentiation between the referents of the concept of "human" and the concept of "nature"? Alternatively, do we "take seriously" the supposed differences between "nature" and ourselves? The answer to this question will in part be dependant upon whether we assert that the "differences" are real differences, or that they are only conceptual differences. It will further depend on whether we assume that the "subject"/"object" and "Self"/"Other" distinctions are either absolute or dissoluble. Are we stuck with the "Other", will something always be "left out", or can we merge with the "Other" and overcome the conceptualisation of difference and thus avoid domination? Can we utilise the models of cross-cultural studies which reveal vastly contrasting ways of being, or are we, due

to our particular historical experience, now destined to an existence which implies and embodies difference? If we assume the latter option, then the concentration of debate must be upon the conceptualisation of difference which does not also imply domination. If we accept the prior alternative, then we must address the question of the root of difference and how that can be avoided and dissolved.

It is important to emphasize an emerging thread in the analysis. For the subject, the position of subjectivity is not debatable. The subject recognises no movement from non-subjectivity and refuses to accept the existence of the movement. The movement to subjectivity becomes an irreversible and irredeemable shift, there is no going back. But what must be asked is whether the pilgrimage of the subject along the road of progress, is a progress to a new state of being, or a "return to origins"? Does Hegel's subject, who leaves behind natural consciousness to progress to the Absolute, unconsciously envision in that state, a return to origins? Is the desired "arrival", the object of desire, an arrival at a conclusion, or is it a return to the point of departure? Does the power of the negative which fuels the subject's desire articulated in the march of progress, actually "go back" in the act of going forward? The subject can only conceptualise it as a going forward, for to go back would be an acceptance of defeat, and an inability to master.

Kojeve verifies the method that we must employ to arrive at an understanding of the "origins" of "man" as we know it. Kojève suggests that *"To understand man by understanding his 'origins' is, therefore, to understand the origin of the I revealed by speech."*¹¹ It is the "Self" or "Self Consciousness" which must be deconstructed if we are to reveal the origin of our conceptualisation of ourselves as "human".

It is interesting to note that in regard to what appears to be a comment on the reception of Spinoza's hypothesis, Hegel echoes the previous remarks concerning the sacrosanct nature of "Self Consciousness" and the "Self" in general, *"If the conception of God as the one Substance shocked the age in which it was proclaimed, the reason for this was that on the one hand, an instinctive awareness that, in this definition, 'Self Consciousness' was submerged and not preserved."*¹² To suggest that anything other than "Self Consciousness" is the absolute unchanging essence of the individual, is to inherently infer that the "Self" has but a temporal or conceptual existence. Clearly, this is threatening to the existence of the subject. Just as Spinoza's hypothesis was rejected for dissolving the absolute autonomous reality of the subject, we must accept that this is the only likely reception from a subject, for any theory that implies the transitory and metaphysical relativity of the subject, of themselves. This will become exaggerated when the theory is a normative one that concludes both that the subject is expendable and must

¹¹ Kojève, Lectures On the Phenomenology of Spirit, p. 3

¹² Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p.

be expended. To accept it, is to accept one's own conclusion or arrival, that is, "a death in life", or dissolution.

Finally, we must come to terms with, or if that is not possible, at least reveal, an uncomfortable fact inherent in this type of philosophical analysis. It has been argued that the discourse that we are immersed in, philosophy, is *"the ideology of the Western ethnos"*.¹³ Vincent Descombes suggests that *"By ideology is meant a particular or relative discourse, seeking to pass itself off as universal or absolute."*¹⁴ Although this in itself seems a fairly reasonable assertion and tends to concord with what has been argued and with what follows, it is the underlying nature of the statement that reveals a contradiction in any such assertion. Derrida reveals this contradiction in the simple suggestion that the *"prosecution's indictment is couched in the language of philosophy itself."*¹⁵ That is, the assertion that philosophy is the ideology of the Western ethos, is itself a component of philosophical discourse. This has particular ramifications for any discourse that deals with the deconstruction of the subject.

It is already apparent and will become more obvious, that the terms of Western philosophical discourse themselves are ideologically theory laden and thus must be avoided, or at least deconstructed to reveal that hidden content. What is perhaps not obvious, is that reflective discourse which presumes to deconstruct the subject, itself will be inherently contradictory. In order to deconstruct the discourse of the subject, we must by necessity speak with the language of the subject. We are bound by an unavoidable metaphysical straitjacket, for to be the subject of a philosophical discourse we are bound by the language imposed by the logic of the metaphysics of the subject. In attempting to deconstruct the subject or the "Self", we are restricted by being subjects ourselves.

To make this more explicit an alternate formulation may be an aid. It could be argued that philosophy is the conceptualisation of the reflective awareness, thus including the reflective articulation of action, thought and being. Although it could also be argued that all ways of being, either those which are reflectively aware of it or not, have an inherently philosophical basis, this line of argument is fruitless, for on that understanding we may as well also attribute philosophies to plants and non-human animals. It is now possible to see that philosophy as the reflective discipline of the arts, is an articulation of "culture". From this it follows that reflective philosophy must be the articulation of the alienated reflective subject. That is, the subject of philosophy must make their object "Other" to themselves in order for them to reflect upon it. If it is accepted that philosophy is reflective articulation, then it is an unavoidable fact that to engage in any form of philosophy we must by necessity assume the status of the reflective subject. In reflecting upon the subject, we must be subjects. But ours is a double reflection, being engaged in philosophy we will reflect upon the "Self" as the reflective way of being.

¹³ Descombes, V., Modern French Philosophy, Cambridge 1980, p. 137

¹⁴ Ibid, p. 137

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 137

The agent of Western philosophical discourse is the subject, and therefore in attempting to philosophically reveal the relativity of the subject, we contradict ourselves by fulfilling the very role that we are asserting is merely the concept of an ideology. We reinforce subjectivity by our own expression of subjectivity in the act of self-reflective philosophy. It is in part a self-negating enterprise, for to enter into debate we must speak the language of subjective discourse and thus contradict our own position.

We have two options, either to be quiet in our immersion in non-reflective consciousness, or to attempt to reveal the relativity and internal contradictions of subjective discourse from the contradictory stance of a subject. In this instance, our only option is the latter alternative. Although this contradictory stance may seem self-defeating, it is by necessity that the revolutionary act must originate from the pre-revolutionary way of being. Revolution is not achieved by putting our head in the proverbial sand. We must resume the status of a Bodhisattvas and return from Nirvana till all subjects have been enlightened.

INTRODUCTION

The two most important traditions which conceptualise the relationship between "Self" and "Other" are those originating in the works of Hegel and Freud. Although neither is directly concerned with the relationship between "Self" and "nature", a reading of the primary texts of both can be applied to offer a conceptualisation of "Self" and "Other" as it is enacted in Western society. It is the critical concepts of "power" and "desire" which must dominate the exegesis.

The focus of the first section will be Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit". In this text, one of the most insightful, although far from clear, articulations of the development of subjectivity in the form of "Self Consciousness" is narrated. The movement of consciousness from "natural consciousness" through "Self Consciousness", to "Absolute spirit" details the essential elements of the progression and structure of the "Self".

By supplanting "nature" in place of the "Other", it will be possible to conceptualise the interplay of power and desire in the relationship between "humanity" as the collective manifestation of self-conscious beings, and "nature". Although a great deal of Hegel's work is particularly abstract, it is in view of this abstract but universal nature, that it has the potential of being applied to a variety of disciplines.

The reading of Hegel will be complemented by an associated reading and application of post-Hegelian analysts who have extended the Hegelian framework, and by doing so, have offered further valuable insights into the relationship between "Self" and "Other", and "culture" and "nature". The most important authors in this regard are Kojève, Hyppolite, Gadamer, Rosen, and Butler.

The second section, which follows on from the analysis of the Hegelian conceptualisation, deals primarily with Freud. Where the Hegelian analysis is an abstract conceptual analysis, the Freudian exposition will be a far more concrete psychoanalysis of the development of "Self" as "ego", and its relationship to what is other to "Self", "nature". The primary Freudian text is "Beyond the Pleasure Principle". This will be complimented by a reading of one of Freud's later more sombre texts, "Civilisation and its Discontents", in which a psychoanalysis of the way of being which is expressed as "Self", is detailed.

The reading of the Freudian text will be followed and reinforced by an examination of Lacan's insights. It is in Lacan's analysis that an inter-working of the essential elements of both the Freudian and Hegelian concepts is articulated.

Although the concept "nature" will not always be immediately apparent in the Freudian and Hegelian conceptualisations, and may only appear irregularly, it

will never the less be interwoven throughout both analyses. It is primarily in the position of "Other", which the concept of "nature" is manifest.

The following section, will initially, briefly draw together the conceptualisations of "power" and "desire", and "self" and "other", as they developed individually in the prior sections. How are the concepts of "Self" and "Other" entailed in our relationship to the notion of "nature"? This will be followed by a consideration of what other conceptualisations and aspects of modern society display the characteristics of the "Self".

This will lead into a further analysis of the expression of power and desire in our relationship to nature. Is the exercise of power and desire in relation to "nature" inevitable, or is it possible for us to live harmoniously with "nature" by avoiding the expression of power and desire entirely? Is it possible to satisfy desire, or is desire an essential element of "human" existence? To answer these questions it will be necessary to consider the web of concepts that constitutes the subject, and the interplay of these with the domination of "nature". It will be argued that it is the positing of the concept "Self", and concentration upon "Self", which drives our being toward the domination of all that is deemed external to "Self".

An assessment of the possibilities to overcome or rather dissipate, the enactment of power and desire in our relationship to "nature" will follow. A component of this will be to consider the environmental philosophy of "Deep Ecology" from a Hegelian perspective. What insights can Hegel's narration offer in reference to the postulations of Deep Ecology? Do these insights only apply to the conceptualisation of "Self" and "Other", as proposed in Deep Ecology, or do they apply equally to other environmental philosophies such as Eco-feminism?

A movement toward articulating a positive proposal will compliment the critique. Our aim, similar to that of other environmental philosophies, will be to dissolve the distinction that we make between "nature" and ourselves. It is in unifying that domination, control and desire are overcome. By drawing on the revelations of the Hegelian and Freudian critiques, it may be possible to offer, not so much another normative conceptualisation of "Self" and "Other", and "culture" and "nature", but a "way of being" in which the more detrimental by-products of our current way of being are avoided.

This positive proposal will derive its fundamental philosophical understanding from the rather odd combination of cross-cultural anthropology and post-modern philosophical critique. It is from these two seemingly divergent schools of thought, that an intuition of the alternative may originate.

The final section that quotes but one "author", is included because of the strength and beauty of expression, and its relevance to the current analysis.

HEGEL

As long ago as the time of Nicholas of Cusa, the proposition that identity is defined via the structuring of oppositions occurs. Nicholas of Cusa suggested that we could define anything with reference to its *"negation of otherness"*.¹⁶ Although this long history exists, it is not until the theorising of German idealism that we see its classical articulation. The first formulation of the notions of difference and negation in German Idealism can be found in Fichte's philosophy, but it is in the works of Hegel that we find their principal philosophical expression. Subsequently, Hegel's works have founded a long tradition concerned with the problem of identity and inter-subjective relations.

Although the history of western philosophy has generally posited the notion of identity as the unity of the thing with itself, it is possible to argue that in this formulation there is always something consciously or unconsciously left out, something which is "Other" to the identity in question. This particularly becomes apparent when we apply the rhetoric to the expression of Self or "human" identity, rather than to abstract algebraic axioms. In "Identity and Difference", Heidegger begins by stating that *"the usual formulation of the principle of identity reads: A=A"*¹⁷ He continues by correctly asserting the obvious, that an equation must have at least two terms. In order to allow for this and to bestow an identity on the term "A" as the expression of a "human" Self, we must reformulate the equation as "A=^B". In this formulation A's identity is posited not as an identity with itself, but as an identity mediated through an Other: that is, by negation of otherness. Although this is not the only possible reformulation of the equation, as shall later be argued, it is the only reformulation that results in the conceptualisation of identity in Western terms as atomistic, isolated, and seemingly autonomous entities.

Fichte reflects the understanding that the subject is only constituted through an act of negation. He begins with the assumption, as Ernst Tugendhat comments, *"a subject cannot be presupposed who is prior to the act of Self Consciousness. . . the I comes into being through its Self-positing - it is not an entirely pre-existent substance."*¹⁸ The Self is a conceptualisation arising from an act of negation or alienation. It is not an independent Cartesian soul.

To have an identity as a Self is to be autonomous, but autonomy is designated by boundaries, by limitations. Where there are boundaries, there is something outside those boundaries. It follows that where there is Self, there must be an Other. Therefore, Self-identity necessarily embodies difference. In order to maintain and assert identity, what is other, must be continually negated. Identity as Self, always presupposes mediation and negation. It is this mediation in otherness that is the fundamental process of

¹⁶ Heidegger, M., Identity and Difference, New York: Harper and Row, 1969, p.9

¹⁷ Ibid, p.23

¹⁸ Tugendhat, E., Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986, p. 51

Hegel's understanding of identity. Judith Butler stresses this, *"for Hegel, Self-identity is only rendered actual to the extent that it is mediated through that which is different."*¹⁹

To understand how the notion of difference is the necessary and sufficient principle for Self-identity, we can use an example from Vincent Descombes. Descombes suggests that a simple concept such as "the first", is only itself, only has meaning in view of the fact that it is not "the second", and so on, *"If from the first time onwards there was no difference, then the first time would not be the first time, for it would not be followed by the second time."*²⁰ He goes on to suggest that "the first" cannot be "the first" unaided, for it is in view of "the second" that "the first" is "the first". Similarly, the "human" Self can only be composed as a transcendent identity, if a conceptualisation of "nature" as an opposed immanence compliments it. As Derrida suggests, *"The same is the same only in being affected by the other."*²¹ For "humanity", for "humans"²², the Other is "nature".

Although the tradition that has been concerned with identity via negation and the assertion of difference, concentrates on the works of Hegel due to his clear emphasis on the relevant issues, it is also possible to suggest that even in Descartes' work we find the same concepts operating. In deconstructing Descartes' system, it is possible to argue that even his mediations, which were both supposed to focus exclusively upon his inner experiences so precious to his own being, and designed to overcome doubt imposed by the external world, never-the-less tacitly depend on difference in order to attain certainty of Self. The Cartesian assertion is that the soul is more than the material world, that it is not exhausted by the soulless mechanical realm. The Cartesian soul or Self, asserts "I am not that", "I am **more** than that".

Although Descartes' system has traditionally been seen as the epitome of Self-identity via inner examination, the structuring of a system of domination and transcendence through the conceptualisation of difference and opposition is clearly apparent. Descartes' Self or soul, secures its identity by opposition to the natural world. The soul is seen as purely transcendent rational beauty, while the body is mere mechanical automata. Not only is the human body **mere** mechanical automata, but so too is the rest of "nature". Descartes asserts that animals are "mere brutes" which do not possess the rational transcendent soul that separates "humans" from the rest of reality. It is possible to argue that it is in these transcendent hierarchical oppositions that the conceptualisation of difference necessary for, and resulting in, the domination of "nature", occurs. Here too, the positing of the transcendent

¹⁹ Butler, J.P., *Subjects of Desire*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 18

²⁰ Descombes, V., *Modern French Philosophy*, Cambridge 1980, p. 145

²¹ Derrida quoted in Descombes, V., *Ibid*, p. 147

²² Where the term human appears in inverted commas, it designates the notion of "human" previously defined as that which is more than "nature", that which is different to, and better than, "nature", rather than a species of nature.

superiority of the "human" Self or soul over that which is **mere** "nature", is clearly apparent. Although it may stretch his intentions, Descartes' system can thus alternatively be seen as another theory of "human" superiority over "nature", based on the difference secured via the negation of otherness. Once again, what is "human" is transcendent, special and different, while what is "nature", is lower, inferior and only of instrumental or "human" utilitarian value. Genevieve LLOYD presents a similar understanding, *"And Descartes, despite their many differences about knowledge, shared Bacon's vision of the "human" race becoming, through the advance of science, the masters and possessors of "nature".*"²³

In applying Hegel's text to aid in understanding the concept of Self, and how this construction relates to the status of contemporary Western "culture's" relationship to the environment, it is not to be assumed that the reading will perfectly reflect that relationship. The task is not to draw parallels between Hegel's exposition and our relationship to the environment, but to utilise the analysis as an instrumental tool. The aim is to offer an alternate conceptualisation of the relationship of Self to environment, which may offer new insights into that relationship. Inconsistencies with the Hegelian text, although important in themselves, may at times be necessary to highlight important aspects of the relationship. Likewise, in the use of commentaries, it is of less importance whether the particular interpretation is a "correct interpretation" of Hegel's theory. What is more important, is to use the commentaries to highlight characteristics of Self and how it relates to the environment. For instance, less importance will be placed on whether Kojève imposed his own meaning on the Hegelian text, rather it is Kojève's commentary on, say, desire, which will be stressed. Finally, there will be important areas of the text that will be disregarded, not because they are not recognised as being important, but because their importance relates to alternate areas of interest, such as inter-subjective "human" relations.

Hegel's text in question, "Phenomenology of Spirit", deals with the broader subject of the progression of "Reason" toward the "Absolute". Of the overall text, it will only be a limited segment which will be concentrated upon. Although it may be argued that the majority of the text is relevant to the present debate, the reading will be restricted to the section entitled, "The Truth of Self-Certainty", with only introductory and concluding comments in regard to the remainder of his system.

With reference to feminist philosophy, Genevieve Lloyd suggests *"The two struggles - master - slave and male - female . . . should be taken in conjunction. They are, of course, not meant to be chronologically related. Rather they represent similar 'moments' in different versions of the story of spirits unfolding from "nature"."*²⁴ Similarly, it will not be argued that the relation of Self to environment, or "nature", is the actual story of the

²³ Lloyd, G., The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy, Methuen, p. 56.

²⁴ LLOYD, G., "Masters, Slaves and Others", in Radical Philosophy, Summer, 1983, p. 5

Phenomenology, rather, it is one expression of the unfolding of Reason. Just as the male-female struggle can be seen as one manifestation of the Phenomenology, the relation between "humanity" and "nature", is another.

In reading below the surface of the Phenomenology we will find the concept of "nature" hard at work. To reveal its existence it will be necessary to burrow below the superficial meaning apparent in the text and expose the repressed determinants which are operating. It is not in a single place or disguised as a single notion that "nature" finds its expression, rather it has a multiplicity of representations, operating sometimes contradictorily, conjunctively and consecutively.

The fundamental premise of Hegel's entire system is that the underlying "nature" of reality is a unified wholeness. All of reality is implied in what seem to be the determinate autonomous elements of reality. What was determinate, becomes indeterminate, as it reveals that it embodies within itself, that which it is not. The realisation of the unity of reality will only take place with the progression of Reason via the synthesis of these oppositions. Although Hegel stresses there is a realisation or "actualisation" of unity, all along the "seed" for that conclusion exists. For Hegel, there are two primary modes of being, "Substance" and "Subject". It is in the synthesis of this opposition, which he sees the manifestation of the arrival at the Absolute.

It could be argued that the Hegelian presupposition of unity is a result of his adherence to Spinoza's system. In Spinoza's system, only one substance exists, "God", which has two modes of actuality. Hegel essentially adopts Spinoza's hypothesis, and asserts a merging of these modes in what he calls "Self-realised substance". That is, for Hegel, *"everything turns on grasping and expressing the True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject."*²⁵ It seems that in the Phenomenology, Hegel has taken seriously the importance Spinoza placed upon obtaining an "adequate idea" of substance.

Jean Hyppolite states, *"the problem which the Phenomenology poses is not one of world history but that of the education of the specific individual who must, necessarily, be formed to knowledge by becoming aware of what Hegel calls his substance."*²⁶ This interpretation reveals that the purpose and aim of the Phenomenology is not one of descriptive philosophy, but rather one of prescriptive or normative philosophy. The Phenomenology sets forth a form, which if followed, will enable the individual to reach Self-realised spirit, the arrival at an absolute conclusion. It is a journey, a pilgrimage of consciousness, which is intended to carry the phenomenological reader to the point of arrival.²⁷ Judith Butler states that *"At the close of the Phenomenology, the philosopher is no longer "Other" . . . for that distinction*

²⁵ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 10

²⁶ Hyppolite, J., Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 39

²⁷ The Phenomenological reader must be included in this process for it to be successful, rather than being a mere observer.

would announce an "outside" to that ostensibly all inclusive unity."²⁸

It will be suggested that the "conclusion" or "arrival", is the ultimate ideal satisfaction for the desire of the Self. It is the end of progress, the end of becoming, the aim and purpose of the Self. But as previously suggested, we will attempt to penetrate behind the facade of this "arrival", this "end point", to establish whether it is a true conclusion, or whether it disguises a repressed and sublimated "return to origins". The reason why this is relevant will be outlined in further discussions.

Although it will be argued that the theme of the Phenomenology is normative, it is impossible to deny (and indeed we would not want to deny), that in another sense the Phenomenology is descriptive. The consciously expressed movement of the Phenomenology is in fact descriptive. It articulates the process of the development of Self Consciousness, from an historical state, to its present status, to a future state. What will be proposed is normative, is the deeper expression of unconscious motives. That is, the meaning which is embodied within the text, which is the expressed unconscious desires of the historical subject, Hegel. What is the subject doing behind the scenes, what is the purpose and intention of the text, what is its hidden agenda?

In Hegel's terms, progression is the progression of Consciousness, as Self, via Reason, to the "Absolute". To quote Hyppolite again, "*The Phenomenology is the concrete, explicit development and formation of the individual, the rise of the finite Self to absolute Self.*"²⁹ This "absolute Self", can alternatively be seen as a whole, complete or perfect Self. The Self moves from being finite, to consuming within itself, all that is external to it. The project is to reformulate all external relations as internal ones. In other words, to make what is other to Self, as part of Self. In this context, we will suggest that the aim is to reformulate the environment, as that which is external to Self, as part of Self or as an internal element of Self. That is, to consume all that is "nature" within Self, or to externalise Self in "nature", thereby transforming what was "nature" into Self.

We will recall that Descartes believed he had found a sure foundation for knowledge in the assertion, "I think therefore I am". Our task in analysing Hegel, is to answer the question posed by Kojève, "*I think therefore I am; but what am I?*"³⁰ What is this "I"? Where does its energy come from? What is its aim? How does this "I" relate to that which is "not I"? We will take seriously the question Kierkegaard once posed, "*where is the director* (the

²⁸ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 22

²⁹ Hyppolite, J., Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 41

³⁰ Kojève, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p. 33

Self or I)? *I should like to have a word with him.*"³¹ The life of the subject, Self or "I", is our principal concern.

Kojeve believed that the problem with Descartes' program was that *"Descartes fixed his attention on the "think", completely neglecting the "I".*³² Kojeve goes on to suggest that it is the "I" which is central. It is Self Consciousness, as reflective awareness of "I" which makes "humans" special or unique, *"there is no "human" existence without Consciousness of the external world. But for there truly to be human existence, capable of becoming philosophic existence, there must also be Self Consciousness. And for there to be Self Consciousness, there must be this specifically human thing.*"³³ For Kojeve, it is Self Consciousness which makes humans not only special, but superior. It is this which makes us truly "human".

The protagonist of the Phenomenology is not the static fixed "subject" of contemporary thought. It can only be understood in appreciating the movement and change it undergoes. While it is common to attempt to concretise the focus of the Phenomenology, due to the threatening "nature" of a subject which is ontologically uncertain resulting from its dynamic "nature", Hegel's protagonist is one which at first is not a subject, then is a subject at least conceptually, to one which finally consumes subjectivity itself. Judith Butler suggests that the desire to give the Self determinate form, is an expression of *"the Understanding's compulsion to fix the grammatical subject into a univocal and static signifier."*³⁴ In fact it is difficult to state with certainty whether for Hegel, there is a real subject at all, or only a conceptual one: one configured by symbolic thought, through the Understanding.

Initially in the Phenomenology, only Consciousness exists. It is a "Self-sameness". At this stage there is no Self Consciousness and consequently no opposition of subject to object. Kojeve suggests there is no opposition of the *"I to the not I, of the "human" to the natural."*³⁵ It is only with Self Consciousness, that these hierarchical oppositions are created. We could go so far as to assert that it is in the process of becoming Self Conscious, that hierarchical oppositions must necessarily be erected.

The elementary stage of Consciousness is characterised by the pure knowledge of Being. It is the contemplative absorption in sensory phenomena.³⁶ It could alternatively be conceptualised as pure "Participating Consciousness". This "natural" Consciousness, is not natural in the sense that it is organic, rather in the sense that it is pure, whole, perfect, or without

³¹ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 22

³² Kojeve, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p. 36

³³ Ibid, p. 36

³⁴ Butler, J.P., Op. cit., p. 18

³⁵ Kojeve, A., Op. cit., p. 36

³⁶ There is disagreement among commentators as to how this section of the text should be interpreted

difference. What is true for Consciousness, the content of Consciousness, is something other than itself; it is immersed in the Other. As Hegel; comments *"what is true for Consciousness is something other than itself."*³⁷

Prior to Self Consciousness, the individual is filled by what it is, it is absorbed in experience. The world appears conceptually undifferentiated.³⁸ It is more than mere absorption of the subject in the object, there is no subject or object. They as yet do not exist. Although in interpreting this notion Kojève appears a little too unsure to state it categorically, his intention is clear, *"He forgets himself, he thinks only about the thing being contemplated; he thinks neither about his contemplation, nor and even less about himself, his I, his Self. The more he is conscious of the thing, the less he is conscious of himself. He may perhaps talk about the thing, but he will never talk about himself; in his discourse, the word I will not occur."*³⁹ At this point there is no Self, no Self Consciousness. It is important to stress that this is not a non-sentient form of existence. Perception, feeling and action are in no way effected. All normal processes are undertaken, the only difference being that the Self has not yet been conceptualised.

Prior to the development of Self Consciousness, the status of Consciousness is characterised by immersion in sensory phenomena. The subject and object are merged, they are undifferentiated. Consciousness is not **of** the other, but **is** the other, or rather, there is no Self or Other, there just *is*. There is *"no opposition of subject to object."*⁴⁰ Although at times Hegel hints or seems to imply that Sense-Certainty does embody a Self, this interpretation (if this meaning is indeed Hegel's true intention), is faulty. As previously suggested, we will assume that Self and Self Consciousness refer to identical concepts. The "Self", is merely "Self Consciousness". There is nothing more to the existence of Self than the existence of reflective non-participating consciousness. The existence of Self is exhausted by reflective consciousness. We have no inkling of Self, without consciousness of consciousness, without reflection.

Although there are conflicting elements, the thrust of the initial section suggests that the narrative is subjectless. Butler highlights this, *"We begin the Phenomenology with a sense that the main character has not yet arrived. There is action and deliberation, but no recognisable agent."*⁴¹ We have all

³⁷ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1979, p. 166

³⁸ It is important to note that this stage, where there is no difference, no negation, must be **before** the beginning of the journey of consciousness. For the dialectic to move, for there to be action, there must be negation. There is a difficulty here for Hegel in getting the process to start in the first place. Whence does the power of the negative arise, what is its initial source before it comes into being.

³⁹ Kojève, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p.37

⁴⁰ Ibid, p. 36

⁴¹ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987,p. 20

the usual elements except reflective Consciousness, Self Consciousness or Self. Consciousness has not yet posited an object. It has not made itself other to itself, there is no subjective agent.

Since there is no subject of object, no Self or other, it would be fair to say that "nature" does not exist. It would be inaccurate to say that Consciousness, being immersed in "nature", is "nature", for "nature", arises with the conceptualisation of opposition via negation. Consciousness is merely immersed in experience, in the here and now. The conceptualisation of "nature" only takes place with Self Consciousness. The individual exists harmoniously with, and does not destroy or consume "nature"⁴², for "nature" does not exist as an opposition. It does not yet exist as an Other which must be negated and destroyed. "Humanity" and "nature" are one, they are undifferentiated. The two concepts do not exist.

Jacques Derrida expresses a similar sentiment, *"Ever since I had a relation to my body, I was not my body. Ever since there was my body, I was something Other to my body."*⁴³ It is only since we have had a relation to "nature", only since we have not been immersed (not **immersed in "nature"**, but simply **immersed**, for in being immersed there is no "nature", there simply is), that we have not been "nature". Ever since there was "nature", we have been something Other than "nature". Ever since we characterised ourselves as "cultural", this has been other to "nature". By speaking, by conceptualising, we create an "Other", we leave something out and at the same time appropriate meaning. It is in the act of reflection or conceptualisation that the split between "nature" and "humanity" came into being. In defining something we fall into the trap of concurrently, and often unconsciously, positing an Other. Even in this instance, we have not adequately avoided the conceptualisation of "nature" as other.

Hegel himself expresses the incommensurability of the thing in and out of the unity from which it arose, *"Just as to talk of the unity of subject and object, of finite and infinite, of being and thought, etc is inept, since object and subject, etc signify what they are outside of their unity, and since in their unity they are not meant to be what their expression says they are."*⁴⁴ Since in the unity the thing is itself, in virtue of the fact that it is not conceptualised, it is impossible to even talk of a thing in its original unity, without contradiction. Simply to talk of the unity of concepts in a unified state is impossible and meaningless. Similarly, to conceptualise from a unified state would destroy that unity.

It is at the stage of Consciousness that the groundwork for Self Consciousness is laid. Hegel assumes that Consciousness comes to

⁴² We are reminded time and again that we as historical subjects, carry with us the ideological luggage of our time. To even talk of "nature", we contradict our intentions.

⁴³ Derrida, J., *Writing and Difference*, Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1978, p. 180

⁴⁴ Hegel, F., *Phenomenology Of Spirit*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p.

experience the sensory world as something *before it*, as marked off in some way from it. It comes to see itself as the 'framework' for the unity of the sensory "theatre". Although Consciousness is absorbed in the sensory world and enthralled by it, it does not identify with it. It appears to be the drive for identity as Self, which sets Consciousness on its pilgrimage. It cannot identify with the sensory world as it has no determinate or particular form, all is reduced to universals. It must construct determinate identity from the indeterminate form it is confronted by. In order to construct identity it must make what is before it determinate, it must unify an Other. It is mediation in alterity that makes determinate form and identity as Self, possible, and it is only through alterity that Consciousness sees what is "before it", as other to itself.

Conceptual thought via the "Understanding", transforms what is indeterminate into that which is determinate. It constructs a unity from the multiple forms before it, and posits this unity as an Other. The Understanding structures difference, it is the *"most astonishing and mightiest of powers, or rather the absolute power."*⁴⁵ It is the formulation of difference which is the root of all power. Difference is the necessary and sufficient condition of power. The "Other" is the focus not only of power, but also of desire. It is the "Other" as the focus of power, conceptualised as "nature", which is paramount.

This movement of positing a separation between Consciousness and its world, is the product of "Force". It is Force which *"is essential to the transition from Consciousness to Self Consciousness because it posits the externality of the world of sensuous and perceptual reality . . . Force posits externalisation as a necessary movement of thought"*.⁴⁶ Force becomes the bond between Consciousness and the external world. From the conceptualisation of determinate form and thus difference, Force is able to forge a separation between Consciousness and the world.

It is in this movement to alterity that Consciousness must alienate itself. In order to be able to reflect on Consciousness, it must make itself other to itself, *"As Hegel sees, the appearance of the Other is indispensable to the very existence of Self Consciousness."*⁴⁷ The formation of an object is the genesis of the Self, of Self Consciousness and of the subject, *"Consciousness of an "other", of an object in general, is itself necessarily Self Consciousness, a reflectedness-into-Self, Consciousness of itself in its otherness."*⁴⁸ That is, the Other is actually a part of the same, but in forming an object, Consciousness is able to see itself as that object. The object or the Other, is in fact a part of the totality of Consciousness, rather than being distinct from it. Similarly, the distinction between "nature" and Self is a constructed illusion.

⁴⁵ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 18

⁴⁶ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 26

⁴⁷ Lloyd, G., "Masters, Slaves and Others", in Radical Philosophy, Summer, 1983, p. 5

⁴⁸ Hegel, F., Op. cit, p. 102

Consciousness negates itself to become Self conscious. It is Self conscious in that it is conscious of itself as an object for itself. We will subsequently see that Consciousness later transforms the projection of itself as an object, into another Self Consciousness.

Hegel suggests a thing is determinate only so far as it is different from another thing, *"To wit if the many determinate properties were strictly indifferent from one another, if they were simply and solely self related, they would not be determinate; for they are only determinate in so far as they differentiate themselves from one another, and relate themselves to the other."*⁴⁹ The aim of Self, is to give itself determinate form in the world, and hence it must differentiate itself, for itself to exist. Clearly this already seems contradictory for it does not differentiate itself, for its Self, does not yet exist. What is differentiated is the same. The differentiation is a differentiation of thought, a conceptualisation, a difference which is not a difference.

What has become apparent is *"the tremendous power of the negative; it is the energy of thought, of the pure I."*⁵⁰ Identity for Self Consciousness gains its status through negating the unified form before it. The existence of the unified forms, are dependant on Self Consciousness, *"Self Consciousness alone is the truth of those shapes."*⁵¹ There is no **real** difference, the truth, and even the existence, of the Other, of the determinate forms, is a product of Self Consciousness. Again we see that the concept of "nature", is a construct of Self Consciousness. It is not an ontological category outside of its conceptualisation. Likewise the Self, has no ontological existence outside of its conceptualisation through the mediation of alterity.

The movement to Self Consciousness and Self Consciousness itself, is a construction of thought. It is created out of the undifferentiated fluid unity. Butler stresses this point, *"Self Consciousness is not the momentary act of a discreet Consciousness attending an opposing and discrete world, but a cognitive experience taking place in a developing sense of time."*⁵² The experience of Self Consciousness is a result of a conceptualisation, a movement of the mind.

Thus although the process of alienation posits an Other to allow the Self to exist, this Other is in fact not other, but part of the same. Consciousness is aware of this ambiguous contradiction, *"I distinguish myself from myself, and in doing so I am directly aware that what is distinguished from myself is not different. I, the Self-same being, repel myself from myself; but what is posited as distinct from me, or unlike me, is immediately, in being so distinguished, not a distinction from me."*⁵³

⁴⁹ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 69

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 19

⁵¹ Ibid, p. 102

⁵² Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 28

⁵³ Hegel, F., Op. cit, p. 102

The Movement to Self Consciousness

Hegel directly addresses the question of Self Consciousness in Section 4, "The Truth of Self-Certainty". He opens the section by stating, "*In the previous modes of certainty what is true for Consciousness is something other than itself. But the Notion of this truth vanishes in the experience of it.*"⁵⁴ It is in this way of speaking that Hegel himself, reveals how committed he is to the opposition of Consciousness and its world, the opposition of Self and Other. If we read closely and carefully between the lines, we find that Hegel posits an identity for Consciousness as separate and autonomous. Consciousness and its experience are different. Although Consciousness may not itself be aware of the difference, via the awareness of itself, Hegel never-the-less allows the ontological certainty of the autonomy and separateness of Consciousness and the world. It seems that the subject Hegel, cannot accept the non-identity of Consciousness. Rather than suggesting merely that the "Notion of the truth vanishes", it is possible to alternatively reformulate this as, "In this mode of being, Consciousness is referred to the Other, and in the experience of it, the Other vanishes as Consciousness is merged with it. Only experience of the here and now exists".

As previously noted, it is in the move to Self Consciousness, that Consciousness must alienate itself from itself, in order to be its own object. It must posit an Other which is separate to itself. In the act of reflection the subject, "*splits itself.*"⁵⁵ Although Self Consciousness is a "*Knowing of Itself*"⁵⁶, it must have an Other in order to be itself. This Other is the externality of Consciousness and becomes the object. For Self Consciousness it "*has the character of a negative*".⁵⁷ It sees that it is more than the vanishing moments, that it is not exhausted by them. It asserts "I am not that, I am more than that."

It is this splitting which is the origin of the differentiation of "humans" and other animals, "*the animal does not really transcend itself as given. . . . it has no distance with respect to itself in order to contemplate itself*"⁵⁸ In moving to Self Consciousness, Consciousness steps out of "*the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the night-like void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the present.*"⁵⁹ It places a distance between itself and itself, it reflects upon itself.

⁵⁴ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 104

⁵⁵ Hyppolite, J., Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 46

⁵⁶ Hegel, F., Op. cit., p. 104

⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 105

⁵⁸ Kojeve, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p. 39

⁵⁹ Hegel, F., Op. cit. p. 111

The movement is both one of positing an Other and in another sense a return from otherness, *"Self Consciousness is the reflection out of the being of the world of sense and perception, and is essentially the return from otherness."*⁶⁰ It is the latter in that the truth of the previous mode of being, was characterised by Consciousness of the other. In the new mode it attempts to know itself, to be conscious of Consciousness, to make itself certain, but can only do this by having an Other, the object. We must also ask whether Hegel has made an unconscious slip by suggesting it is a *"return from otherness"*. To return from somewhere it is necessary to have been at the place before. We cannot return without having left. Is it a return, or is it rather an "emergence from otherness"?

It is Self Consciousness which makes us uniquely "human". Kojève is unequivocal, *"Man is Self Consciousness. He is conscious of himself, conscious of his human reality and dignity; and it is in this that he is essentially different to animals."*⁶¹ To attain this state Kojève suggests that we must enter a state of reflective Consciousness, *"The man who contemplates is "absorbed" by what he contemplates; the "knowing subject" "loses" himself in the object that is known. Contemplation reveals the object not the subject."*⁶² In participating consciousness we are immersed in the object, we are not Self conscious as we are not reflectively aware of Consciousness. To be conscious, alienation must take place, so we can reflect on the Self.

Kojève argues that human consciousness remains indistinguishable from other animal consciousness, until it asserts its reflexivity in the form of alienation and Self expression. Prior to this Self constituting act, "human" consciousness like animal consciousness remains absorbed in the objects which it contemplates. It is not until the Self is displaced, that it is able to learn something about itself.

Hegel states that the difference which is Self Consciousness, *"is in itself, no difference."*⁶³ It is only an "appearance". The truth of Self Consciousness is the unity of it with itself, *"What alone has importance is the difference posited by thought, or the difference which from the very first is not distinct from myself."*⁶⁴

Hegel goes on to make one of his frequently quoted statements, *"this unity must become essential to Self Consciousness, i.e. Self Consciousness is Desire in general."*⁶⁵ In coming to assert that "I am not that", Consciousness

⁶⁰ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 105

⁶¹ Kojève, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p. 3

⁶² Ibid, p. 3

⁶³ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 105

⁶⁴ Ibid, p. 121

⁶⁵ Ibid, p. 105

comes to experience the Other as a lack, as something missing, an absence. Self Consciousness will try to encompass that lack, try to consume it. Stanley Rosen offers an excellent articulation of the process, "*spirit divides itself into an inner and outer world. We become alienated from ourselves or regard our true Self as contained in the object outside us, which we desire to assimilate. Desire is thus fundamentally for myself, or for my interior essence from which I have become detached.*"⁶⁶ The paradoxical problem for Self Consciousness, is how to make what appears as other to Self, which is actually a part of the same, as a feature of Self Consciousness which is characterised by alterity.

The aim and desire of Self Consciousness is always for that which is other to Self. In Butler's words, "*its desire is always for a more expanded version of Self.*"⁶⁷ It is through the partial and passing satisfactions of desire, that Self Consciousness is "*able to gain a more expanded and expansive identity.*"⁶⁸ The journeying subject of the Phenomenology never relinquishes its desire to internalise what is external in order to achieve a more inclusive being.

The subject is in a paradox for it must have an Other for it to exist, but seeks perpetually to negate that Other. To this extent the Self's project is never ending. It is faced by the permanency of desire. Although Self Consciousness seeks an ever expanded sense of Self, it never-the-less is the agent of differentiation which is the cause of its limited essence. Self Consciousness can not achieve either of its goals; to be an all inclusive unity; or to posit a real Other which is not part of the same. Being constituted by desire, Self Consciousness finds itself founded on contradiction. It becomes a passion divided against itself. It both desires reconciliation with the Other, at the same time as requiring the perpetuation of that Other. Self Consciousness unhappily finds itself outside itself in search of Self recovery.

We must ask what must the world be like for desire to exist? For a subject to experience a loss and absence, the thing must have at one point been there. Self estrangement is implicit in the experience of desire. The shift of focus which occurs in the movement of alienation to Self Consciousness, is the root of desire. The subject is filled with a sense of having lost a part of its being, of something it had as being missing. The subject is filled with the presence of the absence of this departed part of its being and it wants it back. For ever after it seeks to regain its lost unity.

Therefore, as suggested, Desire is, in general, a lack, an absence, something missing or incomplete. Desire reveals an emptiness in our being, an absence in our Self. As Stanley Rosen remarks, "*part of the Self is encountered outside oneself.*"⁶⁹ The "I", is a "*greedy emptiness.*"⁷⁰ It is a desire for

⁶⁶ Rosen quoted in Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 45

⁶⁷ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 34

⁶⁸ Ibid, p.35

⁶⁹ Rosen, Op. cit., p. 25

something which once was but now is not. In the other, Self Consciousness sees that which will make it complete, that which will make it whole. It sees the other as signifying its own ontological rupture. Thus it seeks to overcome the other by negating, destroying or consuming it within itself, *"only through the death of the other will Self Consciousness retrieve its claim to autonomy."*⁷¹ Any thing which is other to Self must be annihilated. For Gadamer, the object of Self conscious desire is life, *"precisely because the object for the Consciousness of desire is "everything else".*⁷² Self Consciousness as a process of objectification of Self, is perpetual desire, to be Self conscious, is to desire. For Self Consciousness, desire can never be satisfied, *"the object of desire is always brought into existence again."*⁷³

For Hegel it is desire which makes us aware of our being, which makes us Self conscious.⁷⁴ In desire we are made aware of our existence, by being wrenched out of immersion in sensory phenomena, *"The man who is "absorbed" by the object that he is contemplating can be brought "back to himself" only by a Desire. . . The desire of a being is what constitutes that being as I".*⁷⁵ Desire structures the subject/object opposition by positing an object which is opposed to the subject, and desired by that subject. It is the "I" which is conceptualised as different from the "non I", which is desired. The being of Self Consciousness therefore *"implies and presupposes Desire."*⁷⁶

It is desire which moves us to action. It is the source of energy which fuels our drive to satisfy its thirst. Through action we hope to satisfy desire. We change from being passive to being active. Desire seeks to consume, destroy or transform its object. Desire's instrument for satisfaction is negation, *"all action is negating. Far from leaving the given as it is, action destroys it; if not in its being, at least in its given form."*⁷⁷ The object of desire is the Other. To satisfy desire, this Other must be negated by being destroyed, consumed or transformed. The existence of the Other is both the essence of Self Consciousness itself, and the *"source of the suffering of the emergent subject."*⁷⁸ In Self Consciousness, power and desire come together in the destructive drive toward unity. Where the other is conceptualised as "nature", the result is the destruction of what is considered to have an autonomy outside of "humanity".

⁷⁰ Kojeve, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p. 39

⁷¹ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p.49

⁷² Gadamer, H.G., Essays on Hegel's Dialectic, Yale University Press, 1970, p. 60

⁷³ Ibid, p. 60

⁷⁴ Once again we see Hegel's Spinozian roots. It was Spinoza who stated that "Desire is the very essence of man" The Ethics Part IV

⁷⁵ Kojeve, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p. 3

⁷⁶ Ibid p. 4

⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 4

⁷⁸ Butler, J.P., Op. cit., p. 34

For Kojève, "human" desire is non-natural in so far as it exhibits alienation: in so far as the Self is outside itself. Natural phenomena lack the internal negation constitutive of "human" desire. Since the subject is also created through desire, it is *"in this sense, a non-natural Self."*⁷⁹ It is important to stress that the subject does not precede its desire, then gains a reflection of their Self through that desire. Rather, on the contrary, the subject is defined by desire.

Self Consciousness is threatened by the otherness of the unity of the sensual world. The subject wants a unity with itself as a whole. It seeks to destroy the other after finding itself within that other. Self Consciousness seeks to formulate a unity by making what is other, Self. It must make this other essential to its own being. It seeks to assure itself of its own essential essence by negating the essential essence of the Other. In Gadamer's words, *"it proves this nullity to itself by destroying the other."*⁸⁰ To forge this unity of itself with the world, to make itself certain, to be sure of its existence, it destroys the Other or at least its otherness. Where it does not actually destroy the Other, it consumes it into its own being. The necessity of annihilation, is due to Hegel's suggestion that everything which exists does so by excluding what it is not.

The act of destruction, annihilation or consumption of the other, is the work of the Self. In Hyppolite words, *"the fact is, that this power of the negative is ultimately nothing else but an activity of the Self, since as Self it is negative and it may also be said that it is the thinking operating on this side, which effects this dissolution of self sameness into dissimilarity."*⁸¹

Hegel suggests that this knowledge has a long history although it has not found a definite articulation, *"The ancients conceived the void as the principle of motion, for they rightly saw the moving principle as the negative, though they did not as yet grasp that the negative is the Self. Now although this negative appears at first as a disparity between the I and its object, it is just as much the disparity of the substance with itself. What seems to happen outside of it, to be an activity directed against it, is really its own doing."*⁸² This is a particularly revealing statement. Self comes out of substance, it is not eternal, but a conceptualisation of the Understanding. "Nature" as other, is likewise a conceptualisation of Self. The notion that "nature's" interests and ours conflict, is itself a product of the drive for Self certainty. We conceptualise "nature" as an other, and as such we must struggle against it. Its interests must, by necessity, be in conflict with ours. Indeed, we, as Self Consciousness', create this conflict.

⁷⁹ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 67

⁸⁰ Gadamer, H.G., Essays on Hegel's Dialectic, Yale University Press, 1970, p. 60

⁸¹ Hyppolite, J., Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 47

⁸² Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p.

In destroying "nature" we do not actually destroy nature, for this would be impossible and would in fact be our own destruction as part of the same self-sameness. What then do we destroy? What we destroy is the essence which provides the autonomy of the **concept**, as conceptualised. The concept "nature", is the natural world existing autonomously outside of the life of "humanity". What we wish to do is to destroy the integrity of the concept, by making "nature", "human". We do this by bringing it into our control, by assimilating or domesticating it. We seek to destroy "nature" as an independent entity, as an object of our desire. It is "nature" as external to "humanity", as other to our Self, which is the object of desire. Not nature, as manifest say in, "human nature", but "nature" when conceptualised as Other. The other to the subject, is *"an other in thought."*⁸³ In Hyppolite's words, *"this other is brought into the Self, so that this Self thereby proves itself a principle which possesses itself in total freedom from any determinacy on the part of "nature", and exists in complete Self mastery in the absoluteness so understood."*⁸⁴ This does not only relate to the conceptualisation of "nature", but also to other conceptualised oppositions.

Self Consciousness is not characterised by a specific desire, as in hunger, but is *"Desire in general"*. It is something *"relatively indifferent."*⁸⁵ The object of desire is not fixed, it is anything which is other to Self. Where animal desire has a fixed object, "human" desire is polymorphously perverse. That is, its object is undefined, the Self is permeated by desire, by a yearning for satisfaction. Every satisfaction is but the origin of a new desire. As one desire is satisfied another arises to take its place. The object of desire is the Other which it recognises as essential to Self. Although that Other must be destroyed or consumed as Self sees it as essential to its own being, nevertheless, it requires an otherness to be Self conscious at all, *"Only if this other exists can Self Consciousness find satisfaction in negating it."*⁸⁶ Hence, Self Consciousness is the perpetual positing and overcoming of otherness through temporary satisfaction. Self Consciousness becomes confronted by a proliferation of objects of desire which are necessary for its own certainty. In order for Self Consciousness to gain a determinate existence, *"it must continually pursue an indefinite domain of alterity."*⁸⁷

In Desire we are transformed from "being" to "becoming", *"the very being of the I is becoming"*.⁸⁸ What was static, now seeks a satisfaction, a conclusion, a making whole or perfect. Desire pushes us forward toward that conclusion.

⁸³ Hyppolite, J., Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 44

⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 38

⁸⁵ Gadamer, H.G., Essays on Hegel's Dialectic, Yale University Press, 1970, p. 60

⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 61

⁸⁷ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 39

⁸⁸ Kojeve, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p. 5

It is relentless in pursuit of its object. Preference is given to "progress" and "growth", as expressions of the movement toward that state. They become good in their own right, for they signal a transition to an arrival or satisfaction. For Self Consciousness, as desire in general, and which seeks to consume all that is other, this satisfaction or arrival can only take place when we arrive at the Absolute. The status at which all is Self, where all that was other, is now Self.

Self Consciousness' object as the negative, has *"returned into itself"*⁸⁹ The movement of Self Consciousness is a double movement, one of Self Consciousness reflecting into itself, and the second of the other reflecting into itself. In this reflection, the other (the world of sense and perception), is bestowed the appearance of Life, *"What Self Consciousness distinguishes from itself as having being, also has in it, in so far as it is posited as being, not merely the character of sense-certainty and perception, but it is being that is reflected into itself, and the object of immediate desire is a living thing."*⁹⁰

Self Consciousness sets into motion the paradox which confronts it. What results is the antithesis of Self Consciousness and Life; *"the former is the unity for which the infinite unity of the differences is; the latter, however, is the unity itself."*⁹¹ Self Consciousness posits the Other as a living thing. In applying this, we see that "nature" is posited as a living unity by Self Consciousness. "Nature", being immanence as Life, and "humanity", transcendent as Self Consciousness. The conferring of the unity of Life upon "nature", gives it the semblance of intentionality, of a directionally intentional being. Hegel's subject, having assumed that its proper object is Life, a living thing, subscribes to its object a primitive form of pantheism which attributes creative and intentional powers to the objective external world, which in this case, is "nature".

It is at this stage that an opposition is polarised between Life and Self Consciousness in the form of Life as "nature", and Self Consciousness as "culture". Life and Self Consciousness are but two modes of the one concept, "unity in difference". Consciousness recognises that in Life it is but a vanishing moment which will be consumed. That is, "nature" consumes all, as all is nature. The "I" will perish to this progression of moments, to "nature", if it does not assert its certainty in transcendence. The polarisation results in an antagonism between Life and Self Consciousness. Life appears as a monolith, self sufficient, impervious, and "human" desire a futile humiliating enterprise. It appears that we have come to an end point where "human" reality is expressed as Fichte's insatiable longing. Instead, Hegel leads Self Consciousness to conceptualise a struggle between itself and Life, to determine which will be victor, which will be encompasser. Where Life is related to and conceptualised as "nature", Self Consciousness plunges into a battle of its own making. It refuses to be consumed by "nature" and instead

⁸⁹ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1979, p.

106

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 106

⁹¹ Ibid, p. 106

drives to consume it.⁹²

The life and death struggle which will later arise between Self Consciousness', is complemented by a struggle against Life, against "nature", in which each must prove that they have no need for "nature" and are in no way attached to it. What we will see is the supposition of a paradoxical struggle of Nature as another Self Consciousness, against "nature" as Life.

Self Consciousness, yearning from its essential poverty, must consume Life in order to assert its own essence as more essential. In trying to overcome Life and "nature" as a whole, Self Consciousness accepts that this is a useless enterprise and instead pursues its object as a particular determinate manifestation. In destroying particular living objects, in negating their existence, Self Consciousness asserts that the object no longer exists and finds satisfaction in the accomplishment. Subsequently, Self Consciousness conceptualises itself positively as the agent of this action. In this positive action, through destroying a living form, *"Self Consciousness gives itself a positive form as an agent of destruction."*⁹³ Self Consciousness comes to know itself and its existence as being in essence, an agency of destruction, only able to gain a reality and Self certainty through the destruction and consumption of living things. It only knows itself as that which *"consumes alterity."*⁹⁴ Through the dramatisation of destruction and consumption, Self Consciousness momentarily avoids the reality that it is in essence a vacuum waiting to be filled. For a moment it assumes the positive reality it is after.

Like Self Consciousness, Life is in essence the infinite supersession of difference. In Life, all distinctions are dissolved into a fluidity or universal flux, *"all distinctions in the living organism pass away in flux"*⁹⁵ Unlike Self Consciousness, difference is not internalised as a Self actualisation. Life and "nature" are not subjective but immanent. It is fluidity or pure movement. In Life, the individual members are only individual in that they are in the unity of "nature", conceptualised as Other by Self Consciousness. The individual members appear as *"something determinate, only for an other"*.⁹⁶ The "other" of Life or "nature", is Self Consciousness, or "humanity". It is Self Consciousness which posits the conceptual difference of the individual members, to enable it to supersede them. Indeed, it must continually posit the unity, as the essential character of Life, is movement or flux. The unity is continually dissolving so must be reformulated. The shapes themselves, *"have no being in themselves, no enduring existence."*⁹⁷ The Other which

⁹² Note this is "nature" with a small 'n', not with a capital N. It is natural existence, life, immersion in things, not Nature which is conceptualised as an other Self.

⁹³ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 37

⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 40

⁹⁵ J. N. Findlay quoted in Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979 p.519

⁹⁶ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 107

⁹⁷ Ibid, p. 107

Self Consciousness posits, is not a real unified Other, but a conceptual Other, and as such must be continually restated. Hegel is unequivocal that identity arises via the construction of difference out of no difference, "*this dividedness of the differenceless fluid medium is just what establishes individuality.*"⁹⁸

The movement of the shapes of the fundamental fluid medium is characterised by the dissolution of difference and identity. Difference and individuality is consumed resulting in the in-itself gaining a feeling of its unity with itself, "*what is consumed is the essence: the individuality which maintains itself at the expense of the universal and which gives itself the feeling of its unity with itself, just by so doing supersedes its antithesis to the other by means of which it exists for itself.*"⁹⁹

In accordance with what was previously noted, Self Consciousness can only make itself certain by negating what is other to itself. It desires to overcome and destroy what appears to be independent and autonomous. Hegel states, "*Self Consciousness is thus certain of itself only by superseding this other that presents itself to Self Consciousness as an independent life; Self Consciousness is Desire. . . . it destroys the independent object and thereby gives itself the certainty of itself as a true certainty.*"¹⁰⁰ The articulate forms which seem to stand opposed to Self Consciousness must be abolished in order to assert Self. This becomes a perpetual and self defeating enterprise for Self Consciousness, as it both; requires the Other for certainty of Self, but is also characterised by the desire to destroy that other, "*the very being of Self Consciousness demands that there be an independent other to thus overcome.*"¹⁰¹ In order for Self Consciousness to overcome the other, there must be an other. As soon as Self Consciousness consumes the Other, it lapses back into immersion in Life, immersion in the other out of which it originally rose. Satisfaction of desire is impossible. Self Consciousness becomes a precarious unstable state, dependant on the continual negation of otherness. Self Consciousness continually remakes the object over again, Self Consciousness is desire, "*it produces the object again, and the desire as well.*"¹⁰² The independence of the Other, of any thing other or independent of Self Consciousness, is the root of desire, but this other is vital for Self Consciousness. Indeed Self Consciousness comes to recognise that its project is a futile enterprise for there are potentially an infinite number of living determinant things which must be negated or consumed. Self Consciousness cannot gain the monopoly which it has been seeking.

⁹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 108

⁹⁹ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press,1979, p. 108

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p. 109

¹⁰¹ LLoyd, G., "Masters, Slaves and Others", in Radical Philosophy, Summer, 1983, p. 4

¹⁰² Hegel, F., Op. cit., p. 109

Nature as Self Consciousness

In recognition of this inability to overcome desire through annihilation of the other, Self Consciousness realises that it must have an other which negates itself. It realises that it must have an other which is a Self Consciousness itself. Hegel suggests that in this final movement Consciousness posits an object which negates itself, that is, a Self Consciousness, "*Consciousness has for its object one which, of its own self, posits its otherness or difference as a nothingness, and in so doing is independent. . . . it is a living Self Consciousness.*"¹⁰³ Self Consciousness bestows independence, autonomy and intentionality on the Other to conceptualise it as a Self Consciousness.

Self Consciousness constructs another Self Consciousness itself.¹⁰⁴ It "*develops the notion of a being like itself which might remain independent and offers a more stable experience of reflexivity than the consumption of natural objects could provide.*"¹⁰⁵ Butler further stresses this, "*there is nothing in it of which it is itself not the origin . . . the Self is the author of the Other.*"¹⁰⁶

This other Self Consciousness must do exactly as the first, for "*Action by one side only would be useless because what is to happen can only be brought about by both.*"¹⁰⁷ Self Consciousness transforms "*the (natural and "human") world in which he is not recognised into a world in which this recognition takes place.*"¹⁰⁸ This "second" Self Consciousness is a projection of Self Consciousness in its alterity which previously was expressed as an alienated object. That part of Consciousness which was alienated and expressed as an object on which to reflect, is now transformed into another Self Consciousness.

The expression of this positing of another Self Consciousness in the "natural world", sees "nature" conceptualised in the same manner as Self, that is, as

¹⁰³ *Ibid*, p. 110

¹⁰⁴ This interpretation may be disputed. It is possible to argue that it is unclear in the text whether the other Self Consciousness is an actual Self Consciousness or a construct of the first Self Consciousness. The usual interpretation is that which is most obvious, that there are two actual Self Consciousness'. Although this may be the common interpretation, there is sufficient evidence to assert the contrary interpretation, i.e. "*this action of the one has itself the double significance of being both its own action and the action of the other as well.*" (112) The actions of both Self Consciousness are in fact but the action of the one Self Consciousness. In fact, logically it must be that there is only one consciousness as reality is ontologically undifferentiated.

¹⁰⁵ Butler, J.P., *Subjects of Desire*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 40

¹⁰⁶ *Ibid*, p. 50

¹⁰⁷ Hegel, F., *Phenomenology Of Spirit*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 112

¹⁰⁸ Kojève, A., *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, London: Cornell University Press, p. 11

Nature. It is bestowed autonomy, intentionality, and purpose. The metaphor of the "battle with nature" attains more than a metaphorical expression. Nature is no longer inert substance, but a formidable foe whose aim is to do battle with and destroy, the Other, "humanity". The aim of the Self and of "humanity" is to outwit this Other, and to master it. The battle is conceptualised as mutual.

In the other Self Consciousness, the first sees itself as a being for the other. Once again it must negate this otherness of itself in order to make itself the essential being. The negative side of this attempt at annihilation is that *"in doing so it proceeds to supersede its own Self, for this other is itself."*¹⁰⁹ This means that the Other, is in fact a part of the first, and in destroying the Other we destroy our self. Although the Other is alienated, it is still essentially part of the same. The otherness of the second Self Consciousness, is not an essential otherness, but a conceptual otherness articulated by the first. In destroying what we may consider to be other to Self, we in fact destroy part of the same.¹¹⁰

It is in the movement of the two Self Consciousness' to pure transcendental abstraction, that they must face each other in a life and death struggle. To be Self Conscious, is to be transcendent, having no attachment to Life or to "nature". We must prove that we have no attachment to the processes of Life as ours is a purely "human" transcendent existence. It is "nature" which is immanent, and it is this which we are not. Self Consciousness must risk life as its natural existence, to prove that it has no particular attachment to any mode of immanent existence.

The aim of the battle is to move above attachment to the body, to an expression of our existence as transcendent. Self Consciousness sees this state as one of Nirvana. It assumes that it only exists above and beyond immersion in the body, *"desire is once again transformed to destruction, a project which assumes that true freedom exists only beyond the body. Whereas destructive desire in its first appearance sought only to internalise otherness into a Self sufficient body, this second appearance of destructive desire endeavours to overcome bodily life altogether, i.e., to become an abstract identity without corporeal needs."*¹¹¹

Not only must it risk its own life, but it must also seek the death of the Other. It must prove that it holds the Other in no accord, and that it is not essential to its own being. Self Consciousness seeks to prove that it does not need Nature, that Nature is irrelevant to its being as independent and autonomous. To display that it is not in any way dependant on Nature, it seeks the annihilation of Nature. A two pronged attack against all natural forms is

¹⁰⁹ Hegel, F., Op. cit., p. 111

¹¹⁰ The more accepted interpretation of this may suggest that the Other is an essential Other, and thus it is only the being for an other which is destroyed, not being as an other.

¹¹¹ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 52

enacted, both in the guise of Nature as Self Consciousness, and "nature" as Other or external inert substance.

In the life and death struggle the Self Consciousness' have the option of choosing Life as the immersion in "nature", or transcendence as Self Consciousness. To prove transcendence and superiority, we must continually chose Self Consciousness. To chose Life is to be defeated and to fail to master. It is to be subservient. By choosing Self Consciousness over life, we attempt to prove we are essential beings, that we are not "*submerged in the expanse of life.*"¹¹²

To achieve mastery it is insufficient to actually "kill" or destroy the Other, for that would be a self defeating result. The Other must be preserved, but its autonomy and freedom withdrawn. Self Consciousness must only overcome the Other as it is seen to act against him, "*In other words, he must enslave him.*"¹¹³ Nature must become subservient. It must be tamed and brought into the direct service of "man". It must be domesticated.

The life and death struggle can have only one result. One Self Consciousness chooses life, while the other chooses Self Consciousness. That which chose Life, becomes the Bondsman, while the other which chose Self Consciousness is the Master. The Master has control over the Bondsman. It is the superior being. In this movement, Self Consciousness becomes characterised by mastery. To be truly Self conscious is to master. The binary opposition consists of only two options, to be master or slave, to control or to be controlled. This opposition of mastery and slavery, dominance and subservience, itself is a product of the struggle for Self Consciousness to attain a stabilised Self. Self Consciousness posits the Self Consciousness of the other, and with it, projects the struggle for dominance. Where Self Consciousness exists, inevitably the structuring of power will follow. Power is a product of the movement to Self Consciousness and the attempt to attain certainty of Self.

Externalisation of Self

It is in this final dramatic movement that we learn that the emerging subject not only seeks to internalise the world into itself by consuming otherness, but also strives for an externalisation of its essence. The Self Consciousness of the Lord is related to things only through the Bondsman, who supplies the Lord objects for his consumption. The Lord finds that the consciousness of the Bondsman is a lower form of consciousness and inadequate to reflect the Master's image of Self. Satisfaction of desire by the consumption of otherness is retained as a never ending process. As soon as the Master gains satisfaction by destroying or consuming the Other, the desire re-

¹¹² Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Claredon Press,1979, p. 114

¹¹³ Kojeve, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p. 15

manifests itself. Contrary to the Master, the Slave is directly in contact with things through the work which preformed on material objects for the Master's consumption. It is in this "working on things" which the Bondsman externalises his Self in the world. The thing which is worked on, becomes in one sense a mirror which reflects Self, and in a further sense, an externalisation of Self.

The lord masters the slave and through the slave, things in the world, but it is the slave who gains a stabilised Self Consciousness through the work done on the objects in the world. In working on things, the slave makes those "natural" objects over in its own image, the slave is able to see its Self in the world. Gadamer reflects Hegel's postulation, "*by shaping it, imprinting its form upon it, it converts it into something which remains. In producing the object, Consciousness which works comes to view independent being as itself.*"¹¹⁴ Working on things becomes a project of Self Consciousness. The drive to transform and make "natural" material a reflection of Self and "humanity", is a product of the drive for identity as Self Consciousness, and a product of the drive of Self Consciousness to expand, to encompass the world. Certainty of Self is achieved by working on "nature" and transforming it into an external expression of Self. Rather than destroying or annihilating the Other completely, it becomes preferable to transform the other into Self, to consume it by making it Self.

Where previously Self Consciousness overcame otherness by attempting to annihilate the other, now it seeks to preserve it, by expanding the conceptualisation of Self. Its aim, to effect a unity with the world and by doing this overcome externality, is transformed so that it "*both preserves that realm and renders it into a reflection of Self Consciousness.*"¹¹⁵

Where the Lord's desire to consume things achieves a mere fleeting satisfaction, the Bondsman is able to avoid desire by transforming the external world and accordingly make their image permanent in that world, "*this satisfaction (the lord's) is itself only a fleeting one, for it lacks the side of objectivity and permanence. But that is the reason why the satisfaction is itself only a fleeting one, for it lacks the side of objectivity and permanence. Work on the other hand, is desire held in check, fleetingness staved off; in other words, work forms and shapes the thing.*"¹¹⁶ The slave externalises their Self into the thing thereby overcoming otherness, by making the Other. Self. Thus, in "work", we are able to overcome the externality or otherness of "nature", "*to negate its independence, and to assimilate it to myself, to make it mine, to absorb it in and my I.*"¹¹⁷ The slave is able to expand their Self to

¹¹⁴ Gadamer, H.G., Essays on Hegel's Dialectic, Yale University Press, 1970, p. 70

¹¹⁵ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 44

¹¹⁶ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 118

¹¹⁷ Kojève, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p. 38

encompass all those objects which they have worked on. "Work", is done to "nature", "*Man who works transforms given nature*"¹¹⁸

The desire of Self Consciousness is always directed against the material world and as such it is directed against the natural world. The desire, that is "human" desire, must be expressed through labour on the "natural" world, "*for desire must give shape of form to the natural world in order to find itself reflected there.*"¹¹⁹ Desire as expressed by "culture", hence finds its satisfaction in transforming "nature" into expressions or reflections of "humanity". "Nature" is "humanised", and its otherness is negated by being transformed into a creation of the "human" will. Self Consciousness becomes "culture" or "humanity", and strives to achieve a God-like control and authorship of the entire material realm. Butler is unequivocal, "*desire is always an effort to negate/transform the natural world.*"¹²⁰

The aim of Self Consciousness is to be master of all, to bring all that is other to Self into the control or domain of Self. To be "human" is to dominate, to control, to master and to be superior. It is the Slave who becomes the absolute Master in becoming the master of Nature. Kojeve agrees with this analysis "*And by working, the Slave becomes master of Nature.*"¹²¹ He goes on to say, "*Only after producing an artificial object is man himself really and objectively more than and different from a natural being; and only in this real and objective product does he become truly conscious of his subjective "human" reality.*"¹²² It is in becoming master of "nature" that we become "human". Hegel's message is clear; to be a "real master", it is "nature" which must be mastered. It is "nature" mastery not "human" mastery which is the way to the Absolute.

An important manifestation of work is in "projects". In projects we seek to create an object which is an expression of our essence, that is, of our Self. In fact, for Hegel, "work" is only truly "human", when it is a "project". Kojeve defines a "project" as work which is "*carried out in relation to an "idea"*".¹²³ An idea being a "human" concept or construction of the mind. In projects we seek to externalise our ideas. It is also in projects that we seek a Hegelian recognition by the Other. We hope that in the project, the Other will recognise our status as an independent Self. As Lloyd comments in a discussion of male-female relations, "*Nothing short of actual engagement in 'projects' and 'exploits' will do. In the lack of that, "human" subjects are forced back into mere 'immanence'.*"¹²⁴

118 *Ibid*, p. 51

119 Butler, J.P., *Op. cit.*, p. 57

120 *Ibid*, p. 57

121 Kojeve, A., *Introduction to the Reading of Hegel*, London: Cornell University Press, p. 23

122 *Ibid*, p. 25

123 *Ibid*, p. 64

124 Lloyd, G., "Masters, Slaves and Others", in *Radical Philosophy*, Summer, 1983, p. 8

The collective culmination of the externalisation of a multiplicity of Self's, is manifest as the creation of an entirely "human" world in which to live, *"Man has created a series of entirely "human" worlds, essentially different from the natural world."*¹²⁵ In this world we can live without the ever present fear of "nature" as the Other. Kojève suggests, *"it is only in this World that man lives an essentially different life from that of animals (and "primitive man")."*¹²⁶ This World is the expansion of Self, through the annihilation and mastery of the Other, and through the externalisation of "human" form. The ultimate aim is to make all of reality an expression of the "human Self".¹²⁷

A relevant example of the creation of a "human" world, is apparent in perhaps the most dominating element of society today, "economics". Where it is unable to entirely eradicate the Other, "culture" imposes the illusion of isolation by creating an internal dependence. It attempts to prove that it is not dependant on the Other, and that it has an entirely independent transcendent existence. The mythical purely "human" realm of economics is created and replaces a preceding dependence on "nature". Kojève suggests that this "human" realm comes to be as a result of work which externalises an idea or project, *"A manufactured object incarnates an idea (a project) which is independent of the material hic et nunc; that is why these objects can be exchanged. Hence the birth of an "economic" specifically "human" World, in which money, capital, interest, salary, and so on appear."*¹²⁸

This world has developed till it is seen to embody all our dependence. A relation which appeared external, is reformulated so that it now appears internal. No longer are we dependant on the Other as "nature", rather our dependency shifts to give the illusion that it is within the realm of "culture" which we are dependant. Our attempts to repress the Other, to exclude it, come undone as it is revealed that "economics" is also dependant on the Other. Our illusion of Self dependence and internalisation of external relations, evaporates as we experience the return of the repressed. We are once again threatened, and reject our dependence on the Other. We place further concentration on economics to attempt to reaffirm our Self dependence. We cannot accept that what seemed to be our success in internalising prior external dependence, as an internal transcendent independence, has vanished. We deny the importance of the Other and assert that it is irrelevant. We reaffirm that it is economics which is paramount. "Economics" as our "surrogate mother", our displaced dependence, is revealed to depend on the Other, "nature". Our dependence,

¹²⁵ Kojève, A., Op. cit., p. 32

¹²⁶ Ibid, p. 26

¹²⁷ It is worth noting that Kojève adheres to the common view that Nature is an Other which is threatening and to be feared, "the given natural world is hostile to him, that it tends to kill him, to destroy him, and that it is essentially unsuited to satisfy him really."(Kojève, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p. 29) Here Nature is an intentional Other, a self conscious Other, for Nature does not "kill" or "destroy" if that is not its conscious aim.

¹²⁸ Kojève, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p. 51

like that of the Lord, penetrates through economics, to rest once again with "nature".

The aim of "human" consciousness is not to be what it is (natural biological life) and to be what it is not (transcendent non-corporeal).¹²⁹ As such, it is characterised by negation. It does not seek to unite with "nature", rather to transcend it and be superior to it. The desire of the Self is always after something which is other to Self, at the same time as being involved in a project of Self constitution. It is "desire in general" and the drive to a more expanded version of Self, which leads Self Consciousness to transform the natural world into a "human" expression. Without negation and thus desire, *"it would have no capacity to influence its surroundings"*¹³⁰ It is the Self which strives forward to assert itself on the world. Its goal is to overcome otherness and to make itself the master of immanent natural life. Its ultimate aim is to recast what appears as substance, into a reflection of Self Consciousness. In confronting the natural world, the Self, marks it with the idealised "signature" of Self Consciousness, of "humanity". The process is a gradual "humanization" of "nature".

To recapitulate, it is clear that one manifestation of the Other of the "human" Self, that is, of Western Self Consciousness, is "nature". "Nature" is given the "appearance" of being separate, of being Other to "humanity" and "culture". As such the Self, due to its very constitution, perpetually drives to destroy it, to make it Self. The common conceptualisation of Nature by Western "culture", projects autonomy and intentionality onto the natural world existing outside "culture". It is seen as dangerous, threatening, and something to be overcome. Subsequently, we do not exist harmoniously with it, rather we must battle it. In this battle we must be triumphant, for its interests and ours are considered to be in conflict. If we do not win, Nature will.

The conceptualisation of "nature" is a conceptualisation of Self Consciousness. Self Consciousness, in the form of "culture", posits Nature as another Self Consciousness, as an independent autonomous directional being. The Self, as "culture", does not conceptualise "nature" merely as an inert object, rather in Hegel's words, *"as something which has an independent existence of its own."*¹³¹

Even this way of speaking, conceptualises "nature" as a unity, implicitly positing it as an other. To speak of "its interest" gives it an autonomy. It implies that we and "nature" are indeed different, that we are not naturally evolved organisms, that somehow we are not a part of the whole. Even to

¹²⁹ Adapted from Hyppolite, J., Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 5

¹³⁰ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 90

¹³¹ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 112

conceptualise a notion of "nature" is to suggest that it is different from something. That "thing" signifies us as transcendent "cultural" beings. It is the act of conceptualisation which gives it the "appearance" of a unity in otherness. It is only an appearance, not a fact.

If we continue by considering how best we may characterise the Western way of being, we see that it comfortably fits the Hegelian mould. There is a manifest concentration on the subject. The individual agent is emphasised. Identity of Self is glamorised. Stress is placed upon the need to "know oneself". Parallel to this is the predominance of desire. There is a continual yearning for more, for a satisfaction. The individual strives to forge an identity for themself, and signifies that identity in their possessions and achievements. Significance is placed upon progress, a movement to a conclusion, to a state of satisfaction. Stasis is rejected as horrifying. It is as if progress or "becoming", is the essence of our very being. To accept stasis would be to accept our being as incomplete and alienated.

In this process of becoming, "humanity" seeks to destroy every element of what is considered to be "nature" or other. It must be tamed or civilised. It must be negated, destroyed or transformed, for to leave it as "nature", would signify the imperfection¹³² of "humanity", the incompleteness of the project of becoming. The impossible project of "humanity" will be complete when it is entirely independent, not reliant on an other for identity or survival.

The Absolute

We must now turn our attention to Hegel's "conclusion", his point of "arrival", that is, the "Absolute". What is the Absolute? It is not *"the night in which all cows are black"* where division is totally consumed, but rather, in the words of Gadamer, *"in the concept of spirit a reality has been reached which, like the light of day, embraces everything visible and includes all there is."*¹³³ It is a point at which all difference is internalised in the subject or reformulated as part of Self Consciousness. The aim and status of the Absolute is the point at which the subject and object are unified, where the division between subjectivity and objectivity is annulled.

Schelling conceived the Absolute in itself, as being for conceptual thought at least, a blank identity, a vanishing point of all differences. In contrast, for Hegel, the Absolute is not an impenetrable reality existing, as it were, above and behind its determinate manifestations: it is its Self-manifestation. It is important to stress that for Schelling it is only conceptual differences which

¹³² The notion of imperfection is the binary opposite of perfection which is defined as a unity, a wholeness. This could alternatively be seen as quantitative rather than qualitative as is normally considered. Something which is perfect, is complete or whole, whereas an imperfection is a deficiency.

¹³³ Gadamer, H.G., Essays on Hegel's Dialectic, Yale University Press, 1970, p. 55

are dissolved in the Absolute, not those which appear in daily life. Differences which are removed are those posited by conceptual or reflective thought. The Absolute transcends conceptual thought and with this conceptual differences. Conceptual differences, such as subject and object, Self and Other, "culture" and "nature", "human" and "animal" are dissolved. Unlike Schelling's, Hegel's Absolute retains determinate form by internalising it in Self.

For Hegel, the Absolute is the *"process of its own becoming, the circle which presupposes its end as its purpose and has its end as its beginning."*¹³⁴ The assertion that it has its "end as its purpose", can be interpreted to reveal that it is the Absolute which is the satisfaction of desire. At this point where all external difference is internalised, the lack which is the Other is overcome, the Self has "become".

Following this, Hegel makes what seems a particular revealing comment, *"it has its end as its beginning"*, it is *"a whole which after running its course and laying bare all its contents, returns again to itself."*¹³⁵ Thus its beginning, is its end, purpose or aim. The goal of the entire dialectical process is to re-experience its beginning. The story is one which expresses the desire to return to "origins". The subject desires to return to its origin, through a movement forward. Its project appears contradictory: to regain what was lost by moving forward. As Hyppolite states, *"This act of becoming aware is not a pure and simple return to the past; in its retrospective apprehension it justifies the past and determines its meaning."*¹³⁶ The "return to origins", is disguised in the form of a progression to a point of arrival.

Hegel suggests that in the Absolute, subject and object are unified. How is it possible to unify subject and object? If the Absolute is subject, what then is object? For Hegel, the object of the Absolute is itself. But how can its object be itself, when we have just learnt that the object is posited through a process of reflective alienation? It seems that Hegel's Absolute is a little too optimistic. Either the Absolute is unachievable or Hegel's narrative is contradictory. It is possible to argue that Hegel's articulation of the Absolute as subjective substance is the naive idealist proposition of a desiring subject. As an ideal satisfaction, it is without rival. Self Consciousness desired to retain subjectivity whilst internalising difference. In the Absolute this has been achieved. Hegel's own subjective desire has become apparent. His assertion of the "sublation" of difference, although desirable, is it seems, unachievable.

In Hegel's narrative, as everywhere, the Self is hard at work. It never reveals its true intentions, but always seeks to achieve satisfaction. Always seeking to fill the void which it is. Hegel's system can therefore be seen as a

¹³⁴ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 81

¹³⁵ Ibid, para 12

¹³⁶ Hyppolite, J., Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 44

manifestation of the Self's purpose and aims. The Absolute is a disguised expression of the Self's ultimate satisfaction of desire. It is the position of Absolute subjectivity which the Self sees as satisfying its desire. In the Absolute the Self has expanded to incorporate all that exists. It has at last achieved what seemed an impossible dream, to incorporate the Other into Self.

To fully appreciate Hegel's system we must understand his logic. For Hegel, *"The True is the whole"*,¹³⁷ where, "the whole", is undifferentiated. The actualisation of difference in that whole represents only partial becoming. It is the exercise of mediation. Difference is not True, for only the whole, as undifferentiated, is true. Each component of an opposition contains within itself a contradictory seed which is the Other. To apply this laborious logic to our concern, we see that the differentiation of Self and Other, and "humanity" and "nature", is but a false illusion. Each contains the other and logically they must exist as a unity. The notion of "humanity" as a transcendent independent entity, collapses into its differentiation from "nature".

To avoid the environmental destruction which is a Self destruction, the "Self"/"nature" dualism must be dissolved. For Hegel, as was suggested, it is the Understanding which posits and perpetuates difference. In Hyppolite's words, *"the understanding carries out the work of the negative"*¹³⁸ The Understanding is thus an inadequate instrument to overcome difference. The instrument of unification is the "intuition". It may be through the articulation and exercise of intuition that the "nature"/"Self" dichotomy can be unified.

It is clear that a synthesis is required, but the question is whether this new status will retain our position of superiority, in transcendence over "nature". Can the oscillation of the dialectic offer a conceptualisation which overcomes domination while retaining transcendence? If we maintain our separation, our superiority, how can we be one with "nature"? To be "nature" we must immerse ourselves in that identity. We cannot both be, and not be, "nature". We cannot both be a Self and be the other. A synthesis which preserves both prior identities is impossible, even perhaps for "speculative Reason".

Before leaving Hegel, it is worthwhile to briefly return to consider a prior important text which reflects upon some of the important issues. The text in question is *"The Difference between the Philosophical Systems of Fichte and Schelling"*. Although this text appears to be primarily an analytical text, in it we see the genesis and development of Hegel's own ideas.

In "Difference", Hegel suggests that the aim of philosophy itself and the movement of reality in general, is the overcoming and synthesis of oppositions and difference. Division, is the *"need of philosophy"*.¹³⁹

¹³⁷ Hegel, F., Op. cit., p. 11

¹³⁸ Hyppolite, J., Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974, p. 47

¹³⁹ Hegel, F. The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System Of Philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977

Opposition and division arise as a result of the mind's experience of the world. This is a function of Understanding. The synthesis of division into a unified whole is the work of Reason. It is here that an inherent contradiction exists. The primary instrument of philosophy is reflection. Reflection operates as Understanding and it is the Understanding, which posits and perpetuates division. Therefore, although it seems Hegel did not see it this way, philosophy as the means to overcome difference, is a self defeating enterprise.

In an attempt to resolve this dilemma Hegel suggests that reflection must be united with intuition. By uniting reflection with intuition, reflection is raised to speculative Reason. It could be argued that Hegel is in the least a little naive to think that intuition and reflection could be combined. Intuition is the opposite of reflection. It is the spontaneous arising of knowledge, whereas reflection is the active pursuit of knowledge.

Finally, it has become apparent that, Consciousness, is that which unites, while Self Consciousness, is that which divides. The question appears to be whether we can merge Consciousness and Self Consciousness, the subject and the object, reflection and intuition. Can we retain reflective Consciousness of Consciousness, that is, Self Consciousness, while overcoming the division between the subject and object which results in domination, mastery and the desire to negate. Can we formulate reality into a unified whole, while retaining the prior integrity of the parts? Is it practically and theoretically possible to incorporate "nature" into our concept of Self, whilst retaining the integrity of natural biological systems?

FREUD

Freud concentrated his energy upon revealing the impact of early childhood experiences on later adult life. His fundamental premise was that these early experiences are decisive in determining subsequent adult character and action. Freud believed his primary contribution to be in identifying the influence of childhood development upon adult sexuality. In this instance, the focus rather than being upon sexuality, will be on the impact of these early childhood experiences on the development of the ego and how it relates to the external environment.

To understand how the concept of Self or ego relates to the environment or "nature", it is necessary to appreciate the process of ego formation and the inherent characteristics of the ego. How does the ego come to be structured? What is left behind in the formation of the ego? What happens to that which is left behind? What influence does it have on the adult ego and its relations to that which is other to itself?

Where the prior section concentrated upon analysing the concept of Self from the perspective of a metaphysical or metapsychological approach, this section will be closer to a common psychological evaluation. What are the psychological concepts which are operating?; what are they dependant upon?; and how do they arise? Does the new born child have a sense of Self and Other (and "nature")? What is it? How does it differ from the sense of Self in maturity? How do early childhood experiences construct the concept of Self apparent at maturity, and how do the child's early experiences effect their relationship with the environment in later life? What is it which the child unconsciously carries with them into adult life which influences their actions and determines their characteristics?

As was the case with the Hegelian analysis, we will assume that what is "Other", can be transposed as, the "environment", or "nature". How the ego relates to what is Other to itself, is equivalent to how it relates to the environment and "nature". Although "nature", as the Other, does have a number of peculiarities as we shall find, in general, it is relatively similar to alternate Others in the way the Self relates to it. In understanding how power and desire come together in the ego, we will concurrently achieve an understanding of the primary elements of the relationship of Self to environment.

The investigation will be two pronged; these function conjunctively. Firstly, what is it in the individual's development, in the individual's history or past, which leads to the desire to consume or destroy the Other, and the drive to mastery of what is other to the Self or ego? It is here that the parallels with the prior analysis of the Hegelian tradition will find their strongest expression.

Similarly, as was apparent with the exposition and application of Hegel's theory, it is the concepts of "mastery" and "desire" which will form the basis of the analysis of the Freudian tradition. How does desire come to be

structured? How are desire and the ego or Self, related? The desires of particular interest are those which can alternatively be formulated as; the desire to consume all that is Other to Self, into Self; the desire to possess the Other; and the desire to unite with the Other. To what extent do these desires relate to the individual's understanding or conceptualisation of themselves, and the drive to mastery, control and dominance? It will be argued that ego formation, the insatiability of desire, and the drive to possess power, necessarily exist together. They are part and parcel of the same "complex". It is not possible to have one without the Other, for inherent within each concept is that of the other.

Secondly, it will be necessary to reveal to what extent these personal determinants and characteristics are carried over into "culture". Are the developments and characteristics in question only applicable to the individual, or is there a carry over effect into the social realm? Similarly, is there a corresponding influence on the individual by "culture"? Further, it will be also necessary to consider whether the characteristics in question amount to a neurosis. If so, does the "complex" relate only to the individual, or is it a characteristic of the entire "culture"? That is, should we consider "culture", which is permeated by such specific modes of functioning, to be neurotic? Does it have a psychoanalytic "complex"? If this is the case, should "culture" be glorified, or recognised as deficient in order to facilitate treatment. In particular, is a "culture" neurotic if it destroys that which it is dependant upon, and if so what is the essence and cause of this neurosis? In accordance with this line of questioning we must ask whether the mere existence of "culture", that is of differentiation, presupposes the operation of power and desire, and if so, does the existence of "culture" signify the existence of a neurosis? Following this, we must attempt to reveal what it is which has been repressed, but which is still cathected with energy, and which continually seeks to find expression. Finally, what is the treatment? How can we "undo" the repression?

As was necessary with the analysis of the Hegelian theory, the evaluation and application of the Freudian conceptualisation must start before the beginning of subjectivity. That is, we must begin before conceptualisation. Before the origin of the Self; before the Self or ego has been structured. Characteristic of this stage is that it is in a condition of stasis. It is with conceptualisation or ego formation, that progress and Self development begins. It is only at this stage that desire drives the Self on its project of Self recovery.

The Development of Ego

The original or rather perennial condition of the individual and society, is that of fluidity or flux. It is a state of unbounded universality. Drew Westen states this clearly in "Self and Society", "*Originally the psyche is unstructured.*"¹⁴⁰ There are no boundaries or limitations to existence. All is one and one is all,

¹⁴⁰ Westen, D., Self and Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 131

where "one" does not presuppose two, but where it merely signifies lack of differentiation. It is imperative to recognise that this is not a state of perceived unity or wholeness, but rather a lack of rationalisation or conceptualisation. To assert that it is a unity, is to suppose that a pre-differentiated state, resembles what it is conceptualised to be from a post-differentiated stance. That is, it is to project a concept defined by subjectivity, onto a pre-subjective realm. To imply it is a state of unity or wholeness is to imply that conceptualisation of status already exists, whereas for the child there is a *"lack of differentiation of Self and Other."*¹⁴¹ In this state of primary union, the *"infant has no concept of Self, only a realm of experience"*.¹⁴²

Before the child learns to differentiate Self from Other, before the mother is recognised as "mother", the child exists in a state of non-differentiation. The child does not recognise any limitations to their being, they are whole. As suggested, this may be a little deceptive as the child does not perceive themselves to be the "whole", they do not conceptualise themselves as a being which includes all. To do this would by necessity conceptualise boundaries. The child does not conceptualise themselves at all, they just are. They simply exist, they are not reflectively aware of their being, nor do they conceptualise identity.

Westen agrees that identity is not conceptualised, *"To say that the infant lacks differentiated concepts of Self and Other is not to imply, as many theorists have, that the infant confuses Self and Other. It is very unlikely that when a three month old sees its mother walk away it thinks to itself, "There goes a piece of me."*¹⁴³ In positing identity, something is always consciously or unconsciously left out, something which is other, there are always holes. For the child at this stage, there are no holes, there is nothing which is other. Rather than assert that all is "one"; thereby implying a differentiation, it may better be stated that all is the same. Although this does not adequately avoid the conceptualisation of autonomy, no other concept will help. Baliant rejects the notion that the original state is one of primary narcissism, where the individual's being is one of Selfness, and instead suggests that this first state is one of an intense relatedness to the environment, which he calls *"primary love"*.¹⁴⁴

To stress the previous point, it is not that the mother and child form an essential unity, but that there is a lack of differentiation between mother and child. The child does not visualise the mother as part of its own being, it simply sees all as the same. The situation for the mother is quite different. Although she does initially see the child as comprising her own being, she later asserts the child's uniqueness. For the mother is subject, and as subject, she must alienate the child from her own conceptualisation of Self.

¹⁴¹ *Ibid*, p. 155

¹⁴² *Ibid*, p. 156

¹⁴³ *Ibid*, p. 156

¹⁴⁴ Baliant quoted in *Ibid*, p. 132

For the child, the absence of the mother is not an absence of a component of its Self, it is merely the feeling of absence or loss. Something which was there is gone. A vacuum is formed, a hollow waiting to be filled. The absence of the mother fills the child not with the **conceptualisation** of loss but with the **feeling** of loss. The child yearns not for the "mother", but simply yearns for perfection, for the removal of the feeling of absence. This is the agonizing Hegelian feeling of being torn apart. The child does not know what is absent, nor what it is which constitutes the lack which is so agonizing. The child merely has the **experience** of absence, not the conceptualisation of the cause of the feeling.

It is here we see the birth of desire. The feeling of a loss which is unconceptualised, is the source of "desire in general". Its object is undifferentiated. The child desires what is absent, to be present. It is merely a yearning for presence recovery; a movement to fulfilment. The child knows it needs something to make it whole again. The child yearns for what is missing and is permeated by desire. It cares for nothing but the removal of loss and the return of presence. The child is desire. As desire, it is aware of itself.

From the experience of desire resulting from an absence, the child becomes aware of its own being, its own existence. It is through desire that the subject or the ego is constituted. The ego is the yearning to fulfil the loss. The ego or Self is constituted in essence by a gap, by an emptiness. It does not, as may be commonly thought, suppose the existence of a real ontological entity, but rather, of the reverse, an absence. It is not whole, it is hollow.

The stage of unconceptualised feeling later gives rise to the conceptualisation of loss, and recognition of that loss. What is lost, what is not present, finds its original and primal conceptualisation as "Other". The "Other" is formed by the experience of desire. The "Other" becomes the defined object of desire, and is conceptualised as that which will fill the vacuum.

From the recognition of ego as desire and the Other as the object of desire, it is evident that the primal nature of the Self, is the desire for what is lost, it is the desire for otherness. It seeks the Other to be present in its being.

The child's initial and fundamental interactions are with the mother. It is the mother which is the source of presence. Being the source of presence, the presence of the mother, signifies a lack of absence. As lack of absence, the presence of the mother perpetuates primal being as undifferentiated wholeness. It is with the absence of the mother, that "absence in general" comes to form the foundation of the child as "subject". The experience of the lack of presence, the "mother", provides the experience of absence which is desire. In the case of "desire in general", being is permeated by the experience of lack. The ego or subject is born.

Being the primal object of desire, the "mother", correspondingly is the first conceptualisation of otherness. It is the mother who is the first Other which is missing. Jessica Benjamin agrees with this analysis, *"the first Other we*

encounter is our mother."¹⁴⁵ The mother is the primary "Other" on which others are founded. From the conceptualisation of the absence of presence which is the mother, the "mother" becomes the first Other which is absent or present. It is in this act of conceptualisation that the child is initiated into the symbolic system of signifiers which constitutes language.

Additionally, the mother undergoes a process of objectification. The "mother" becomes the first object, the "thing" of desire. Evelyn Fox Keller suggests that this object is an "emotional" object, *"the primary object the infant carves out is . . . an emotional 'object', namely, the mother, . . . the infant discovers dependency and need - and a primitive form of love, . . . Out of the demarcation between Self and mother arises a longing to undo the differentiation, an urge to re-establish the original unity."*¹⁴⁶

From the original state of undifferentiated wholeness or fluidity, the primal differentiation of mother from child takes place. The child differentiates the mother from its own being, but finds itself in the paradox Hegel's Self Consciousness. It both desires the "mother" as Other to be overcome, to satisfy its experience of absence, and requires the mother as Other for its own reflective experience of being.

Finding itself in this paradox the child recognises that its only course of action is to control the absence and presence of the "mother" itself. Aware of its own inadequacy, (for the time being at least), to facilitate the actual presence and absence of the "mother", the child turns to the **experience** rather than the object. It must master the experience of absence, of lack. It may also be argued that this stage of attempting mastery, the child has not yet conceptualised the mother as Other, and is as yet only aware of the experience of absence, not the object of absence. In attempting to master the experience, it finds it is as yet inadequate to achieve its aim of reunification. The desire for increased power becomes insatiable, solely satisfiable by the power to be able to achieve the impossible, that is the return of the mother.

Beyond The Pleasure Principle

In his essay, "Beyond the Pleasure Principle", Freud directly addresses the child's attempts to come to terms with presence and absence. Freud's basic principle is that *"the course taken by mental events is automatically regulated by the pleasure principle."*¹⁴⁷ The "pleasure principle" refers to the mental rule which impels towards the attaining of pleasure and the avoidance of displeasure. Mental strivings which are converted into corresponding

¹⁴⁵ Benjamin, J., Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination, p. 295

¹⁴⁶ Keller, E.F., Reflections on Gender and Science, New Haven, Yale University Press, p. 81

¹⁴⁷ Freud, S., The Essentials of Psychoanalysis, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986, p. 218

physical strivings, are invariably set in motion by *"unpleasurable tensions"*.¹⁴⁸ The intention of the mental and physical action, is the lowering of the unpleasurable tension, paralleled by the production of pleasurable sensations. Freud suggests this mental principle takes into account "economic" motives; the yield of pleasure involved.

Pleasure and displeasure relate to the amount of mental excitation present in the mind. Although it may initially seem contradictory, *"unpleasure corresponds to an increase in the quantity of excitation and pleasure to a diminution."*¹⁴⁹ The seemingly contradictory nature of this statement results from the association between activity and mastery which will be detailed. Freud later asserts that the dominating principle of mental life and even perhaps all life in general, *"is the effort to reduce, to keep constant or to remove internal tension due to stimuli (the "Nirvana principle" to borrow a term)."*¹⁵⁰ What Freud is suggesting is that psycho-physical effects are relational to mental stability and instability. In a state of stability, that is lack of excitation, there is no motive or drive to action. It is mental instability which results in, and necessitates action. Unconscious stability presupposes stasis, and instability action. The controlling principle of the mind is to keep the quantity of excitation present in the mind as low as possible. Anything which results in increased excitation, is to be avoided. Fechner termed this the *"tendency toward stability."*¹⁵¹

The importance of the preceding analysis is that the primary principle directing unconscious mental activity is characterised by the drive to stasis or continuity. That is, the mind seeks to maintain its present state. The most primal state is as suggested one of absolute stasis and stability. It is this state which the mind continually seeks to re-attain. In suggesting this, Freud implies that the mind, like Other material objects, embodies the principle of inertia. It is essentially elastic in that it seeks to avoid change and to return to its original state.

For the near natal child, displeasure and mental activity is produced with the feeling of absence, and pleasure with the binary opposite of presence. The principle is exceeding simple, but its effects are far ranging. These early associations are subsequently carried with the individual throughout life and influence all action. Although it may be argued that these are speculative assumptions, there is sufficient evidence to justify their assertion.

It is with absence, that excitation is intensified, and with presence, that excitation is lowered. The excitation of absence is desire. Desire is the excitation of the mind which is produced by a change in the state of continuity or stasis, to discontinuity and movement. Lack of desire is the lack of excitation, which is also the lack of discontinuity from the primal state. As desire, the ego is characterised by an increase in mental excitation or activity.

¹⁴⁸ *Ibid*, p. 218

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid*, p. 219

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid*, p. 261

¹⁵¹ *Ibid*, p. 220

The aim of the mind as ego, which is permeated by desire or excitation, is to return to the original state of stasis. In Westen's words, "*the baby attempts to preserve his original state of perfection.*"¹⁵²

The pleasure principle does not enjoy unimpeded satisfaction or the inevitable attainment of its aim, for if this were the case it would automatically achieve results and thus the ego would fail to exist. Here Freud introduces the "*reality principle*" which tempers the pleasure principle. The reality principle replaces the pleasure principle as the primary principle of mental activity, while the pleasure principle is retained in an unconscious regulated form. The reality principle does not forgo the possibility of attaining its goal, "*it does not abandon the intention of ultimately obtaining pleasure*"¹⁵³, but postpones satisfaction and temporarily tolerates displeasure in order to ensure an ultimate satisfaction in the future.

It is under the ego's instincts of Self preservation, that the reality principle comes to supersede the pleasure principle.¹⁵⁴ The ego recognises that the satisfaction of desire, the attaining of pleasure, and the lowering of mental activity, spells its own death knoll, and thus substitutes a principle which allows its preservation but which does not discard the ultimate goal. The ego sees that it is necessary that satisfaction of the primary aim be in a modified disguised form which allows its continued existence. It is this displacement which is the turning point of mental activity and the means to satisfaction. It no longer seeks to return to a state of continuity in its essential primal form, but instead strives to attain a state of continuous all inclusive ego. The parallels with Hegel are immediately obvious.

In Freud's words, the original goals of the pleasure principle are excluded from the "*all inclusive unity of the ego. . . . by the process of repression.*"¹⁵⁵ By "roundabout paths" the pleasure principle seeks direct or substituted satisfaction. It works in the unconscious while the reality principle, functions as the principle of Self Consciousness. The moments of primal pleasure, that is the feeling of continuity, are "*felt by the ego as unpleasure.*"¹⁵⁶ Rather than being pleasurable, they conflict with the ego's drive to Self preservation. The psychic whole is thrown into paradoxical conflict with itself.

Fort Da

To turn to a concrete example pertaining to the development of the child, we will concentrate upon the often contemplated section in Freud's analysis

¹⁵² Westen, D., Self and Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 134

¹⁵³ Freud, S., The Essentials of Psychoanalysis, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986, p. 221

¹⁵⁴ Ibid, p. 221

¹⁵⁵ Ibid, p. 221

¹⁵⁶ Freud, S., The Essentials of Psychoanalysis, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986, p. 221

known as "Fort Da". Fort Da is a game frequently played by children in one form or another at a particular stage in their development. Freud justifiably assumes that by analysing children's play, important unconscious determinants and operatives may be uncovered. Freud additionally assumes that the primary motive for children's play is what we may consider to be the most likely, the economic motive. That is, simply, the *"yield of pleasure involved."*¹⁵⁷

The game of Fort Da was the first game played by a boy of one and a half, which Freud witnessed by chance. The game was not one conveyed to the child by another as is often the case, but was invented by the child himself. This suggests that both the process and the meaning of the game was related to the child's achieving pleasure. The game was not one which was enacted once, but was repeated by the child over and over.

Although the boy was to a large extent well behaved and obeyed orders, never-the-less he had developed the habit of taking any objects he could get hold of and throwing them away from himself, *"into a corner or under a bed."*¹⁵⁸ This activity was accompanied by a long loud "o-o-o-o-o", along with an expression of interest and satisfaction. Freud and the mother of the child came to realise that this exclamation, rather than being meaningless, represented the German word "fort" or in English, "gone". From this Freud recognised that the only game the boy played with his toys was the "gone" game.

He confirmed his intuitions when he observed what can only be seen as the ultimate expression of the game. In playing with a cotton reel and string, the child did not undertake 'normal' play activities such as pulling it along behind himself like a carriage. Rather, he would hold the string and throw the reel over his curtained cot so that it disappeared from view. Having done this he would exclaim his customary "o-o-o-o-o". The decisive moment came when following this expression of "gone", he would pull the string till the cotton reel reappeared, joyfully proclaiming "da" ("there"). The complete game is thus the progression from "gone" to "there". It was a game of disappearance and return, or alternatively, presence and absence. Although Freud notes that it was the first act which was most frequently and untiringly repeated, it was from the second movement of "presence" or "there", that the greatest pleasure was derived.¹⁵⁹

It is in this game that we can see the essence of a number of important elements in the overall analysis. For the child, the playing of the game is the first expression of the satisfaction gained from mastery. It is the mastery of absence and presence. It is not the mastery of the absence and presence of the mother as conceptualised as "mother", but the mastery of the **experience** of presence and absence. The child was repeatedly subject to absence when

¹⁵⁷ *Ibid*, p. 224

¹⁵⁸ *Ibid*, p. 225

¹⁵⁹ Freud, S., *The Essentials of Psychoanalysis*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986, p. 225

the mother would leave. The child found he could come to terms with this absence and compensate for it by becoming master of the absence himself. Rather than being subject to increased mental activity and thus displeasure, the boy came to experience the pleasure of controlling absence himself. It is in mastering this most primal of absences that the child was set on a life-long pilgrimage to master and control all absences.

As the mother becomes conceptualised as "Other", the child associates presence and absence with "otherness". It is the Other which is either present or absent. It is therefore the Other which must be brought under control and dominated. Where the Other is associated with, or conceptualised as "nature", it is this which must be mastered and controlled. It must be tamed, domesticated, and brought into the sphere of control of the Self.

The association between the "mother" and "nature" is both implicit and explicit. It is explicit to the extent that "nature" is often referred to as "Mother Nature". The implicit content of the association is relevant to the progression of dependence, initially the child is dependant upon the mother for survival, later the individual is dependant on "nature". Where absence and presence is associated with dependency, the drive to mastery and control is emphasised. In this transition to "Mother Nature", that we move from a consideration of the individual psyche to a psychoanalysis of the "culture".

Norman O. Brown highlights the important position the mother plays in our conceptualisation of "nature". Brown draws on both Freud and Klein to emphasise the relation between the "mother", and how we think about "nature", *"The world is our mother: The outside world is "the mother's body in an extended sense." If you have chanced to wonder at the frequency with which landscapes are used in dreams to symbolise the female sexual organs, you may learn from mythologists how large a part has been played in the ideas and cults of ancient times by "Mother Earth", and how the whole conception of agriculture was determined by this symbolism."*¹⁶⁰

The association between mother and child, is displaced onto the relation between Self and Other due to the identification between "mother" as Other, and "nature" as Other. The desire to overcome "motherhood" which signifies difference and thus desire, is transferred by association to the desire to overcome "nature".

It is from the act of mastery which resulted from the experience of desire, that the individual makes their original assertion of identity. The Self imposes its being on the Other in order to control that Other. Mastery becomes one of the two founding principles of the ego. The ego is characterised by desire for presence, and mastery of absence. These initial manifestations of power and desire are subsequently sublimated and displaced onto associated, or what may consciously seem to be unrelated, unconscious expressions of desire and mastery.

¹⁶⁰ Brown, N., *Love's Body*, New York: Vintage Books, 1968, p.36

Freud suggests that the interpretation of the game is related to the *"child's great cultural achievement - the instinctual renunciation (that is, the renunciation of instinctual satisfaction) which he made in allowing the mother to go away without protesting."*¹⁶¹ This statement of Freud's is insightful for a number of reasons. Firstly, we see that the child has renounced instinctual satisfaction. That is, he has come to control and master the primal instinct of reunion, the return to the original undifferentiated state. It is this movement which signals the superseding of the pleasure principle by the reality principle. The ego has begun its reign of power.

In the experience of absence, the ego or Self is born. The ego is, as suggested, dependant on differentiation and lack, for existence. If the reality principle does not supersede the pleasure principle, the ego will slip back into fluidity. It is the ego which defines, it is the ego which seeks to avoid being as flux and which stresses limiting boundaries and limitations to being. By renouncing satisfaction of the instinctual striving for presence, the individual asserts their identity as ego, as differentiated. The ego asserts its acceptance of absence.

We are offered an additional far-reaching glimpse in the use in this instance of the term "cultural". The renunciation of the instinct to continuity, is the essence of "culture". "Culture" is by its nature and essence the drive to differentiation. It accepts and asserts the presence of absence. In effect, "culture" is absence. The absence which constitutes "culture", is "mother nature". Nature is the Other of "culture". The acceptance of absence and the corresponding acceptance of desire is the basis of "culture". To be "cultural" is to renounce the instinct for continuity. To renounce this instinct, "culture" must become master of what is Other, it must master "nature". The renunciation of satisfaction which is "culture", is the reality principle. It is the reality principle as "culture" which postpones instinctual satisfaction and sublimates and displaces instinctual desire.

Freud considers why it is that the child renounces the satisfaction of this instinctual desire. Why is it that since the absence of the mother, or absence in general is clearly neither *"agreeable or even indifferent"*¹⁶², does the child repeatedly re-enact the experience of absence himself, *"How then does his repetition of this distressing experience as a game fit with the pleasure principle?"*¹⁶³ It is not that it is the necessary preliminary of the joyful moment of return of presence, for it is the first movement of the act which is most regularly repeated. At the outset of the game the child was in a passive situation, it had to passively experience absence. By playing the game, the child takes control, he became the active agent, *"In the case of children's play, . . . children repeat unpleasurable experiences for the additional reason*

¹⁶¹ Freud, S., *The Essentials of Psychoanalysis*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986, p. 225

¹⁶² Freud, S., *The Essentials of Psychoanalysis*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986, p. 225

¹⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 225

that they can master powerful impression far more thoroughly by being active than they can by merely experiencing it passively."¹⁶⁴

Freud suggests that the activity is not a result of an **instinct** for mastery, but is an assertion of independence. By playing the "gone game" the child attests its independence. In essence the game states, *"all right then go away! I don't need you. I'm sending you away myself."*¹⁶⁵ It is an assertion of ego as an autonomous independent entity, which is not dependant on the Other or the reconciling of absence. As "culture" which is "humanity", the assertion and movement is one of denying dependence on "nature" and alienating it from our existence ourselves. "Culture" stresses that it is more than "nature", and entirely independent of "nature".

As the movement from passivity to activity, the game is one which posits the Self as the agent of activity. The Self or ego is an active agent of mastery. The activity is initially only expressed in games, but as the child develops, so do these "games" of activity. For the child these "games" are not merely games, but are constitutive of their being. Similarly, what was a game becomes the essential activity of "work". "Work" is active activity. That is, it is not merely activity, but is activity which takes control, which imposes the Self on the Other. There are two primary manifestations of active activity. Both of these manifestations are destructive of the Other. The activity which became apparent in the "gone game", later is either directly destructive, "destructive activity", or indirectly destructive, "constructive activity". The consequence of both is the destruction of the Other. There are clear echoes here of the strivings of the Hegelian Self Consciousness which either sought to destroy the Other, or to make the Other over as a reflection of the Self's image.

The game was not enacted a single time but was repeated over and over again. Each active repetition of an unpleasurable experience, *"seemed to strengthen the mastery they are in search of."*¹⁶⁶ To achieve mastery of a situation, it is not sufficient to assert mastery over the Other a single time, for that Other is perpetually present. For the ego, as previously stated, the Other must always exist. It, by necessity, continually eludes the Self from achieving complete mastery. For the child it is the same game of mastery which is repeated, in which they try to *"make themselves master of the situation"*¹⁶⁷, but as the child is introduced to "culture", the expression of mastery is tempered by the reality principle. The drive is repressed and achieves expression in a variety of disguised and displaced ways. Although it appears to be expressed in a variety of seemingly unrelated modes, it is never-the-less the same desire to master absence which is the Other, which fuels the perpetual enactment of all cases of mastery. As the Other is always and necessarily the presence of absence, the Self is never able to overcome or

¹⁶⁴ *Ibid*, p. 243

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid*, p. 226

¹⁶⁶ Freud, S., *The Essentials of Psychoanalysis*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986, p. 243

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid*, p. 227

come to terms with, that absence. It is never able to entirely master the absence and bring it into its sphere of power and control.

An important aspect of the theory of "instinct renunciation" which Freud stresses, must be reiterated. Although it is often assumed that an instinct is something that pushes forward to a new state, it in fact compels the organisms to a prior state which has been lost, *"It seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in organic life to restore an earlier state of things which the living entity has been obliged to abandon under the pressure of external disturbing forces; that is, it is a kind of organic elasticity, or, to put it another way, the expression of the inertia inherent in organic life."*¹⁶⁸ Freud seems to be suggesting that all instincts urge toward regaining a lost state. In this instance, that "lost state", is the original fluid continuity of experience and being. Since this being is the fundamental and primary drive of the organism, we can see that the drive to unity is an essential feature of all being.

This "instinct to unity", plays two particularly important roles in the discussion at hand. To the rational mind these elements, as with other aspects of psychoanalytic exposition, may seem inconsistent being contradictory, but it must be recognised that the unconscious and conscious minds operate on more than one front, and not in a clear linear or rational manner. Firstly, it is the instinct for continuity which is renounced in the "instinctual renunciation". It is the drive to unity or to continuity which is the object of mastery. To be "cultural", to transcend "nature", and to come to terms with perpetual absence, the individual must master and renounce the instinct to continuity. The ego must renounce "nature" as that which is continuous, that which is unified. In addition the instinct for continuity is also manifest in the drive to master that which is Other, discontinuity itself.

Secondly, it can be seen as the root cause of the desire to incorporate into ego or destroy all that is discontinuous, all that is Other. It is this instinct which *"tends toward the restoration of an earlier state of things"*¹⁶⁹, that state being a state devoid of differentiation and otherness. As suggested, the instinct is both consciously renounced in the movement to "culture", but still unconsciously strives to attain its goal. Since the unconscious is timeless¹⁷⁰, and since the instinct for reunification is perpetually cathected with psychic energy, the organism may consciously renounce the instinct while unconsciously it is unceasingly hard at work. The individual is drawn by the inertia of the memory traces which plague it. The "past" exists perpetually in the "present". The perennial state is always present, and although repressed, it seeks satisfaction by any means acceptable to the "censor."

Freud goes on to state that it may seem strange that instincts are in essence conservative, as we have come to understand them as a *"factor impelling*

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*, p. 44

¹⁶⁹ Freud, S., *The Essentials of Psychoanalysis*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986, p. 245

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid*, p. 237

towards change and development".¹⁷¹ This is a perversion of understanding, for movement to change and development, *"must be attributed to external disturbing and diverting influences."*¹⁷² It is only when the organism is disturbed or diverted from the course prescribed by natural inertia by some external influences, that it tends toward "progress".

It is possible to speculate that the external influence is the ego, which also has an inherent inertia pulling toward self preservation. As a return to the prior state of continuity spells the end of the ego, the two principles come into conflict. The result is that the instincts are *"bound to give a deceptive appearance of being forces tending toward change and progress, whilst in fact they are merely seeking to reach an ancient goal by paths alike old and new. . . . it must be an old state of things, an initial state from which the living entity has at one time or Other departed and to which it is striving to return by the circuitous paths along which its development leads."*¹⁷³ The real goal is disguised and finds expression as the goal of the ego which is to assert itself on the external world of otherness. The aim becomes that which has been stated previously, to make all that is Other to Self, as an expression of Self. In this way it pushes forward to incorporate all that is Other to Self, to make Self absolutely certain in the world by destroying what is threatening to Self, the Other. Meanwhile it pursues its actual aim which is to return to a state of unity, to re-unify that which is de-unified, and thus to dissipate ego. It is this "unity instinct" which is manifest both in the drive to negate otherness by the ego, and the drive to negate disunity and thus the ego itself.

Freud is unequivocal in asserting that it is the operation of the instinct pulling to the primary state of things which is the cause of progress in civilisation and the drive to perfection¹⁷⁴, *"What appears in a minority of human individuals as an untiring impulsion toward further perfection can easily be understood as a result of the instinctual repression upon which is based all that is most precious in human civilisation. The repressed instinct never ceases to strive for complete satisfaction which would consist in the repetition of a primary experience of satisfaction. No substitutive or reactive formations and no sublimations will suffice to remove the repressed instincts persisting tension."*¹⁷⁵ Since the instinct is repressed, it perpetually seeks satisfaction through disguised and substitutive expressions. Unfortunately for the ego, these never fulfil its yearning, and thus "human" progress is correspondingly perpetually on-going. No degree of destruction of otherness will suffice or dampen the repressed instinct. The energy of the drive can only be dissolved by the return to continuity, the dissolution of ego.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid*, p. 244

¹⁷² *Ibid*, p. 245

¹⁷³ *Ibid*, p. 246

¹⁷⁴ The term "Perfection" merely means to make whole, to re-unify, to make complete.

¹⁷⁵ Freud, S., *The Essentials of Psychoanalysis*, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 986, p. 249

The instinct for continuity or unity is expressed both in its essential form but also more commonly in the form of one of its vicissitudes.¹⁷⁶ As the original instinct is unacceptable to consciousness, the instinct seeks to find expression in an alternate form. This may take the form of a displacement, a sublimation, or other form of disguise. The true original aim is perverted. The new object of the aim is a perversion of the original aim.

It is possible to argue that in addition to the energy of the instinct for a prior state, there is also the energy of Eros. It is Eros which seeks to "*combine organic substances into ever larger unities*".¹⁷⁷ If this is the case, it could be argued that it is Eros which is the energy of the ego. The ego as Self, tends towards encompassing what is Other into a larger more extensive unity. Taking this into account, it is clear that its aim and that of Eros are, if not identical, at least similar.

Freud goes on to suggest that the two sources of energy, the instinct for continuity and the energy of Eros are opposed. One is "*constructive or assimilatory and the Other destructive or dissimilatory*".¹⁷⁸ In this we can see the two aspects which were previously mentioned, both of which result in environmental destruction. The later is directly destructive, while the former is indirectly destructive as the by-product of constructive activity.

The paradox is that both Eros and the instinct for unity or destruction aim at essentially the same goal. That is the unification of reality, the return to non-differentiated experience. This paradox is similar to that encountered by Self Consciousness. It both strives to overcome otherness, while at the same time attempting to incorporate all that is Other into a Self unity. More precisely, the paradox is how to become an all inclusive being, while retaining ego identity as differentiated.

If we consider the functioning of the ego from the perspective of the early experience of presence and absence, we find that the modified goal of the ego is to make everything present, not by removing absence, but by mastering presence and making all that is Other, present in the ego, by transforming it through "work". Since by removing absence, desire is dispelled and with it the ego itself, the ego concentrates on mastering presence. It is in this false belief that desire can be satisfied and the goal of stasis obtained by being an all inclusive Self, which is the decisive fallacy. The Self fails to accept that it depends on otherness for its existence. It attempts to master presence while allowing absence. It fails to see they mutually coexist. It wrongly assumes that it can attain stasis, by incorporating everything into itself, without recognising that this too must spell its end. The ego, is in a similar paradox as Hegel's Self Consciousness pursuing the Absolute. The ego optimistically believes that it can incorporate all that is other into ego, without accepting that there will always be an Other, while there is ego.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 205

¹⁷⁷ Ibid, p. 250

¹⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 255

To return to our prior analysis, we can see that one of the primary manifestations of external influence on the individual, is the influence of "culture". Initially "culture" is introduced to the child in the form of the "law of the father". This law is subsequently introjected into the ego as the super-ego or ego-ideal. For Freud, the establishment of the super-ego, *"represents the most important characteristic of the development both of the individual and of the species."*¹⁷⁹ It is in the institution of this agency that the individual and species is elevated above mere natural existence. To those who have complained that there must be a higher nature in humans than the ego, Freud replied, *"here we have that higher nature, in this ego-ideal or super-ego."*¹⁸⁰ The super-ego is the cultural agency, the agency of transcendence.

Civilisation and its Discontents

It is now worthwhile to turn to an alternate but complimentary formulation in which we may be able to reinforce the conceptualisation of the development and formation of ego, and its subsequent relationship to the external world. The passage of interest comes from "Civilisation and its Discontents" in which Freud generally discusses means to the attainment of happiness and the basis and benefits of civilisation from the perspective of a critique of culture. Freud sees an overlapping of the play of symbols and metaphors which operate in the individual's unconscious, and those which are apparent in "culture".

A passage of particular interest is the section dealing with the basis of religious feeling. Once again, to begin we must return to before the beginning, before the conceptualisation of ego. Freud considers a proposal by an associate, Romain Rolland, that the basis of religious feeling is alone a "peculiar feeling", which may be termed *"a sensation of eternity, a feeling of something limitless unbounded - as it were oceanic."*¹⁸¹ The feeling is one of an indissoluble bond with the external world as a whole. It is a recognition of a fundamental connectedness among all things.

In attempting to offer a psychoanalytic explanation of the feeling, Freud asserts that *"normally there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of our Self, of our own ego."*¹⁸² Freud suggests that the ego appears as an autonomous unity, marked off from everything else, *"towards the outside, the ego seems to maintain clear and sharp lines of demarcation."*¹⁸³

¹⁷⁹ Freud, S., The Essentials of Psychoanalysis, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986, p. 458

¹⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 459

¹⁸¹ Freud, S., Civilisation and its Discontents, Freud Library, Vol 12, Penguin, 1985, p. 251

¹⁸² Ibid, p. 252

¹⁸³ Ibid, p. 253

Freud is under no illusions that this sense of Self is eternal or perennial. He states that the adult's ego feeling could not have been the same from the beginning and must have undergone a process of development. This process of development is the process of differentiation.

Freud mistakenly asserts that *"originally the ego includes everything"*.¹⁸⁴ Although he is partially correct in this assertion, and reveals one of the most important elements of our analysis, he is incorrect in asserting that it is the "ego" which includes everything. If we agree that a feeling or conceptualisation of ego or Self embodies distinction and the limitations of being, it must follow that the feeling in question is one of non-ego, or dissolved indistinct, fluid ego. This is clearly not "ego" at all as it was previously stated or as it is commonly conceptualised. The oceanic **feeling** of fusion and the **conceptualisation** of ego are diametrically opposed.

Although this important inaccuracy exists, it should not distract from the central argument. Freud goes on to suggest that it is only later that *"it separates off an external world from itself."*¹⁸⁵ In this statement we clearly see the analogy with Hegel's hypothesis. It is an act of alienation, in which a part of the same is estranged to form the Self and Other. It constitutes a difference which is not a difference. A difference which is actually part of the same.

The result of this alienation is that *"our present ego feeling is, only a shrunken residue of a much more inclusive - indeed, all embracing - feeling which corresponds to a more intimate bond between ego and the world about us,"*¹⁸⁶ The ego of maturity is an alienated ego, constituted by a difference which is not a difference. The ego has detached itself from the external world, which is in fact part of the same. It is here that the foundation of the instinct to return to this primal state is structured.

The feeling of the original all-embracing state is retained in the unconscious, repressed, but cathected with psychic energy. It perpetually seeks expression through substitutive formations. To regain the lost unity, it attempts to incorporate all that is Other into Self, by consuming or destroying otherness. Its real aim is the restoration of limitless unbounded narcissism.

Freud suggests that it is the mother, in particular her breast, which forms the first external "object", *"for the first time set over and against the ego an object in the form of something which exists outside"*.¹⁸⁷ It is this which nourishes the child, it is this which the child desires. As suggested, it displaces this desire onto socially acceptable objects. Objects which the superego, as the internalisation of "culture", does not object to. But the desire for substitutes is unending, as it is only the impossible end of primal reunification which will

¹⁸⁴ Ibid, p. 255

¹⁸⁵ Freud, S., Civilisation and its Discontents, Freud Library, Vol 12, Penguin, 1985, p. 255

¹⁸⁶ Ibid, p. 255

¹⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 254

satisfy desire. It is the absence of absence, which is the yearning of desire. It yearns for the Other which is actually part of the same.

Freud allows that the feeling of ego as strictly limited and bounded, is not inevitable and that there is one state in which the *"boundary between ego and object threatens to melt away. Against all the evidence of the senses a man who is in love declares 'I' and 'you' are one."*¹⁸⁸ But as previously detailed, Freud is mistaken in assuming that this is the only state in which ego dissolves. Ego dissolution is common in any experience of contemplation, any experience where "participation" in the object takes place. In these instances of absorption, reflective awareness of the ego vanishes. We are returned to pure consciousness, undifferentiated reality. The boundaries of the ego are not constant or unchanging. They are only maintained in the act of conceptualisation of difference.

The ego also marks the external world as threatening. The ego is *"confronted by a strange and threatening outside."*¹⁸⁹ It both desires the external world for existence, but attempts to destroy it as threatening. The paradox of "nature" as threatening, and "nature" as nurturer, is founded.

Freud states that *"An infant at the breast does not yet distinguish his ego from the external world as the source of the sensations flowing in upon him. He gradually learns to do so, in response to various promptings."*¹⁹⁰ It appears that the formation of the ego is not inevitable. It results from external "promptings" and must be learnt. These external influences are the influences of "culture". Their primary effect is to disturb the stasis of the child's mental existence. The formation of ego is not universal, but dependant upon "ways of being". The imposition of "culture" resulting in the child learning to differentiate ego from the external world, destabilises the child's mental existence through an increase in excitation. The individual thereafter strives to regain the lost stability. In various disguised forms, their mental inertia leads them to continually drive to return to their origins, to return to the state of undifferentiated limitless unbounded fluidity. The most common disguise is in the form of movement forward; progress to a divine or "religious" state.

Freud does not deny that this primal state is preserved in the mind, *"In the realm of the mind, . . . what is primitive is so commonly preserved alongside of the transformed version which has arisen from it that it is unnecessary to give instances as evidence."*¹⁹¹ Although Freud recognises that this most primitive and fundamental of states is preserved, he does not, in common with many others, seem to accept its most profound influence on later everyday adult life. This is perhaps not surprising, for such a state is threatening to all egos

¹⁸⁸ Ibid, 1985, p. 253

¹⁸⁹ Freud, S., Civilisation and its Discontents, Freud Library, Vol 12, Penguin, 1985, p. 254

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 254

¹⁹¹ Ibid, p. 256

and any instinct which pulls in its direction, must be subject to the strongest repression.

In this essay Freud continues by considering the foundation of civilisation and the means to happiness. He suggests that we are threatened in two ways which are of importance to our analysis; from the decay of our own body; and the overwhelming and merciless forces of destruction of the external world, that is of "nature". In this assertion, we see Freud too has fallen into the trap of asserting that the external world, as "nature", is a "real" threatening Other, not merely a concept which has been alienated from, and structured by, the Self. He suggests that the way to overcome the destructive forces of "nature", is to become *"a member of the human community, and, with the help of a technique guided by science, going over to the attack against "nature" and subjecting her to the human will."*¹⁹² Here we clearly see that "civilisation" or "culture" is the opposing force to counter "nature" as Other. By joining together in an autonomous exclusive group, we relegate "nature" to otherness, we declare "we do not need you", "we can control you". We falsely believe that we have transcended natural existence. In Freud's mind, it is only by joining together that we may be able to control and subjugate "her". It is possible to argue that the use of the term "her" when referring to "nature" is a clear sign of the association between the "mother" as the first Other, and "nature" as Other. In addition, there is no mention of a harmonious unity between "nature" and humanity.

In attempting to understand methods for achieving happiness and, therefore, the satisfaction of desire, it is interesting to consider Freud's analysis of the technique of Yoga. In this Freud notes that a *"regression to primordial states of mind which have long been overlaid"*¹⁹³ is achieved. The state of mind is the feeling of an oceanic bond with the world as a whole. In practice, the instinct for continuity is not so much "killed off", as in Freud's words, but is satisfied. It is interesting that Freud devalues this satisfaction as *"only the happiness of quietness."*¹⁹⁴ Surely a means which overcomes the instinct which is manifest as destruction and which achieves happiness, is much more than **only**.

In a further interesting and perhaps remarkable passage, Freud contends that it is possible civilisation itself which is the cause of our misery, and that we would be much happier if we *"returned to primitive conditions."*¹⁹⁵ He goes on to suggest that voyages of discovery which led to contact with primitive people, revealed that they were far happier than their European counterparts, who had the immeasurable technology and knowledge which enabled them to discover and often to colonise the primitive people.

¹⁹² Freud, S., Civilisation and its Discontents, Freud Library, Vol 12, Penguin, 1985, p. 265

¹⁹³ Ibid, p. 260

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p. 266

¹⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 274

Continuing this surprising and provocative line of analysis, Freud suggests that there has been disappointment that the incredible advances in the application of technology to control and subdue "nature" has not led to the happiness it promised. It is worthwhile to quote this passage at length;

*"this newly won mastery over space and time, this subjugation of the forces of "nature", . . . has not increased the amount of pleasurable satisfaction which they may expect from life and has not made them feel happier. . . . One would like to ask: is there, then, no positive gain in pleasure, no unequivocal increase in my feelings of happiness, if I can, as often as I please, hear the voice of a child of mine who is living hundreds of miles away or if I can learn in the shortest possible time after a friend has reached his destination that he has come through the long and difficult voyage unharmed? But here the voice of pessimistic criticism makes itself heard and warns us that most of these satisfactions follow the model of 'cheap enjoyment' extolled in the anecdote - the enjoyment obtained by putting a bare leg from under the bedclothes on a cold winter night and drawing it in again. If there had never been a railway to conquer distances, my child would never have left his native town and I should need no telephone to hear his voice; if travelling across the ocean by ship had not been introduced, my friend would not have embarked on his sea-voyage and I should not need a cable to relieve my anxiety about him."*¹⁹⁶

It appears that to the contrary of popular opinion, it is possible to argue that the "advances" of "humanity", rather than satisfying desire, have accentuated it. Possibly the reason is that it has increased the excitation of the mind, producing displeasure, rather than pleasure. By alienating ourselves from "nature" and treating it as an Other which must be mastered and controlled, we have increased the strength of the instinct to return to the state of continuity. It is a vicious circle in which having alienated a part of our being, we attempt to master the otherness which has been formed; but then the mastery and positing of this otherness, strengthens our dissatisfaction. Freud himself reflects a similar understanding by asserting that civilisation is built upon renunciation of instinct, that is, upon the acceptance of the dissatisfaction of desire, *"it presupposes precisely the non-satisfaction of powerful instincts."*¹⁹⁷ Once again, we see that both civilisation or "culture", and the ego, cannot accept the state of continuity necessary for satisfaction. The lack of differentiation, in this case between "culture" and "nature", spells its annihilation, and thus its only option, is to accept instinctual dissatisfaction.

In relation to the drive of the ego or Self to incorporate within itself all that is external, and thus to form one absolute ego, it is interesting to note a brief passage of Freud's which reflects a far sighted understanding. He suggests

¹⁹⁶ Freud, S., Civilisation and its Discontents, Freud Library, Vol 12, Penguin, 1985, p. 276

¹⁹⁷ Ibid, 1985, p. 286

that it is the ego as civilisation fuelled by Eros, *"whose purpose is to combine single human individuals, and after that families, then races, peoples and nations, into one great unity, the unity of mankind."*¹⁹⁸ It appears Freud had similar sentiments to Hegel and foresaw the contemporary trend to the "world community" or "global village".

In another passage Freud is distressed and confused by the disparity between humans and other animals, *"Why do our relatives, the animals, not exhibit any such cultural struggle? We do not know."*¹⁹⁹ Why is it that other animals do not seek to destroy and control their environment? We have already suggested that the essential difference between "humans" and animals is Self Consciousness, the ego. Other animals do not conceptualise themselves as distinct, they are continuous with the external world. It is the discontinuity which is the cause of our cultural struggle; it is perhaps this which is the cause of environmental degradation.

In a final important passage, Freud considers the parallels between "culture" and individuals, *"If the development of civilisation has such a far reaching similarity to the development of the individual and if it employs the same methods, may we not be justified in reaching the diagnosis that, under the influence of cultural urges, some civilisations, or some epochs of civilisation - possibly the whole of mankind - have become 'neurotic'?"*²⁰⁰ In "The Body's Recollection of Being", David Levin asks a similar question, *"could we determine that the pattern of an entire civilisation, or at least the pattern of a specific historical epoch, is the symptomatic manifestation of a collective neurosis?"*²⁰¹ The "culture" in question for both Freud and Levin, is the "culture of the Ego". In psychoanalytic terms, this would become the "Ego Complex". That is, a neurosis based on the concentration on individuation and alienated identity.

Freud continues, *"moreover, the diagnosis of communal neuroses is faced with a special difficulty. In an individual neurosis we take as our starting point the contrast that distinguishes the patient from his environment, which is assumed to be 'normal'. For a group all of whose members are affected by one and the same disorder no such background could exist; it would have to be found elsewhere."*²⁰² But we do have the background for comparison to enable a judgment to be made. This background is the alternate ways of being of the world. As previously noted these alternate "ways of being" do not share the drive to destroy "nature" as Other, nor the drive to satisfy desire. Their mental existence is stable, they are satisfied. With such clear evidence, a judgement of neurosis on "culture" is inevitable, although it is highly unlikely that this judgement will or could come from within that social

¹⁹⁸ *Ibid*, p. 313

¹⁹⁹ Freud, S., *Civilisation and its Discontents*, Freud Library, Vol 12, Penguin, p. 315

²⁰⁰ *Ibid*, p. 338

²⁰¹ Levin, D. M., *The Body's Recollection of Being*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

²⁰² Freud, S., *Op. cit.*, p. 338

order itself. It could be argued that ego, the Self, "culture", and "civilisation", are all manifestations of the same neurosis. It is illusory conceptual differentiation which is the root of this neurosis and the root of the destruction, mastery and control of otherness. "Ego" is the agent of differentiation and thus also of environmental degradation.

Lacan and Others

It is worthwhile to briefly reiterate the prior conceptualisation and to reinforce and clarify it, from the perspective of Lacan's critique of Freud and Hegel primarily developed in "The Mirror Stage". It is in this paper that Lacan attempts to bring Freud and Hegel together via a conjunctive reading. Lacan's analysis of Fort Da reveals the interweaving of presence and absence, and displacement of desire, apparent in the game. Lacan ventures into a critique of Hegel's and the Self's conquest of otherness, by observing what has previously been stated, that there can be no Self or ego, without "fort", that is, without absence, without otherness. Self is, *"the presence of an absence"*.²⁰³ As Mark Taylor suggests in "Atarity", *"the child (as Self conscious), can be born only when the mother withdraws her breast."*²⁰⁴ While the breast is present, there is no object, it is only with absence, that desire is born and with it the Self. "Fort" is Self consciousness, while "Da" signifies its dissolution into participating consciousness. The presence which is the ego results from the absence of the Other, when the Other is present, the Self is absent.

Where Freud sees the child play in Fort Da as a compensation for the mother's absences, Lacan stresses that this is a Self absence. The actions dramatise the self alienation which is signified by, and compensated for, in the game. Kaja Silverman suggests that in the object which is thrown away, the child *"perceives its own missing complement"*.²⁰⁵ Lacan interprets the story of Fort Da as a parable of the moment of alienation of Self, rather than the absence of the mother, *"the reel is not the mother reduced to a little ball by some magical game worthy of the Jivaros - it is a small part of the subject which detaches itself from him while still remaining his."*²⁰⁶

As we saw with Fichte and Hegel, the subject does not exist before or in independence of the symbolic system, within which it exists. Rather the subject is dependant upon, or rather is secondary to, the signifying system which constitutes it. The subject in Lacan's terminology, is a product of a signifying transaction.²⁰⁷

²⁰³ Taylor, M.C., *Altarity*, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, p. 88

²⁰⁴ *Ibid*, p. 88

²⁰⁵ Silverman, K., *The Subject of Semiotics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 168

²⁰⁶ Lacan quoted in Silverman, K., *The Subject of Semiotics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 168

²⁰⁷ Silverman, K., *Op. cit.*, p. 172

Similarly, as for Freud, desire has its origin in the act of differentiation. In addition, it is necessary that the ego perceives its distinctness from the objects with which it earlier identified. The subject is the product of an act of differentiation which produces a division, and it is this division, which inspires in the subject a profound sense of lacking. Lacan thus projects a subject who is from its beginning differentiated and alienated. It is constituted by the organic deficiency which is the primordial state of being. Once again from "Ecritis", *"It is the subject who introduces division into the individual."*

For Lacan, as for Freud, desire is the on-going constitution of the subject. The act which constitutes desire, is the same act which precludes its satisfaction. It is the separation from the mother as part of a continuity, which is the original constitutions of desire. Thus, *"desire is always linked with a project of impossible recovery."*²⁰⁸ Desire comes to signify the impossibility of a subject which is understood as a conscious independent Self-determining agency.

Lacan rejects Hegel's and the ego's optimism that it will be able to ultimately overcome otherness. Lacan's "Other" is pure negativity which is unassimilable and cannot be incorporated. He rejects Hegel's notion that we can transform the negative, *"through the magical powers of Self consciousness"*²⁰⁹ into something positive. It is logically impossible to transform all negativity into a reflection of Self identity, for the Self is dependant on the Other as Other. Something always escapes the Self. The Self is an emptiness, a yearning for the Other. For the subject, *"there is always an excessive remainder."*²¹⁰ To be subject, to differentiate or to define, is to lack: its fundamental characteristic, is the presence of absence. There is always an Other which must be negated, which must be destroyed, desire is never finalised. Absolute copulation of the subject and object is impossible.

Taylor suggests that from Lacan's perspective *"Freud extends and deepens the criticism of Self consciousness that began with Kierkegaard. For Freud, as for Kierkegaard, satisfaction is impossible."*²¹¹ In this we see that Lacan perhaps best articulates the absence and hence the desire which is the ego. The "I" must be mediated by the Other, which cannot be assimilated into the same, it is a difference which cannot be reduced to identity, it signifies the insatiability of desire, *"Since fulfilment is impossible, desire is endless."*²¹² The lure of the optimism of Hegel's speculative philosophy is the promise to heal the wound, to remove the absence plaguing the subject. For the philosophical subject, the lure of absolute Self or ego is overwhelming; it signals the satisfaction of desire without surrendering ego identity.

²⁰⁸ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 193

²⁰⁹ Taylor, M.C., Altarity, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, p. 94

²¹⁰ Ibid, p. 94

²¹¹ Ibid, p. 96

²¹² Ibid, p. 101

Since otherness is a universal which is unassimilable and essential to the subject, desire has no fixed or particular object, *"The structure of the drive is open ended."*²¹³ For Lacan, every object which is assimilated is a substitute for the "real thing", that is the original absence. Desire is never satisfied but moves relentlessly forward in a process of displacement, substitution, and sublimation. It is a process which Lacan compares to the *"metonymic play of signifies."*²¹⁴

Following this Lacan articulates the similarities between Hegel and Freud with reference to the goal of the ego to, *"see itself reflected in everything."*²¹⁵ The goal of Hegel's subject to see itself in every "Other", is essentially narcissistic. Taylor suggests that, *"Such narcissistic love is unseparately bound up with aggression. Unwilling to tolerate difference, the 'loving' 'I' seeks satisfaction by dominating Others and assimilating difference. This struggle for mastery is the psychological form of 'will to power' that Heidegger believes to be characteristic of the modern philosophy of the subject."*²¹⁶ Not only is it characteristic of the **philosophy** of the subject, more to the point, it is characteristic of the subject itself.

In his exposition of the mirror stage, Lacan highlights the importance of instinctual renunciation for the Self. The inertia of the primary state is threatening to the ego for a return to that mode of being spells the end of ego identity. The pull of the instincts must be renounced for the "I" is an *"apparatus for which every instinctual thrust constitutes a danger."*²¹⁷

The subject is characterised by a "lack of being", and as a lack it wants to be that which it is not. As suggested the lack is the separation, "the incisive cut", from the maternal unity. The cut is maintained by the law of the father which prohibits incest and thus bars the possibility of reunion. This is not necessarily perceived by the child as a barring of copulation with the mother, but the barring of the experience of presence. The father's word, the word of "culture", is that "thou shalt not reunite", "thou shalt exist as differentiated", and thus as perpetual lack. Being barred from a return to unity, the child conceptualises the lack which it is, as "mother". Thus "mother" is an absence, which as soon as it is, is lost. It is never there, for it is the Other which is absence.

For Lacan, it is "The name of the Father" which secures "culture" by *"continually wrestling the subject from the bosom of mother 'nature'."*²¹⁸ Like the Self which is differentiated from the mother, "culture" is differentiated from "nature". It is the super-ego as the law of the father, which first raptures the mother-child dyad and then makes reunion impossible. It is "culture" which

²¹³ Lacan quoted in Taylor, M.C., *Altarity*, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, 103

²¹⁴ Taylor, M.C., *Altarity*, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, 103

²¹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 98

²¹⁶ *Ibid*, p. 99

²¹⁷ Lacan, J., *Ecritis*, Tavistock Publications, p. 5

²¹⁸ Taylor, M.C., *Op. cit.*, p. 89

stands between the child and reunification. The internalisation of the law of "culture", is the internalisation of difference.

The original separation of mother and child is severed by the "word of the father" and as such it is a traumatic *"catastrophic cleavage."*²¹⁹ This is the first primal repression, the repression of the absence which it is. The subject is born through definition and differentiation, *"it emerges through a process of differentiation in which it struggles to construct identity by separating itself from otherness."*²²⁰ It is this differentiation which constitutes the first repression. In an attempt to regain equilibrium, the ego attempts to *"exclude, dominate or incorporate everything different from itself."*²²¹ Lacan argues that these attempts inevitably fail and subjectivity remains forever an inherently unstable state. It must perpetually assert its Self, for it is never stable or certain. The repressed continually returns to unsettle all domesticating or stabilising activity. Lacan terms this traumatic alterity which perpetually returns, "the real".

Lacan also sheds light on the essential quality of the time "before the beginning", by somewhat paradoxically asserting that it is "unrepresentable". This "before the beginning", is before differentiation and is therefore before conceptualisation. It is never present, never "there", for these notions are themselves post-conceptualisation. Unable to be present, *"this origin cannot be re-presented."*²²² It signifies the presence of an absence which discloses the absence which is inherent in every present. There is no "original presence", for it simply is. Levinas describes this as the "unrepresentable before", and Taylor as the "time before time", a "non-original" origin.²²³ It is the primal scene which never takes place, for logically, it cannot be conceptualised.

Lacan argues that the phallus is *"a symbol of the lack of desire"*.²²⁴ Desire operates in the gap severed between "mother" and child. To unite with the mother, "I" would have to be what the mother desires. What does woman want? What does she lack? The subject guesses that she lacks the phallus and so it must be this which she desires. To satisfy desire, the ego seeks to take the place of the phallus, that is, it strives to be phallographic. The "I" must stand erect, defined. The phallus must not be confused with the penis, for the phallus is the signifier of absence. It is the mythic signifier which we become to unite, to return to continuity. The phallus not only fulfils desire, but is also the difference which **is** desire. Being the lack "of" desire, it is the difference which the mother is. The phallus comes to represent the phallographic order, which is characterised by the desire for, and the domination of, the Other.

219 Taylor, M.C., *Altarity*, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, p. 88

220 *Ibid*, p. 92

221 *Ibid*, p. 92

222 *Ibid*, p. 93

223 *Ibid*, p. 93

224 Lacan quoted in Taylor, M.C., *Altarity*, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, p. 105

The phallographic order destroys the Other as "nature" in an attempt to unite and to stand erect itself.

In the final paragraphs of "The Mirror Stage", Lacan suggests that it is the "I" which is the subject of neurosis, *"We can thus understand the inertia characteristic of the formations of the I, and find there the most extensive definition of neurosis - just as the capitulation of the subject by the situation gives us the most general formula for madness, not only the madness that lies behind the walls of asylums, but also the madness that deafens the world with its sound and fury."*²²⁵ It could be argued that both Lacan and Freud, reflect the view that it is the "culture of the Self" which is mad, and as such that madness permeates our social being. Morris Berman argues a similar line, *"it is hard to avoid the conclusion that in its modern form the ego is the product and expression of pathology."*²²⁶

Finally, Lacan recognises that the split between "culture" and "nature" is a manifestation of the Self, for it is only the "science of the Self", psychoanalysis, which reveals its essential nature, *"At this junction of "nature" and "culture", so persistently examined by modern anthropology, psychoanalysis alone recognises this knot of imaginary servitude that love must always undo again, or sever."*²²⁷ It is "nature" which is mastered by "culture". But this dichotomy itself is merely an imaginary construct of the Self or ego.

²²⁵ Lacan, J., Ecrits, Tavistock Publications, p. 7

²²⁶ Berman, M., The Reenchantment of the World, New York: Bantam, 1981, p.164

²²⁷ Lacan, J., Ecrits, Tavistock Publications, p. 7

CONCLUSION

Power and Desire; Self and Other: In Hegel and Freud

It is in the conceptualisation of Self, that power and desire come together in their most formidable combination. Power and desire depend on, and are constituted by, the structuring of difference. It is as difference, that the Self, necessarily entails and presupposes desire and domination. Power and desire are not additional or optional properties of the Self, they are inalienable to its essence.

In both the Hegelian and Freudian traditions, similar operants determine action and constitute the Self. Originally there is a undifferentiated, fluid, continuous unity. The concepts of Self and Other, "culture" and "nature", do not exist. It is a self-sameness, a merging of identity and non-identity. It is not a state of perceived or conceptualised wholeness or unity, rather, it is a state of pure experience.

The movement to Self Consciousness and ego identity, is one of differentiation of the formless medium. An alienation takes place in which a part of the sameness is separated and alienated as an Other. It is with the establishment of this Other, that the Self and ego, are structured. The act of alienation, differentiation and conceptualisation of the dichotomy, is a product of reflective consciousness.

It is the activity of "difference", which results in the separation of Self from other. In Derrida's words, *"the movement of difference as that which produces different things, that which differentiates, is the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark our language, such as, nature/culture."*²²⁸ The energy of difference is negation. The power of the negative fuels the conceptualisation of difference. The concepts of "Self", "other", "nature", and "culture", do not exist independently, or express a positive meaning. Rather, as Christopher Norris suggests, *"our signifying practices only make sense insofar as they enter into a play of relationships and differences which cannot be reduced to positive terms or pure Self identical meanings."*²²⁹

The origin of Self Consciousness is the act of reflection in which alienation of "Self" occurs. This is the original act of negation which constitutes the Self. Benjamin states that the *"process of acquiring a Self is referred to as differentiation."*²³⁰ Taylor asserts that this act of differentiation is *"the*

²²⁸ Ronse, H., Implications, p.9

²²⁹ Norris, C., Derrida, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 139

²³⁰ Benjamin, J., Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination, p.

*traumatic separation of man from mother "nature".*²³¹ Rosen comments, *"Reflection is positedness as negation".*²³² In alienation, being becomes Self/Other. Other is alienated from Self. Rosen suggests *"the term alienation, means becoming other".*²³³ Alienation is a characteristic of Self Consciousness, or more accurately, alienation is Self Consciousness. It is the same act of alienation which is the origin of the "nature"/"culture"(humanity) split.

Alienation proceeds from an original state of continuity. It is through differentiation that *"this fluid medium itself becomes the other through the difference."*²³⁴ The fluid medium has a quality of sameness. It is in the act of affirming Self, in this fluid medium, that identity negates being and, "becomes other". Taylor argues that for Hegel, *"in relating itself to its apparent other, difference really relates to itself."*²³⁵ The relation to the other, turns out to be a Self -relation.

The alienation of the undifferentiated unity, is perceived by the Self or ego, as an alienation of themselves. It is experienced as a lacking, a component of their identity removed to an unreachable elsewhere or beyond. It is with this differentiation, that desire is born.

In Hegel, we saw that Self consciousness, "is desire in general". It is characterised by the lack which it is. Self consciousness is not in itself, an essence, it is rather a lack which is the "other". It is a negation and alienation; a hollow rather than a whole. As an emptiness, Self consciousness is dominated by the desire to overcome the other, and to incorporate it into Self. Its aim is to reformulate all relations which appear as external, as internal ones. Self consciousness desires to make itself the world. Mark Taylor states that *"In his struggle to domesticate all forms of otherness by negating or repressing everything different from himself, modern man seeks the Self-certainty and security for which Descartes longed and that Hegel believed had been clearly revealed in the absolute knowledge of his speculative system."*²³⁶

Desire is born from the yearning to overcome the other which has been alienated from unified being. In Stanley Rosen's words, *"Desire is thus fundamentally desire for myself, or for my interior essence, from which I have become detached."*²³⁷ The desire for the Other, finds expression in a multiplicity of sublimated forms. Butler suggests, *"The effect of desire's*

²³¹ Taylor, M.C., *Altarity*, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, p. "Conception"

²³² Rosen, S., *G.W.L. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*, New Haven, Yale University Press, p. 114

²³³ *Ibid*, p. 172

²³⁴ Taylor, M.C., *Op. cit*, p. "Conception".

²³⁵ *Ibid*, p. "Conception"

²³⁶ *Ibid*, p. "Cleaving"

²³⁷ Rosen, S., *G.W.L. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom*, New Haven, Yale University Press, p. 30

articulation is the perpetual displacement of the signified."²³⁸ That is, desire is displaced onto a inexhaustible series of manifestations of the original object, which is a component of the Self. This displacement is essential to the subject, as it continually requires another object through whose negation it can assert itself. As such, desire is for the Self, insatiable.²³⁹

It is the lack which is the other, which is also the essence of power and dominance. The otherness of the Other is threatening to the Self, and must be overcome by either destroying its essential otherness, or making it over as a reflection of Self consciousness. In both these ways the defining character of the Other is destroyed so as to make it Self. In the destruction of the Other, the Self aims to expand its own being to encompass the extremities of existence.

The pivotal issue which leads to both power and desire, is not merely the **existence** of the Other. It depends not so much on the otherness of the Other, but on the paradoxical element that the Other, is actually part of the same. As Benjamin stresses, *"the root of the problem of domination is a failure to achieve true differentiation."*²⁴⁰ Self consciousness sees the other as part of its being and thus experiences it as a lack, something which is essential to its own being and which must be re-incorporated. The sameness of the other results from the movement of alienation which is the origin of Self Consciousness. Before Self Consciousness is structured, everything which exists is part of the same. It is only when a part of this sameness is alienated and becomes an "other", that desire and dominance are born. This movement of alienation is the critical shift in focus which Self Consciousness forever tries to undo. Although the fluid continuity, the multiplicity in sameness, has been shattered, it never-the-less remains essential to the being of Self Consciousness.

Norman O. Brown stresses the importance of the illusory character of the differentiation of Self and Other, *"The boundary line between self and external world bears no relation to reality; the distinction between ego and world is made by spitting out part of the inside, and swallowing in part of the outside."*²⁴¹ He goes on to suggest that the erection of the boundary does nothing to alter the fact that there is, in reality, no boundary, *"the net effect is an illusion, self-deception; a big lie. Or alienation."*²⁴²

The goal of Self consciousness is thus to re-experience the original sameness by overcoming all otherness. It desires to make all that is other, a part of the same Absolute subject. Kojève states that *"Self consciousness*

²³⁸ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p. 194

²³⁹ Taylor, M.C., Altarity, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, p."Conception"

²⁴⁰ Benjamin, J., Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination, p. 294

²⁴¹ Brown, N., Love's Body, New York: Vintage Books, 1968, p. 143

²⁴² Brown, N., Love's Body, New York: Vintage Books, 1968, p. 144

naturally, spontaneously, tends to extend itself, to expand, to spread through the whole domain of the reality given to man and in man."²⁴³ Unfortunately the goal of Self consciousness to expand its being to the limit of reality, is a self defeating and impossible dream, for Self Consciousness and subjectivity, depend on the existence of the other. In essence, they are difference.

In Freudian psychoanalysis, the story is almost identical. Desire originates from the individual's drive or inertia, to regain the original experience of sameness. The ego is split off from the original continuity with the maternal body.

The ego experiences otherness as contradicting the characteristics of this primary state. The Other, must be either incorporated into Self, or destroyed. The inertia signals a lacking which constitutes the subject. Kaja Silverman suggests, *"The subject is defined as a lacking because it is believed to be a fragment of something larger and more primordial. . . . the human subject derives from an original whole which is divided in half, and its existence is dominated by the desire to recover its missing counterpart."*²⁴⁴

Similarly as for Hegel, the ego is in essence, a difference which is in fact a part of the same. This difference is experienced as an absence. The ego seeks to master this absence. It seeks to dominate and control it. The Other, is this absence, and thus it is the Other which the ego seeks to control and dominate. Although this activity is fuelled by the drive to the primal state, there is a counter force pulling in the direction of the experience of subjectivity. This force is the power of the ego itself, or Eros. To reconcile these counter forces, the conflict is resolved in favour of the unattainable aim of making everything ego; thus retaining subjectivity, while attaining the experience of original undifferentiated unity.

The differentiation of Self from Other, is not the only product of difference, it is the original cause of all other dichotomous differences. This differentiation is alternatively expressed as the "nature"/"culture" dualism. It is on this dualism that all the theoretical powers of "human" subjective reason are based. Without this dichotomy, pretensions as to the superiority of the human species would vanish.

The project of desire is an impossible dream. Its successful fulfilment would spell the dissipation of the subject. Butler suggests that desire is the *"expression of a longing for the return to the origin that if recoverable, would necessitate the dissolution of the subject itself."*²⁴⁵ The subject remains haunted by a memory which it, as a Self, cannot possibly re-experience. Desire is for that which it is not, nor could logically be. The subject as desire

²⁴³ Kojeve, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press, p. 82

²⁴⁴ Silverman, K., The Subject of Semiotics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 152-153

²⁴⁵ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p.187

is internally contradictory. If the subject is to exist, so too will desire. The pacification of desire is simply a matter of dissolving the subject.

The concept of "nature" gets entangled in the web of power and desire of the Self, by being identified as an Other. It is other to "culture", and therefore other to Self. As Other, it must be overcome, or in some other manner incorporated into Self. Isaac Balbus reflects this understanding and applies it to the thinking which emerged with the Enlightenment, *"In using "nature", the Enlightenment consciousness strives to annul its otherness in order to make it an extension of itself."*²⁴⁶ He goes on to assert that the Self as "culture", imposes *"its own stamp on "nature"; nature must be made other than what it is, so that humans can recognise themselves in it."*²⁴⁷

The identification between the Other and "nature", is partly due to an association between the nurturing "mother" as Other, and "nature" as nurturer. Nature is accepted unconsciously as that which nourishes and is identified with the mother, which is the first Other, and first nurturer. Balbus supports this view, *"The earth in short, becomes "mother nature" because it is the mother who nurtures. . . it necessarily follows that nature becomes a repository for our unconscious attitudes toward our mother."*²⁴⁸ But the relationship to "nature", is, like the relationship to the mother, characterised by ambiguity. It is a "love-hate" relationship, for the other is both desired to exist, and desired to be destroyed. It is by concentrating on some of the "unconscious slips" or everyday Freudian parapraxes of discourse, that the unconscious associations are revealed. For example, the common notion of the "rape of nature", is far more than a mere metaphor. It is the unconscious desire for union with the "mother", as that which is absent.

Bataille: Discontinuity as Erotic Domination

In "Erotism, Death and Sensuality", Georges Bataille, brings desire and dominance together in the expression of eroticism. Following this line of analysis, it could be argued that our relationship to "nature" is in essence erotic, although this may be far from the common understanding. Bataille's terminology expresses fundamentally the same understanding as Hegel's and Freud's. Bataille discusses "continuity" and "discontinuity". Continuity can be seen to refer to the original perennial state of "natural consciousness" or undifferentiated wholeness. Fox Keller highlights the continuous nature of the perennial state, *"In the early world of the infant, experiences of thoughts, feelings, events, images, and perceptions are continuous. Boundaries have not yet been drawn"*.²⁴⁹ In contrast to the experience of continuity, discontinuity is the ego or Self Consciousness. In the transition to Self

²⁴⁶ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 141

²⁴⁷ Balbus, I. D., "A Neo-Hegelian, Feminist, Psychoanalytic Perspective on Ecology" in Telos, 52, 1982 pp 140-155, p. 142

²⁴⁸ Ibid, p. 147

²⁴⁹ Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 80

Consciousness, there is a transition from "continuous to discontinuous".²⁵⁰ As egos or Self Consciousness', "We are discontinuous beings, but we yearn for our lost continuity. We find the state of affairs that binds us to our random and ephemeral individuality hard to bear. Along with the tormenting desire that this evanescent thing should last, there stands our obsession with a primal continuity linking us with everything that is, . . . , (with eroticism), the concern is to substitute for individual isolated discontinuity a feeling of profound continuity."²⁵¹ Bataille expresses the Self's and ego's desire to maintain discontinuity while seeking the experience of continuity.

The satisfaction of desire by a return to the state of continuity, is rejected, as it signals the death of the being which is discontinuous. Bataille suggests that we cannot imagine the transition to a state fundamentally different to the current state, "without picturing violence done to the being called into existence through discontinuity."²⁵² Indeed this is not a mistaken belief, for a return to continuity, the overcoming of difference, must result in the dissolution of the way of being defined by discontinuity. Benjamin stresses that any form of merging or boundary loss, "is experienced as psychic death once we have differentiated."²⁵³ Butler expresses the same sentiment, "desire's satisfaction, signifies a kind of death in life."²⁵⁴ Bataille agrees with these comments; the transition to the erotic state which is continuous, "presupposes a partial dissolution of the person as he exists in the realm of discontinuity."²⁵⁵ Recognising the contradictory claims, Bataille highlights Hegel's and Freud's understanding of the goal of the Self or ego, "What we desire is to bring into a world founded on discontinuity all the continuity such a world can sustain."²⁵⁶ We thus strive to make all that is other, Self, to make all that is discontinuous, continuous, while retaining the difference which is the Self.

Social Manifestations of Self

Collective discontinuity or difference, is "culture". Heidegger states that "modern phenomena manifests itself in the fact that human activity is conceived and consummated as "culture".²⁵⁷ "Culture" arises as the collective transcendental difference, of the Self or ego. "Culture", is the "way of being" of the Self; "Culture", is of the Self. The other, of "culture", is "nature". As other, "nature" must be destroyed or incorporated into "culture".

²⁵⁰ Bataille, G., Erotism: Death and Sexuality, San Fransisco: City Lights Books, 1957, p. 15

²⁵¹ Ibid, p. 15

²⁵² Ibid, p. 17

²⁵³ Benjamin, J., Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination, p. 296

²⁵⁴ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p.14

²⁵⁵ Bataille, G., Op.cit., p. 17

²⁵⁶ Ibid, p. 19

²⁵⁷ Heidegger, M., The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p. 116

The otherness of "nature" must be controlled, dominated or made over as a reflection of "culture". "Culture" as "humanity" strives to bring "nature" into the sphere of "humanity". "Nature" must be "humanised". The aim of "culture" is thus the same as the aim of the Self, Self Consciousness and the ego. That is, to make all that is other to "culture", a part of, or as a reflection of, "culture". It desires to make all that is, an expression of "culture" or a construct of "humanity"; to expand the sphere of "human" influence to the limits of reality.

We have already seen how the sphere of "economics" has a metaphysical base which is dependant upon and results from the strivings of the Self. This is not the only "cultural" manifestation of the Self. Others include, science, technology, religion, urbanisation, and the institution of private property. In these we see the characteristics, and drive, of the Self expressed. They either or both seek to maintain and enhance a differentiation in transcendence, or to overcome otherness in a movement to a all inclusive totality. In all of these "cultural" manifestations, there are clear reminders of the relationship between Self and "nature".

The first, and perhaps most important characteristic of the modern Western way of being, is the predominance of science. Science is one of the central doctrines, if not the central doctrine, of Western "culture". The philosophical deconstruction of science is an imposing task; hence, it will only be possible to mention those aspects which directly relate to the present concern. To understand the nature of science, we must reveal its metaphysical foundations.²⁵⁸

In his essay, "The Age of the World Picture", Heidegger asks *"In what does the essence of modern science lie? What understanding of what is and of truth provides the basis for that essence?"*²⁵⁹ To answer this, we must first clarify some of the important characteristics of science. Heidegger suggests that science as research, is *"necessarily a science of individualised character"*.²⁶⁰ That is, scientific research is necessarily a specialisation. Heidegger suggests that this is not only a necessary evil, but science's founding characteristic. It is in the "specialisation" of scientific research, that we already find the Self at work in the demarcation of boundaries of identity.

The specialisation of scientific research which is in essence, an act of differentiation, Heidegger suggests, results from the introduction of *"subjectivism and individualism"*²⁶¹, which has occurred in the modern age. From this "introduction", the very essence of "man" has changed in that, *"man becomes subject."*²⁶² Heidegger states that the word "subject", derives

²⁵⁸ The investigation only relates to "modern" science, not to ancient practices.

²⁵⁹ Heidegger, M., Op. cit., p. 117

²⁶⁰ Heidegger, M., The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p. 123

²⁶¹ Ibid, p. 128

²⁶² Ibid, p. 128

from "subietum", which means, that which *"gathers everything onto itself"*.²⁶³ Once again, we see the prior exposition of the essence and drive of subjectivity, coming together in Heidegger's analysis of science. It is in science, that "man" becomes the relational centre of all that is.

In his analysis, Heidegger's primary contention is that the way of being of modern science, its "world picture", sees the world as picture. It is not merely that it has a peculiar vision of the world, but that it sees the external world as a unified whole, a "picture." It is only with the way of being constituted by subjectivity, that it is possible for the world to be a "picture", *"the world picture of the modern age, and the modern world picture both mean the same thing and both assume something that could never have been before, namely, a medieval or ancient world picture. The world picture does not change from an earlier medieval one into a modern one, but rather the fact that the world becomes picture at all is what distinguishes the essence of the modern age."*²⁶⁴ The age of the world picture is an objectification of the external world, into a structured conceptual whole. The external world as a whole, becomes the Other, as object for the scientific subject.

Heidegger asserts that this act of conceptualisation, is one and the same event as the individual becoming subject.²⁶⁵ In the act of conceptualisation, *"there begins a way of being human which mans the realm of human capability as a domain given over to measuring and executing, for the purpose of gaining mastery over that which is, as a whole."*²⁶⁶ Evelyn Fox Keller, reiterates Heidegger's point and extends it to developmental psychoanalysis, *"the ability to perceive reality "objectively" is acquired as an inextricable part of the long and painful process by which the child's sense of Self is formed. In the deepest sense, it is a function of the child's capacity for distinguishing Self from not-Self, "me" from "not-me"."*²⁶⁷

By forming the world into a "picture", by transforming it into a "human" conceptualisation, the world stands conquered. Mark Taylor suggests that in the activity of representation, the subject transforms the world into its own image, *"the world is therefore the picture of the creative subject."*²⁶⁸ In addition, the more "objectively" the world appears, *"all the more subjectively does the subject rise up"*.²⁶⁹ As picture, the world becomes a construct of "culture", "humanity" or science. The world becomes anthropology, a reflection of "humanity". The word "picture" refers to the image of the world, as a *"structured image"*²⁷⁰; an image structured by the Self, and thus

263 Ibid, p. 128

264 Ibid, p. 130

265 Ibid, p. 132

266 Ibid, p. 132

267 Fox Keller, Reflections on Gender and Science, p. 80

268 Taylor, M.C., Altarity, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, p. "Cleaving"

269 Heidegger, M., The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York: Harper and Row, 1977., p. 133

270 Ibid, p. 134

controlled and mastered by the Self. Science is thus an *"absolutely necessary form of this establishing of Self in the world."*²⁷¹

The notion of the world as picture is reflected in the myth of objectivity. Modern science is based on the conception that subject and object are independent. The subject is seen as being entirely independent of the object, with only an arbitrary relationship. The observer is conceptualised as an essential subject, not a mediated subject. The subjectivity of the Self and the objectivity of the external world as a scientific model or theory, is a manifestation of the differentiation of Self from other.

It is in science, that the Self substitutes abstract "cultural" concepts, mathematics, for actual objects. Science domesticates the external world by transforming the multiplicity of forms, into logical, mathematical, "human" forms. Hollier reflects this understanding, *"Science, having glazed the world over with the ideal, eliminates any difference which is not logical, or reduces it to a specific difference. Difference must be reduced, diminished, and strung together by logic."*²⁷² By making the world into a construct of human logic, the Self masters the externality of the world.

Science thus posits the world as object, as an Other to be conquered.²⁷³ The primary Other of science, the primary expression of the external world to "humanity", is "nature". That is, "nature" is that which exists independently of "culture". This foundation of science leads to its more ostensible images and projections, which are everywhere apparent. In the expressions of science, the drive of the Self to master and control "nature", is most clearly manifest.

Modern science is characterised by the desire to control and master the external world. As suggested, the primary other which science seeks to master is "nature". Unlike older forms of science, modern science driven by subjectivity, does not seek to explain or understand natural events, so much as to control, dominate and master them. Nature is seen as that which is threatening, that which must be subdued by "human" inventive and creative skill. Science is an instrument of difference, and it aims to control and dominate. Control, is of one thing, "nature" as Other. Self as science, strives to assert itself on "nature" as Other, in order to make itself master and possessor of that threatening Other.

Francis Bacon was one of the first to voice the view that science should be directed toward the control and manipulation of "nature". As Lloyd states, *"Bacon construed the mind's task in knowledge not as mere contemplation, but as control of nature", "For Bacon, the endeavour to 'renew and enlarge the power and empire of mankind in general over the universe' is a sound and*

²⁷¹ *Ibid*, p. 135

²⁷² Hollier quoted in During, L., *"Culture and Critique"*, Lecture notes

²⁷³ It is interesting to note that there is a movement away from objectification and differentiation in the emerging field of quantum mechanics, in which observation is dependant on the actions of the observer.

noble ambition."²⁷⁴ In Bacon's own words, "*My only earthly wish is . . . to stretch the deplorably narrow limits of man's dominion over the universe to their promised bounds.*"²⁷⁵ Today this valourisation of science is unchanged. As Carol MacCormack states, "*We allocate honour and prestige to people of science and industry who excel in understanding and controlling the powerful domain of "nature".*"²⁷⁶

If we take but one example of modern science, we see most of the characteristics of the Self expressed. It could be argued that the discipline of "genetics" is founded on the control and manipulation of "nature". Through the application of genetic engineering, processes which were previously out of human control, are mastered. The very essence of "nature" takes on the appearance that it is able to be controlled. Not only does it allow "nature" to be controlled, it also allows "nature" to be made over in the image of the Self. What previously escaped the power of the Self, what previously remained essentially other, can now be transformed as an expression of the Self. The entire realm of "nature" now has the potential of becoming a reflection of Self, "culture", or "humanity". Nature becomes wax in human hands by being transformed by Hegelian "work".

By making "nature" an expression or reflection of "humanity", the Self progresses on its road to total consumption of otherness. Literally, the Self as "humanity", becomes the world. Nature becomes instrumentalised and objectified. Not only does genetic engineering enable what was previously an untransformable other to become an expression of Self, but it also allows that other to be consumed and possessed by the Self. For the first time, the essence of "nature" is able to be owned as a product of genetic engineering. The genetically engineered mouse which develops breast cancer at maturity was the first "animal" to be patented. Nature is "humanised" by being patented, it is brought into the control of the "human" world of institutions. It becomes a concept, an entity defined by a patent number, rather than an independent integral Other. The mouse has no say, no control, for it is no longer a "mouse" in the sense that it is a natural autonomous entity, rather it is a "human" creation.

Technology, like science, is primarily aimed at the control and mastery of "nature", "*Scientific calculation prepares the way for instrumental technology, which is designed to secure "human" existence by controlling or dominating "nature".*"²⁷⁷ It is in the application of technology that modern humans have been best able to attain the ends desired by the Self. It is in modern phenomena such as industrial manufacturing that the Self has undertaken the transformation of "nature" by Hegelian "work" on a grand scale. Balbus

²⁷⁴ Lloyd, G., The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy, Methuen, p. 15

²⁷⁵ MacCormack, C.P. & Strathern, M., (eds.), Nature, Culture and Gender, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 47

²⁷⁶ Ibid, p. 6

²⁷⁷ Taylor, M.C., Altarity, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, p."Cleaving"

highlights a similar point made by Karl Marx, *"As Marx would have it, "through production nature appears as his world and his reality, he contemplates himself in a world he has created."*²⁷⁸ Lisabeth During articulates a similar point, *"technology is not, as high "culture" preciously complains, the monstrous squeezing out of human will, human aspiration, the human spirit, but its direct expression: the will to power of Western metaphysics."*²⁷⁹

The prevailing conception of private property is similarly a peculiarity of the Western way of being. As such, it too is a mechanism by which the Self attempts to obtain its goal to incorporate all externality, as an expression of the Self. By being able to "own" the elements of the external world, the Self is able to incorporate difference into its being. By owning objects, the Self is able to assert, "that is me" "I am reflected in these things", "they express my being". The Western conceptualisation of private property, is a reflection of the desire of the Self to rectify the deficiency which it is. Baxter suggests that Marx reflects this understanding, *"a person already in possession of some private property may feel that he desires a portion of someone else's private property because some aspects of that other's property he believes, will fulfil a want or express his existence more fully."*²⁸⁰

The characteristically Western drive of greed and materialism, is but another manifestation of the Self, which it may be argued, has resulted in a large portion of contemporary on-going environmental destruction. In essence, greed and materialism are fuelled by the Self or ego attempting to make itself whole again, to regain the lost presence. It is a manifestation of the movement to the Absolute by overcoming otherness through incorporation. The objects of desire are displaced substitutes for the lost presence of the "mother". By consuming objects of alterity, the ego attempts to overcome its imperfection, it attempts to fill the absence which it is. The Self believes that each desired object will satisfy its desire. The individual feels, "if only I can get . . . I'll be happy". The Self unconsciously assumes that the desired object, is what is missing. Unfortunately, "desire", being "desire in general", the desire to overcome all otherness, is displaced onto an unceasing array of goods and possessions. The Self fails to recognise that desire is its very being. Each object which is incorporated into the Self is immediately replaced by a plethora of new desirable objects. Greed and consumerism are not optional characteristics of "culture", they constitute its being.

The "consumerism" of the Western way of being, does not only extend to material goods and possessions, it encompasses all otherness, including other ways of being. Other less "civilised" ways of being are identified with "nature" as being natural, and therefore they too must be incorporated into Western "culture". The "culture" of the Self, that is the Western way of being, by its nature necessarily strives to consume these other ways of being.

²⁷⁸ Balbus, I. D., "A Neo-Hegelian, Feminist, Psychoanalytic Perspective on Ecology" in *Telos*, 52, 1982 pp 140-155, p. 142

²⁷⁹ During, L., *"Culture and Critique"* Lecture notes.

²⁸⁰ Baxter, B., *Alienation and Authenticity*, London: Tavistock Publications, 1982, p. 135

These "Others", must be incorporated into Self, into "culture". If they cannot be incorporated, they must at least be destroyed as Other. The Self, as "culture", seeks to expand its being to include all that is. An interesting example of this is in the transformation of "primitive art" into Western art. Picasso received his inspiration from the incredible energy and form of West African tribal art. Picasso subsequently transformed this "natural" art into a reflection of Western "culture". As we would expect, it is the transformed reflection of the Self, which became valued, not the original material on which it was based.

"Culture" is in essence, "consuming "culture"". Unlike others, we are not immersed in our way of being. We reflect on it and chose it at will. We are like shoppers in a "cultural" supermarket; like a smorgasbord, choosing a little from here, a little from there, in order to construct the way of being we think will satisfy desire. But our desire, is not for anything in particular. It is merely the desire to consume or destroy, all that there is on the smorgasbord, for we desire the entire smorgasbord.

It is possible to argue that the modern movement to urbanisation, is another expression of the Self as "culture". In the movement to urbanisation, the Self seeks to separate itself from the Other, which is "nature". Its aim is to experience a world where difference is reduced to a seeming sameness. Like economics, urbanisation is an attempt to formulate a world created entirely by "humanity", and entirely dependant upon the creations of the Self. In addition to the experience of the all consuming Selfness, the differentiation of urbanisation from more "natural" forms of human existence, can also be seen as another manifestation of the differentiation of Self and Other.

A variety of environmental philosophers have looked for the cause of contemporary environmental destruction, in the various aspects which constitute and characterise the Western way of being. Many have suggested that the cause lies with modern science and technology, while others such as John Passmore in "Man's Responsibility to Nature" and L. White's influential paper "The Historical Roots of our Environmental Crisis", have entertained the notion that it is the Christian religion which is the cause. Briefly this criticism is based on the division, which is forged between humans and other animals, by the biblical teachings. They suggest that by demarcating humanity, from the rest of creation, we have been led to see ourselves as over and above "nature", and as "nature" merely existing for our use and consumption. Although there is at least an element of truth in these assertions, they fail to take account of the true cause of this differentiation.

Rather than being the cause of our current environmental crisis, social elements such as science and religion are merely symptoms. They themselves are products of the same agent which has resulted in environmental destruction. What analyses of the Christian religion have highlighted, is that it is the division between "humanity" and "nature", which is the cause of destruction. The protagonist of this conceptual division, like all other conceptual divisions or differentiations, is the Self or ego.

The desire to control and master the Other, and to face it in a life and death struggle, is not confined to the more commonly supposed activities. Even in the pure "nature" pursuits such as mountain climbing, the aim is to conquer or master the Other in a life and death struggle, which has no certain outcome. The objective is to master the mountain as Other. The mountain is given an intentional identity of its own, an intentional otherness which must be overcome. The answer to the frequently asked question, "Why climb the mountain?", is succinct, "Because its there". The mountain is Other till it is climbed, mastered, conquered and brought into the sphere of the control of the Self. Conquering and controlling, is not only in the form of the **material** destruction of "nature" as Other, but also includes the mastery of "nature", in this more "acceptable" form. It is important to highlight the fact that not all ways of being, see a challenge in natural objects such as mountains. In "Seven Years in Tibet", we find that rather than being excited by Hillary's ascent of Everest in 1953, the Tibetans are dismayed as to why one would want to climb it at all!

It is even possibly to argue that to leave "nature" completely as Nature, as Other, is an expression of Self. The drive to retain "nature" as Other, by "nature preservationists", can be seen as an unconscious recognition of the value of otherness to the attainment of certainty of Self. By maintaining a pure unbastardised other, the Self is able to be certain of its own differentiated existence, and thus avoid psychic death.

Environmental Philosophy and Self

These "cultural" examples of the Self's drive to overcome otherness by consuming the other into Self, or by literally destroying the individuality, autonomy and integrity of the other, are expressions of the Hegelian Self Consciousness or Freudian ego. Both drive to incorporate all that exists within themselves, thus constituting themselves as all encompassing subjects. For Freud, this is denoted by the expansion of ego, while for Hegel, it is manifest as the conclusion of the Phenomenology, and indeed of all becoming, that is, the Absolute. It is possible to argue that similar movements are reflected in one of the two primary doctrines of environmental philosophy. The philosophy in question is "Deep Ecology".

The term "Deep Ecology", was first coined by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. His aim was to differentiate between what he called "shallow ecology", being environmental thought which remains anthropocentric, and an alternate "deeper" conception, which radically alters the way we perceive ourselves in the world. The focal argument of Deep Ecology corresponds to a central theme of this paper, that environmental destruction, results from differentiation, in particular the differentiation between humans and non-humans. It is in the proposed resolution of this division, that concord between the philosophies is lost.

In the terms utilised in this paper, Deep Ecology argues that to overcome the destruction of the non-human external world, we must expand our Self

identity, to incorporate what is now seen as other to Self. Since the Self strives to destroy what is other, we must find a new way of being in which what is other, is seen as integral to the Self. To do this we must expand our notion of Self to include "nature" as currently conceptualised.

The primary criticism of Deep Ecology has come from the brand of environmental philosophy commonly known as Eco Feminism or Ecological feminism. Although the critique of Deep Ecology, will draw on the arguments of Eco Feminism, the crux of the objection is fundamentally different, and in fact applies to Eco Feminism itself. Although the Eco-Feminist critique of Deep Ecology, is to some extent well founded, it is necessary to go beyond its arguments, if a lasting harmony with "nature" is to be established.

Ynestra King states that *"we live in a "culture" founded on the repudiation and domination of "nature". This has a special significance for women because in patriarchal thought women are believed to be closer to "nature" than men. This gives women a special stake in ending the domination of "nature" - in healing the alienation between human and nonhuman "nature".*"²⁸¹ King identifies that the aim of environmental philosophy, must be to reunite what is "human" and what is nonhuman; to undo the movement of alienation which resulted in the structuring of Self Consciousness and thus the domination of "nature". The question of philosophical environmental debate, is what should this reunification look like? How should it be conceptualised?

The aim of Eco Feminism as expressed by King, reflects the aim of this paper, *"eco-feminist theory seeks to show the connections between all forms of domination, including the domination of non-human "nature".*"²⁸² Although the aims correspond, it is in the solution, that difference arises. Although Deep Ecology, Eco Feminism and the current critique have similar intentions, and are working with similar conceptualisations, their prescription for remedy differs.

To return to the tenets of Deep Ecology, Naess' central concept is one of "biospherical egalitarianism". To this extent, his conscious intentions are admirable. Deep Ecologists see this biospherical egalitarianism, as a uniting of Self with other, so that Self and other are transformed into a larger all inclusive unity.

The goal of the proposed expansion of Self, is to overcome the alienation of Self, which is additionally alienation from "nature". This movement of alienation, is the same alienation, which resulted in the conceptualisation of Self consciousness or ego. The failing of Deep Ecology, is that overcoming of alienation by the expansion of the concept of Self, is inadequate because Self, is in its essence an alienation.

²⁸¹ King, Y., The ecology of Feminism and the Feminism of Ecology, Harbinger, The Journal of Social Ecology (1983), p. 16

²⁸² Ibid, p. 17

Jim Cheney highlights the difference between the Deep Ecology's conceptualisation of the unity aimed at overcoming alienation, and the unity which can be recognised as the Freudian oceanic feeling and Hegelian original sameness. *"The metaphor of the river disappearing into the ocean is misleading . . . The correct metaphor (for Deep Ecology) is of a lonely but megalomaniacal pond sucking up all the water of the world and becoming itself an ocean."*²⁸³ In the expansion of Self to include "nature", the essential nature of the Self remains unchanged. In fact, in the movement proposed by Deep Ecology, the Self progresses on its totalitarian path.

We can thus see that the philosophy of Deep Ecology, is itself an expression of the consuming Self. Like Hegel's Self Consciousness, and Freud's ego, both which sought to transform themselves into all inclusive subjects, the Self proposed by Deep Ecology, is an optimistic proposal which signifies the very objective of the subject. The Self of Deep Ecology, is analogous to Hegel's Absolute subject. For Hegel, substance is transformed into subject. What was an isolated Self Consciousness, becomes a totalising subject which includes substance. Similarly, the Self of Deep Ecology, is constituted not only by the traditional atomistic "human" Self, but in addition, it incorporates substance in the form of "nature". Both Deep Ecology and Hegel's Phenomenology, detail a monistic order in which the Self is triumphant. For Hegel, it is in the form of a spiritual monism, whereas Deep Ecology's conception, could be termed an "ecological monism". Alan Drendson suggests Deep Ecology presents us with a Self-centric conceptualisation to replace an anthropocentric one.²⁸⁴ It seems even environmental philosophy, cannot escape the drive to express and expand Self.

The goal of Deep Ecology is therefore the same optimistic goal expressed in Hegel's Phenomenology, to overcome otherness, to overcome alienation, by expanding the Self to consume the Other, while retaining subjectivity. The task of Hegel's Self consciousness, and the philosophy of Deep Ecology, seek to incorporate that which is other to Self, into Self. Both seek to overcome the experience of otherness, by making what is other, Self. It is in this overcoming of otherness, that it is possible to argue that they represent the Freudian unconscious desire to return to the subject, what appears as not Self, what is absent.

Jim Cheney expresses a similar understanding in analysing the norms of patriarchal environmental theory, *"there is a very strong tendency on the part of male theorists to understand networks of defining relationships on the model of an expansion of Self to the boundaries of the whole. This is, to be sure, a way of overcoming alienation, and as a way of having one's cake and eating it too, it can't be beat: one overcomes alienation from the other by absorbing the other in the Self"*.²⁸⁵ The desire to have one's cake and eat it

²⁸³ Cheney, J., "Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology" in Environmental Ethics, 9, Summer 1987, pp 115-145, p. 114

²⁸⁴ Drendson, A.R., Environmental Ethics, spring 88

²⁸⁵ Cheney, J., "Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology" in Environmental Ethics, 9, Summer 1987, pp 115-145, p. 114

too, is the essence of Hegel's Self Consciousness, Freud's ego, and Deep Ecology's Self. It desires and drives to overcome otherness, while retaining subjectivity.

What has happened in the expansion of the Self by Deep Ecology, and the movement to the Absolute of Hegel's Phenomenology, is that the original perennial sameness or undifferentiated immanence, becomes an "oceanic feeling" of **Self**. Where no Self existed, a conceptualisation is substituted, which retains subjectivity, but which also allows the regaining of the lost unity. The **concept**, of Self, and the **feeling**, which is the primal state, are assimilated as the Self of Deep Ecology and the subject of the Absolute. An inconsistency arises, for the oceanic state is not the "oceanic concept of Self", for the **concept** of Self, contradicts the oceanic **feeling** of fusion.

As previously suggested, the tendency to impose the Self in all many of affairs, pervades the activity of the subject. Even where the conceptualisation of Self is absent, the commentator, who is subject, commonly imposes the concept of Self without even realising it. In discussing the American Indian salmon ceremony, Lewis Hyde suggests that the natives tend to respond to "nature" as a part of their Self.²⁸⁶ Cheney suggests that what is actually the disappearance, or lack of the Self, is portrayed as "*Self-aggrandizement on a grand scale.*"²⁸⁷ Egoism becomes, in Holmes Rolston III words, "*ecoism*".²⁸⁸ Here ecoism is analogous to Hegel's Absolute, and Deep Ecology's Self. We find that the Self is reconceptualised as a super individual in the form of the entire ecosystem. As was the case with Hegel's system, we are led to believe that it is within our realm of possibility to attain this status of Absolute subject, and indeed, that this must be our primary objective. We are handed the optimism of Hegel's Absolute, in the form of an "ecological monism".

Eco-feminists believe that in their conceptualisation, the problems of deep-ecology are avoided. Indeed much of eco-feminist theory is primarily constituted by a critique of Deep Ecology. Areil Salleh suggests that Deep Ecology results from "*the Self estranged male reaching for the original androgynous natural unity within himself. The Deep Ecology movement is very much a spiritual search for people in a barren secular age.*"²⁸⁹ Accordingly, Deep Ecology is an expression of the Self striving for a transcendent unity of Self, and Other as "nature". Salleh goes on to ask, "*how much of this quest for Self realisation is driven by ego and will? If, on the one hand, the search seems to be struck at an abstract cognitive level, on the other, it may be led full circle and sabotaged by the ancient compulsion to fabricate perfectibility.*"²⁹⁰ The tenet of Deep Ecology is inspired by the Self,

²⁸⁶ Cheney, J., "Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology" in Environmental Ethics, 9, Summer 1987, pp 115-145, p. 115

²⁸⁷ Ibid, p. 115

²⁸⁸ Holmes Rolston quoted in Cheney, J., "Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology" in Environmental Ethics, 9, Summer 1987, pp 115-145, p. 117

²⁸⁹ Salleh, A.K., "Deeper than Deep Ecology: The Eco-Feminist Connection" in Environmental Ethics, Vol 6, Winter 1984, p. 339

²⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 340

and is a reflection of the Self's drive to reach a transcendent unity. As Jim Cheney suggests, the inherent danger in Deep Ecology is that the methods employed for overcoming alienation, are precisely those methods which originally produced, and now sustain alienation. That is, Deep Ecology's proposal of an expanded Self is itself a product of the act of differentiation and alienation which is the Self, and which has resulted in the very problem of environmental degradation.

The problem with Deep Ecology, is that it fails to recognise the primal source of the "human"/"nature" dualism, and the fuel of destructive negation.²⁹¹ What is it which motivates the negation of otherness, the mastery and consumption of "nature"? As previously stressed, the agent of negation is the Self or ego. It is this which posits the Other, and which demands the destruction, or consumption, of that otherness. Thus it is the Self, which posits "nature" as an Other, and which seeks to destroy it as Other. This then is Deep Ecology's primary failure. In failing to recognise the agent of destruction, as the Self or ego, Deep Ecology untowardly prepossess the expansion of the agent of destruction, as the cure for destruction. This it seems is in the least dubious logic.

Apart from the uncertainty as to the benefits and outcome of attaining a state of all consuming subjectivity, the primary criticism of Deep Ecology results from it being founded on a misconceived premise. The subject, is as previously suggested, not an essence, but a negation or differentiation. The goal of attaining an expanded sense of Self which incorporates difference, must be misguided as it wrongly supposes that it is possible to retain subjectivity, while overcoming difference and otherness. The Self is defined by difference, and relies on the otherness of the Other. Where an Other is incorporated into Self or destroyed, another is posited in its place. It is not a finite process, the arrival at Absolute subjectivity is impossible, the proposal of Deep Ecology is unattainable.

Similarly, we must recognise that it is the Self or subject, which is the agent of desire, consumption and destruction. It is perhaps foolhardy to suggest that we should succumb to the Self's demands, and strive for an expanded, and perhaps more powerful Self. Since satisfaction of desire and the overcoming of difference are impossible objectives, we must look for alternate means to avoid environmental destruction.

In criticising Deep Ecology, Eco-Feminists stress relational matrixes as the defining characteristic of an ecologically harmonious Self. They reject the all consuming Self of Deep Ecology, and assert a Self which is defined by

²⁹¹ Although all Deep ecologists talk of a expanded sense of self, some, George Sessions for example, also imply that in the movement to this expanded self, we move in an expereince which transcends conceptualisations, "*The subject/object distinction disappears - actually, one goes beyond all conceptual knowledge, and experiences the union that the mind has with thewhole of nature.*" Sessions, G, Deep Ecology Peregrine Smith Books 1985, p. 239

networks of *"care and responsibility."*²⁹² We do not need to look much further, to recognise that although Eco Feminism is perhaps less characterised by the properties of the Self, never-the-less, it too succumbs to the assertion of subjectivity. We cannot simply reject the "all consuming Self", for the nature of the Self, is to be all consuming. By entering into the discussion as to the proposed normative "nature" of Self, Eco Feminists presuppose and maintain that which is the agent of destruction. Merely to talk of the Self, is a product of subjectivity. All definitions of Self, must rely on differentiation. No conceptualisation which entails a fundamental dualism of Self and Other, can guarantee the elimination of domination. Where differentiation exists, alienation and thus power and desire, are concurrently manifest. Deep Ecology, and to some extent Eco Feminism, are not cures for our "cultural" neurosis but are themselves symptoms.

A further flaw of relevance, in some strains of Eco Feminism, is in their assertion that women, by view of the fact that they are closer to "nature" than men, do not share the same domineering attitude that men do. This assertion itself is internally contradictory, for it assumes the validity of the "nature"/"culture" opposition. Karren Warren highlights this, *"Are women closer to "nature" than men? In order for the question to be meaningfully raised, one must presuppose the legitimacy of the "nature"- "culture" dualism. The idea that one group of persons is, or is not, closer to nature than another group assumes the very nature/culture split that Eco Feminism denies."*²⁹³ It is the question itself which is flawed. The "nature"- "culture" dualism and the "masculine"- "feminism" dichotomy, are constructs of the order of the subject, and it is this order which Eco-feminists submit to, and by doing so, their position becomes internally contradictory. We see that it is the conceptualisation of difference, which is at fault and which dictates meaning. It is the **conceptual** links between "women" and the concept of "nature", which is paramount.

Other feminist's object²⁹⁴ that it is the conceptual links, which women cannot transcend, due to their closeness to "nature", which is monthly reminded in the reproductive cycle. This too is inadequate, for it discounts the far more frequent reminders in the form of hunger, food consumption and nomadic functions which apply equally to both sexes. It seems there could be no equally regular and forceful reminders of our closeness to "nature", as these ever-present necessities.

In accordance with the philosophising of Deep Ecology, it could be argued that Hegel's system provides a model for environmental philosophers to follow in the synthesis of subject and object, of Self and other, and "humanity" and

²⁹² Cladia Card quoted in Cheney, J., "Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology" in Environmental Ethics, 9, Summer 1987, pp 115-145, p. 120

²⁹³ Warren, K.J., "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections", in Environmental Ethics, Spring 1987, p. 15

²⁹⁴ Plumwood, V., Ecofeminism: An Overview and Discussion of Positions and Arguments, in Australasian Journal Of Philosophy, Supplement to Vol. 64: June 1986

"nature". Although this may superficially appear to have merit, it is in the conceptualisation of the Absolute as subject, that it becomes clear that it is both unattainable, and fails to overcome the operation and exercise of power and desire. In the Hegelian synthesis, as in the proposals of Deep Ecology, the Self, as subject, rules supreme. The position of subjectivity, rather than being given up, is extended, reinforced and enhanced. With this extension it is likely that an increased energy is transferred to the Self, and thus also to power and desire.

Levinas attacks this aspect of Hegel's totalising philosophy, "*it is obvious that Hegel's "system of philosophy" is a paradigmatic case of the "totalitarian" philosophy*".²⁹⁵ In "Transcendental Philosophy", Theodore De Boer goes so far to suggest that there are "*Totalitarian tendencies inherent in all of Western philosophy*".²⁹⁶ These totalising tendencies are apparent in environmental philosophy itself, in the form of the all consuming Self.

The Inadequacies of Self

Hegel's articulation of the story of the Self, as in all other conceptualisations of Self and Other, is narrated by a Self seeking to reinforce their position of subjectivity. The author is a Self, a subject who is uncertain about his own subjectivity and who is tormented by otherness. As such, Hegel's story becomes a very peculiar one indeed. It illuminates the conceptualisation of subjectivity, and the operation and fuel of power and desire, by offering a story which represents the ideal desirable outcome by the protagonist of the story, the subject. It seems that in his philosophy, Hegel himself was unable to escape the game of subjectivity

The story of the Phenomenology, is a clear expression of the characteristics and movement which is the Self. The philosophy of Deep Ecology reflects a similar thematisation. Although both prescribe a normative path to follow, both unfortunately do it from the perspective of the subject, and both allow for the logic of subjectivity. The subject wants; to overcome desire; to satisfy desire; and to progress to a ultimate arrival, conclusion or satisfaction. In moving toward this point of arrival, the Self understandably seeks to ensure the preservation of its own existence.

Although both Hegel, and the philosophy of Deep Ecology, assert that difference can be overcome, and otherness synthesized, this can at best be an optimistic idealisation. The accounts are reflections of the ideal state which the subject wishes to achieve. The subject wishes to negate otherness, by incorporating all that is not Self, into Self. Far from the Self being dissolved, it is in fact given its most powerful expression. The Self becomes all. In these **ideal** projections, the Self achieves its desired

²⁹⁵ Peperzak "Some Remarks on Hegel, Kant, and Levinas", in Cohen R. (ed.), Face To Face with Levinas, State University of New York Press

²⁹⁶ Cohen R. (ed.), Face To Face with Levinas, State University of New York Press

conclusion. Unfortunately, these are but *ideal* prescriptions. They are ideal not in the sense that they are theoretically and logically pure, rather they are an *ideal* satisfaction for the subject.

The failing of these ideal prescriptions, lies in the fact that they inadequately take account of the essence of subjectivity. As has been previously stated many times, subjectivity, the Self, ego or Self Consciousness, is founded on the conceptualisation of difference. This conceptualisation results from a movement of alienation, in which the subject posits a part of the same as Other. The notion that the subject or Self can be the whole, or the totality, is a logical impossibility. The subject or Self, cannot possibly overcome difference, while retaining subjectivity.

Jacques Derrida expresses a similar, although somewhat differing understanding. For Derrida, Hegel's program is an impossible dream as otherness cannot be assimilated. In Derrida's phraseology, something always escapes incorporation, something is always left out. Something is always Other.

Deep Ecology and Eco Feminism, are alternate ways of conceptualising the relationship of Self to Other. The important issue, is that it is not a particular conceptualisation which is at fault, but the conceptualisation of difference in general. Conceptualisations, are differences which are not differences. They are differences which are part of the same. In being part of the same, a thrust toward that essential unity, is perpetually present. Moris Berman states, "We do not need a new solution to the mind/body problem, or a new way of viewing the subject/object relationship. We need to deny that all such distinctions exist."²⁹⁷

For both Freud and Hegel, the energy which motivates environmentally destructive action, derives from the original state before alienation; before the conceptualisation of difference. For Freud, it is the inertia of the perennial state which fuels the destruction and consumption of otherness. Similarly for Hegel, it is the difference, which is not a difference, which leads Self consciousness to attempt to re-incorporate that which is part of the same. It is not the actual original state which fuels destructive action, but the conceptualisation of difference within that state. The difficulty is how to synthesise those differences?

It appears we have arrived at something of an impasse. To reconcile our relationship to "nature", to avoid further environmental destruction, there is at least a degree of consensus that we must overcome the differentiation of Self, and "nature". The need to overcome this division stems from the need to satisfy desire and dissolve the drive to negate and destroy the other. It may be that we can synthesise Self and Other, but not by retaining the essential subjective elements of the pre-synthesised state. It is possible to return to origins, but in returning to that "origin", neither our Self nor the "origin" will

²⁹⁷ Berman, M., The Reenchantment of the World, New York: Bantum, 1981, p. 179

remain. It is necessary to accept that the concepts of Self and Other, will need to be dissolved, in order to attain an ecologically desirable way of being.

The Way Out

We have reached the challenging point at which our goal is to heal the wound which severed the subject from their world. How is it possible to undo the "incisive cut" of subjectivity? Norman O. Brown offers us some food for thought, *"Is there a way out; a cure; is there such a thing as health? To heal is to make whole again, as in wholesome; to make one again; to unify or reunify."*²⁹⁸

The secret to healing the neurosis of civilisation, lies in re-unifying that which has been cut in two. In another book, Brown sums up the task which we are confronted by, *"primal childhood experience, according to Freud, is idealised because it is free from all dualisms. If therefore we think of man as the species which has the historical project of recovering his childhood, psychoanalysis suggests the eschatological proposition, that mankind will not put aside its sickness and its discontent until it is able to abolish every dualism."*²⁹⁹

Although it is generally agreed that it is the otherness of "nature" which must be reconciled, disagreement arises over the means to resolution. Environmental philosophers see only three ways of being, and only two of which will overcome the alienation which is the differentiation of Self and Other. The first way of being as individual atomistic selves, is rejected by all. Deep ecologists propose the conceptualisation of a gigantic all encompassing Self, and Eco-feminists, a Self defined by relations. It has been argued that both of these merely attempt to treat the symptoms, while fuelling the cause. It is like trying to heal a wound with a knife. The problem can only be exacerbated.

What the vast majority fail to consider, is that there may be another way of being, other than the options already considered. They fail to "step outside" the way of being which is based on differentiation of Self and other. It is a clear case of "not being able to see the forest for the trees". The object our analysis is attempting to reveal, is the Other of subjectivity. What is the Other of the subject/object dichotomy?

Heidegger offers us a possible lead, *"Being subject as humanity has not always been the sole possibility belonging to the essence of historical man, which is always beginning in a primal way, nor will it always be."*³⁰⁰ Although the subject may find it difficult to see it this way, it has not always been the

²⁹⁸ Brown, N., *Love's Body*, New York: Vintage Books, 1968, p. 80

²⁹⁹ Brown, N., *Life Against Death*, London: Sphere Books, 1968, p.55

³⁰⁰ Heidegger, M., *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p. 153

case that humans have been subjects, and therefore there is no necessity why we must continue to be.

It is the subject or Self, which is the root of destruction and desire, and therefore it is the Self which must be abandoned. In Bataille's words, "*We suffer from our isolation in our individual separateness*"³⁰¹ And in Jessica Benjamin's, it is the "*individualistic emphasis on strict boundaries between Self and others which promotes a sense of isolation and unreality.*"³⁰² She goes on to stress that the Western rational world view, emphasises difference over sameness; boundaries over continuity; polarity and opposition, over mutuality and independence.³⁰³

The secularisation of society has eroded the remaining forms of communalism which allowed a lowered consciousness of Self. Benjamin stresses that "*the experience of losing the Self, of continuity, is increasing difficult to obtain except in the erotic relationship*". Later she comments that we are facing a period of unbearably intensified privatisation and discontinuity, unrelieved by an escape to continuity.³⁰⁴ It is our suffering from isolation and discontinuity, our feeling of a lack, loss or absence which must be dissolved. Cheney suggests "*we must lose or desire to lose the sense of oneself as a distinct individual.*"³⁰⁵

Immediately we can expect the subject will ask, "*what does this new conceptualisation look like?; how are Self and Other to be reconceptualised?*" To ask questions such as these, misses the point entirely. It is conceptualisation, and thus necessarily the conceptualisation of difference, which is the root of differentiation. To conceptualise we must reflect. To reflect upon ourselves, we must alienate our self, as other, from the fluid sameness, continuity or undifferentiated wholeness. It is in the act of conceptualisation, that desire, mastery, power and dominance were born.

In "Nature, Man, and Women", Alan Watts endorses the notion that it is the Self or ego, which must be the focus of attention, "If the ego were to disappear, or rather, to be seen to be a useful fiction, there would no longer be the duality of subject and object, experience and experience. There would simply be a continuous, self-moving stream of experiencing, without the sense either of an active subject who controls it or a passive object who suffers it."³⁰⁶

³⁰¹ Bataille, G., Erotism: Death and Sexuality, San Fransisco: City Lights Books, 1957, p. 20

³⁰² Benjamin, J., Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination, p. 293

³⁰³ Ibid, p. 306

³⁰⁴ Ibid, p. 307

³⁰⁵ Cheney, J., "Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology" in Environmental Ethics, 9, Summer 1987, pp 115-145, p. 121

³⁰⁶ Watts, A., Nature, Man, and Women, London: Abacus, 1976, p. 61

To overcome, or rather to diffuse, the energy which fuels power and desire, we must regain the experience of the primal continuous state of undifferentiated sameness. It will no doubt be objected that this is an impossible dream, as we are, in essence, discontinuous beings. This too misses the point that the conceptualisation that we are discontinuous beings, is a product of the discontinuous being which we now are. Although we now are conceptual discontinuous beings, this conceptualisation is not our only possible option.

To ask an individual, defined by a conceptualisation of Self and Other, to attempt to grasp the meaning of a state which is non-conceptual, is perhaps asking too much. The subject is defined by discontinuity and disjunction; since the state which the focus of attention cannot be definitely formulated by the logic or metaphysics of opposition, the two cannot mix on the same symbolic plane. The reflective subject thinks in concepts, and wants to grasp a conceptualisation which will satisfy their desire. But unfortunately, the state in question is contradicted by conceptualisations, and contradicts the subject's integrity.

The perhaps insurmountable problem, is trying to conceptualise, the unconceptualisable. The way of being proposed is intuited or felt, rather than intellectualised. It is, a way of being, not a conceptualisation of becoming. As Taylor asserts, *"In order to think these unthinkable thoughts and glimpse these unimaginable images, it is necessary to think and imagine differently."*³⁰⁷ The way of being in question, is as Feuerbach suggested, "other to thought", it is thought's other.³⁰⁸

It is interesting to note that we may have done Hegel something of an injustice by entirely rejecting his system. Two passages of particular interest, basically reiterate what has been argued: *"Dealing with something from the perspective of the Absolute consists merely in declaring that although one has been speaking of it just now as something definite, yet in the Absolute, there is nothing of the kind, for there all is one"*³⁰⁹; and *"for the Absolute is not supposed to be comprehended, it is to be felt and intuited, not the Notion of the Absolute, but the feeling and intuition of it"*³¹⁰

In a similar way, Habermas also recognises the difficulty of conceptualising *"the sense of loss of wholeness or unity which haunts modernity."*³¹¹ He suggests that we must intuit this state of unity, for we always already have a certain intuitive knowledge of it. Although various commentators have argued that it is unfortunate that Habermas does not go past this vague conceptualisation and appeal to intuition, Habermas himself freely admits it is

³⁰⁷ Taylor, M.C., Altarity, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, p. "Encore"

³⁰⁸ During L., Hegel, Lecture Notes

³⁰⁹ Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979, p. 9

³¹⁰ Ibid, p. 4

³¹¹ White, S.K., The Recent Work Of Jurgen Habermas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 135

sketchy, but stresses it is necessarily so. He maintains, in Stephen White's words, *"that those who try to reach behind or over the modern understanding of the world are even more inadequate."*³¹² As Habermas states, *"there have been many failed attempts to have one's cake and eat it too; to retain both Kant's insights and, at the same time, to return to the 'home' from which these same insights have driven us."*³¹³

To overcome the domination of "nature", it is necessary to rethink the actual conceptualisation of "nature" as concept. As White states, *"the only adequate way to cure modern man's destructiveness in relation to his environment is to rethink radically our way of conceptualising non-human 'nature'".* This rethinking would involve some basic rejection of our dominant cognitive-instrumental mode of relating to "nature".³¹⁴ It is the modes of thought which reduce everything to a conceptual hierarchical dichotomy, which must be abandoned, not a particular conceptualisation. By offering a new conceptualisation, we do not alter the basic premises, nor the essence of the consciousness which is the agent of destruction.

It is not that we must "return to nature", for this, once again, reaffirms the conceptualisation of "nature" and "humanity" as divergent. We cannot return to "nature", for this presupposes the existence of "culture", which by its character, is all consuming and transcendent over "nature". The existence of "nature" and "culture", necessitates our continued existence as "cultural" non-natural superior beings. It is possible to take this to the extreme: even to talk about the "domination of nature", affirms the category of "nature" as that which is non-human. By entering into the on-going conversation as to the means to avoid the domination of "nature", we perpetuate that domination. Although it may seem contradictory, it is the existence of both "culture" and "nature", which must be scrutinised.

It is possible to restate a concrete example of continuous non-reflective existence, which was previously cited. The way of being which does not conceptualise Self, is characteristic of pure participating consciousness. As was suggested, this form of consciousness is experienced frequently, even by an individual which is at other times characterisable as a discontinuous Self. The experience in question, is the experience of conscious immersion in a vast number of experiences of everyday consciousness. This is apparent in being absorbed; in concentration; in a particular task; or perhaps alternatively, when we are "carried away" by a theatrical performance. This form of experience does not entail passivity in the form of inactivity, it is merely the form of consciousness in which the experience of subjectivity is absent.

To attempt to express this form of being of immersion or absorption in things, in the terms of the present philosophical analysis, it is possible to argue that where the way of being of discontinuity, is conscious of the Self and Other as

³¹² White, S.K., The Recent Work Of Jurgen Habermas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988, p. 136

³¹³ Ibid, p. 136

³¹⁴ Ibid, 1988, p. 136

separate. the way of being of continuity, is not conscious of the Self and other at all. They become merged in a continuity. It is not that the Self and Other are experienced as continuous, as this would maintain a conceptualisation, and thus a difference. Rather, only experience exists, not the experience of the Self and Other as whole. The subject no longer experiences the Other, the experience **is** the other. The experience is absorbed in the other, but not as Other, rather as the same.

To suggest that the Self and other are experienced as continuous, is but another expression of Hegel's totalising philosophy which must be abandoned. In Cheney's words *"a move toward health from a norm (an atomism) which is itself pathological - a move toward health, which however, carries sickness of atomism with it."*³¹⁵ That is, the suggestion that the Self and other are experienced as unified, carries with the pathological luggage of the Self. It is once again the movement to Self aggrandizement, the expansion of the Self to include what is other.

Other "Ways of Being"

To further delve into the current focus of attention, it is worthwhile to consider alternate ways of being. The alternate ways of being which would undoubtedly be the most fruitful on the basis of the assertions of this analysis, are those in which the domination and control of the environment does not take place. These ways of being are those associated with what are commonly called "primal" or uncivilised societies.

In considering these conceptualisations, it is important to remember that they are conceptualisations. That is, they are structures imposed by Western subjective anthropologists. As Bertrand Russell remarked, animals studied by American behaviourists act like Americans, *"running about in random fashion"*, whereas those studied by German behaviourists resemble Germans, *"sitting and thinking"*. It will be necessary to remember that where a way of being is referred to as a conceptualisation of Self, this has been imposed by a subject, and indeed in most cases, against the logic of subjectivity. Olivia Harris highlights this, *"it is all too easy for anthropologists using the dominant discourses of European "culture" to universalise our own categories of male and female, "nature" and "culture", and thus render ourselves deaf to alternate ways of structuring the world."*³¹⁶ Leach suggests that in formulating a model in which to understand other societies, the model is largely shaped by our own presuppositions, and may not correspond at all to *"the conscious model in the minds of the native people"*.³¹⁷

³¹⁵ Cheney, J., "Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology" in Environmental Ethics, 9, Summer 1987, pp 115-145, p. 124

³¹⁶ Olivia Harris in MacCormack, C.P. & Strathern, M., (eds.), Nature, Culture and Gender, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 93

³¹⁷ MacCormack, C.P. & Strathern, M., (eds.), Nature, Culture and Gender, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 4

The primary aspect of interest which characterises the primal ways of being, is that there is a lack of strict and definitive differentiation between Self and Other. In most cases it appears that there is no conceptualisation of difference at all. Although the theorists quoted refer to the way of being as one in which the concept of Self is conceptualised as undifferentiated, this imposes subjectivity where none exists. The Self is based upon the differentiation of Self and Other. Where Self and Other are not differentiated, the only possible logical conclusion is that Self does not exist.

Not only do these ways of being not conceptualise a differentiation between Self and other, they fail to differentiate between "culture", "nature" and the individual Self. This should now not be surprising. Once again, the subjective commentaries at times fall into the trap of suggesting that in their "culture", the social incorporates the natural.

Although Drew Westen enters into discussion of the nature of the conceptualisation of Self, he often adequately describes the characteristics of these alternate ways of being. With reference to the lack of "nature"/"culture" differentiation, he states, there is a *"relative lack of symbolic differentiation"*, there is a fundamental *"fluidity of boundaries between "culture", "nature", and the individual. A salient aspect of this is the oft-noted fusion or confusion of the natural and social worlds."*³¹⁸ The "symbolic differentiation" which he discusses can be translated as "conceptualisation". Unfortunately, he does not go so far as to recognise that the "confusion" is in fact merely the lack of conceptualisation. The individuals are in no way "confused", they are simply immersed or absorbed in experience. Kitagawa offers an example of the lack of differentiation between "culture" and non-human "nature". He cites a Papuan tribe who *"include the crested dove, the black cockatoo and even a particular iguana as members of the tribe."*³¹⁹ Westen suggest that anthropologists have wrestled with this *"confusion of "culture" and "nature"*.³²⁰ The confusion does not lie on the part of the "primitives", but rather on the part of those who conceptualise a *"difference which is actually part of the same"*.

Westen at least hints that he recognises that the "confusion", is relative to our way of being, and that even for us, the opposition of "culture" to "nature" is a learnt experience which contradicts the more "pure" experience of early childhood, *"What is distinct about this representation of reality, is its relative indifference to a distinction that appears to "us" obvious, and which in fact is obvious to children in all "culture's to two or three years of age."*³²¹

³¹⁸ Westen, D., *Self and Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 250

³¹⁹ Kitagawa quoted in Westen, D., *Self and Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.250

³²⁰ Westen, D., *Op. cit.*, p.250

³²¹ Westen, D., *Self and Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.251

In his later work, Levi-Strauss came to realise the arbitrary essence of the "nature"/"culture" dichotomy. He suggests that the nature-culture contrast, is purely an artificial creation of "culture".³²² Although this reveals a deep understanding, its contradictory quintessence also reveals the basis of our problem. By being "an artificial creation", "culture" folds into "nature", and thus is no longer artificial! The question which we have been attempting to conceptualise, is that which Leach proposes, *"how is it and why is it that men, who are part of nature, manage to see themselves as "other than nature" even though, in order to subsist, they must constantly maintain 'relations' with nature?"*³²³

In "The Hagen Case", Marilyn Strathern moves a step further, by stressing that Goody *"characterises the dichotomy (between "nature" and "culture") itself as a highly abstract and rather eighteenth-century piece of Western intellectualism"*³²⁴ In "No nature, no culture: the Hagen case", she goes on to state that for the Hagen of Papua, *"The is no "culture," in the sense of the cumulative works of man, and no "nature" to be tamed and made productive."*³²⁵ It has started to become clear, that it is the conceptualisation of the dichotomy, which is characteristic of the domination and destruction of "nature" as we understand it. Without the concept, there is no need of an ethic or morality formulated to protect it.

The "confusion" of "culture" and "nature" is paralleled by a corresponding lack of clear differentiation of Self and Other. The concept of Self which is so quickly accepted by the Western way of being, is entirely foreign to other ways of being which *"lack a comparable concept."*³²⁶ Clifford Geertz adequately expresses the uniqueness of the Western conceptualisation of Self, *"the Western conception of a person as a bounded unique, more or less integrated motivational and cognitive universe, a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, and judgement, and action organised into a distinctive whole and set contrastingly both against other such wholes and against its social and natural background, is, however incorrigible it may seem to us, a rather peculiar idea within the context of the world's cultures."*³²⁷

Comaroff's exposition of the Tahidi of Southern Africa, suggests that their "Self" is not defined in Western terms, but *"extends past the visible limits of the body"*, it is *"enmeshed in a web of influences, field of relations."*³²⁸ Lee's

³²² MacCormack, C.P. & Strathern, M., (eds.), Nature, Culture and Gender, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 4

³²³ Leach in MacCormack, C.P. & Strathern, M., (eds.), Nature, Culture and Gender, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 5

³²⁴ Strathern in MacCormack, C.P. & Strathern, M., (eds.), Nature, Culture and Gender, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 178

³²⁵ Ibid., p. 219

³²⁶ Westen, D., Self and Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.251

³²⁷ Geertz, C., quoted in Westen, D., Self and Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.251

³²⁸ Comaroff quoted in Westen, D., Self and Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 252

pioneering ethno psychological study of 1950 of the North American Indians stresses that they, *"do not possess a differentiated conception of Self, and indeed, Wintu language lacks a corresponding term."* The Wintu according to Lee, *"conceive of the Self not as strictly delimited or defined, but as a concentration at most, which gradually fades and gives place to the other. What is other for us, is for the Wintu completely or partially or upon occasion, identified with the Self"*³²⁹ Although like most subjects, Lee utilises the concept of Self, it would be difficult to find a clearer expression of the non-existence of the Self, than we find in a way of being, which even lacks the term.

The non-existence of the Self for the Wintu, or contrarily its conceptualisation as absorption in the other, is intriguingly obvious in Lee's attempts to elicit autobiographical accounts. The individual would begin their "story" by talking of their husband or wife. After insisting that it be their own life account, they would start describing the lives of relatives, finally arriving at what they termed, *"that which was in my mothers womb"*.³³⁰ The notion of their own life not entailing everyone else's was alien, they were unable to grasp the concept of their "Self". This not only applies to the Wintu described by Lee, but Strauss found a similar problem in interviewing the Cheyenne. Instead of talking of their own Self, they would frequently begin, "My grandfather . . .". Strauss suggested that intrapsychic and interpsychic processes are for the Cheyenne indistinguishable. As Westen states, *"The Cheyenne Self participates in, and cannot be defined by contrast with, other Cheyenne selves."*³³¹

Westen suggests that "identity" is probably not an appropriate term to describe the way of being of societies such as the Tlingit since *"identity" implies wholeness, or a oneness of cognized Self.*³³² This definition of the term "identity", equally applies to the concept of "Self".

De Laguna summarises the way of being of the Tlingit, *"The individual of the Tlingit is thus not a unitary Self distinct from all others, but is compounded and linked to all others. . . His Self not only "participates" to some extent in their selves. . but also to varying degrees, "participates" in animal spirits, in supernatural beings and even in portions of the inanimate world."*³³³ In De Laguna's exposition, the notion of "participating consciousness" finds a practical expression.

Robert Redfield, argues that the "primitive world view"; fails to differentiate humanity from the rest of "nature"; sees the individual as participating in

³²⁹ Lee quoted in Westen, D., *Self and Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.252

³³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 253

³³¹ Westen, D., *Self and Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.316

³³² *Ibid.*, p.315

³³³ De Laguna quoted in Westen, D., *Self and Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.315

"nature"; and the Self as undifferentiated from the other. In light of Heidegger's critique, it is interesting that Redfield fails to recognise that the lack of conceptualisation by "primitives", in fact amounts to a lack of a "world view", rather than to a peculiar or unique "primitive world view".

The lack of the conceptualisation of Self, not only exists in these primitive societies. It also appears to be manifest in earlier Western "cultural" expressions. Jaynes' carefully examined the language of the *Iliad* and found that the characters do not ponder their actions, nor do they introspect. Rather *"the Iliad is about action"*³³⁴ It appears that our Greek fore-fathers also lacked the conceptualisation of a reflective Self.

According to the anthropologist John Bennett, tribal societies perceive the Self as a synthesis with the environment, whereas *"industrial societies appear to develop the most pronounced sense of Self detached from the environment"*³³⁵ In his acclaimed account of the development of the person and the concept of Self, Mauss indicates that his primary intention is to show *"how recent is the word "Self", used philosophically; how recent "the category of the Self, the cult of the Self; and how recent even the respect of Self"*.³³⁶ Mauss contends that it is not until the eighteenth or nineteenth century that the concept of the individual or person, becomes the "category of the Self". He goes on to suggest that the concept, *"is still being slowly erected, clarified, specified, and identified with Self knowledge."*³³⁷ It is the concentration on Self, which results in the confusion of the differentiation of "culture" and "nature", and Self and Other. Further, it is the Self as the agent of destruction, which is lacking in these "uncivilised" people. People such as the Cheyennes' only fear loneliness and isolation, which they see as resulting from individuality and consciousness of Self.

In accordance with a lack of differentiation of Self and other, it would be expected that these alternate ways of being would not exhibit the insatiable desire which discontinuous ways of being do. Although there is considerable academic literature which tends to confirm this hypothesis, it is perhaps more interesting to quote a passage from Captain James Cook's Journals on reaching Australia, *"From what I have said of the natives of New-Holland they may appear to some to be the most wretched people upon Earth, but in reality they are far happier than we Europeans; being wholly unacquainted not only with the superfluous but the necessary conveniences so much sought after in Europe, they are happy in not knowing the use of them. They live in a Tranquillity which is not disturb'd by the inequality of condition: The Earth and*

³³⁴ Jaynes quoted in Westen, D., *Self and Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.256

³³⁵ Bennett, J., quoted in Westen, D., *Self and Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.250

³³⁶ Mauss, quoted in Carrithers, M., Collins, S., and Lukes, L., (eds.), *The Category of The Person: Anthropology, Philosophy History*, London: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p. 3

³³⁷ Mauss quoted in Westen, D., *Self and Society*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985, p.256

sea of their own accord furnishes them with all things necessary for life, they covet not Magnificent Houses, Household-stuff &c. . . many who we gave Cloth &c to, left it carelessly upon the sea beach and in the woods as a thing they had no manner of use for. In short they seem'd to set no value upon any thing we gave them."³³⁸ Dampier made similar observations. In attempting to bribe some natives, he states that they put down everything they were given, and did not "seems to admire any thing that we had."

Unlike Western philosophy which displays a profound lack of understanding of the essence and effects of the Self, the East appears as a stark contrast. Many if not all, Eastern philosophies, exhibit an understanding of the need to overcome the experience of Self. According to Buddhism, the root of misery is desire (tanha), and it is this which stands in the way of reaching Nirvana. Thus the individual must strive to escape the "conceit of individuality". Similarly Jainism calls for the containment of individual passion. In the West the individual Self is "valorised" whereas the Self or ego expressed in India by the Upanishads is negatively valued.

The normative prescription or proposed conceptualisation, is one which is non-normative and non-conceptual. Like Taoism, it is a philosophy of non-action. This does not suggest that it prescribes we do nothing, but that we immerse our selves in being, "*The way to do, is to be*"³³⁹ It is in essence, the lack of conceptualisations of being. Once again from the Tao te Ching, "*The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao. The name that can be named is not the eternal name. . . . Those who know do not talk. Those who talk do not know.*"³⁴⁰

In Zen Buddhism we find the aim is the merging of subject and object, in order to reach what Zen describes as "no-mind". Zen contrasts with Cartesian dualism, in that presence of the awareness of mediation between subject and object is absent. Awareness **is** the other, it is not **of** the other. As Baxter states, "*the alternative is to become absorbed into the knowable allowing the Self to merge and enhance the known*".³⁴¹ In Hui-neng's terms, observing reality is not enough, "*one must be the reality*"³⁴² For Zen the subject only acts authentically in accordance with their true "nature", when they lose their Self in the reality of the world. This "authentic" existence cannot be attained by the Self attempting to make themselves the world. Authenticity is not the merging of the Self with the world via an act of all consuming Self consumption. This form of abstraction only serves to heighten alienation.

³³⁸ Cook, J., The Voyage of the Endeavour 1768-1771

³³⁹ Tao-te-ching, translation by Gia-Fu and Jane English 1973 Wildwood house London.

³⁴⁰ Ibid, Cpt 1 Chapter 56

³⁴¹ Baxter, B., Alienation and Authenticity, London: Tavistock Publications, 1982, p. 43

³⁴² Ibid, p. 45

As an alternate conceptualisation, Jon Elster proposes the "no-self theory".³⁴³ He suggests that this theory which emerged with Hume, finds its most sophisticated expression in Buddhism. One of the aspects of being, is a belief in the "Self". But this belief is based on an illusion. Buddhism offers ways in which to overcome the experience of Self, not so much because it is a bad thing in itself, but because it causes so much unhappiness and unfulfilled yearning. Once again, it must be noted that this is a conceptualisation by a subject, and as such, is contradictory to our aims. Elster recognises this and stresses that an *"excessive attachment to a theory of non-Self, is a sign that one has not liberated oneself from it effectively."*³⁴⁴

Contemporary Philosophy and the Deconstruction of the Subject

The recognition of the negative value of a sharp demarcation between Self from Other, revealed by anthropological analysis, finds support in what is perhaps surprising quarters. It is in contemporary philosophical feminist theory, and deconstructive philosophy, that it could be argued similar ways of being, as those of the primal societies, are expounded as normative proposals for a new consciousness. The concepts of; "fluidity" of boundaries; "multiplicity" of relations; and "ambiguity" of definition, find expression in contemporary feminist accounts; deconstruction theory; and wide ranging anthropological evidence.

The experience of Modernity, is infiltrated and permeated by expressions of the Self. To witness the history of the modern age, is to witness the rule of the sovereignty of the subject. Liz During suggests that for modernist thinkers, *"to think the thoughts of the present day, is to participate in the sovereignty of the I."*³⁴⁵

Although Hegel's philosophy has been one of the most influential theories on many modern thinkers, the tide has turned to reveal a paradoxical concentration on the philosophy of Hegel, with a corresponding rejection of his "program". Giles Deleuze was one of the first to make clear the importance of the abandonment of Hegelianism in 1954.³⁴⁶ In "A Thousand Plateaus" written in conjunction with Felix Guattari, in a style alien to common "Self expression"³⁴⁷, Deleuze states that his aim is *"To reach, not the point where one no longer says I, but the point where it is no longer of any importance whether one says I."*³⁴⁸ His program contradicts that of

³⁴³ Elster, J. (ed), The Multiple Self, p. 28

³⁴⁴ Ibid., p. 29

³⁴⁵ During, L., Hegel Lecture Notes

³⁴⁶ Roth, M.S., Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France, London: Cornell University Press, p. 194

³⁴⁷ According to Deleuze it is a system of rotating chairmanship which seeks to avoid the exercise or establishment of any single voice of authority exerting ultimate power.

³⁴⁸ Deleuze, G., and Guattari, F., A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, p. 3

conservative contemporary thought, *"Where psychoanalysis says "Stop find yourself again", we should say instead "Lets go further still. . . we haven't sufficiently dismantled our Self."*³⁴⁹

In "The Subject Of Semiotics", Kaja Silverman highlights the complimentary "nature" of Foucault's rhetoric, *"Foucault insists that man as we know him, is the product of certain historically determined discourses, and by challenging those discourses we can "dissolve" him. Foucault does not suggest that we will thereby eliminate the category of the human, but that we will deconstruct the conceptions by means of which we have so far understood that category."*³⁵⁰ The "human" is now understood as different, superior and above "nature". As Foucault asserts, it is this conceptualisation which must be "dissolved". To facilitate this, it is necessary to understand that it is "man" as Self Consciousness, which must be dissolved. In dissolving "human" as Self Consciousness, we become human as a species among a multiplicity of other species.

In "Knowing and History", Michael Roth adds to Silverman's understanding of Foucault. He suggests that Foucault is both a strong proponent of the anti-anthropologisation of philosophy and social understanding and points to the "signs of the disappearance of "man" from our thinking. Foucault stresses the transitory nature of "man", that is of the Self as "humanity". Further, he deconstructs the conceptualisation, so as *"to hasten that disappearance."*³⁵¹ Foucault's position is made clear in a much quoted passage in "The Order of Things", which describes "man", as an imaginary self-possessed subject of discourse, which like a figure drawn in sand at the ocean's edge will soon be erased by the incoming tide.³⁵²

To a large extent, Derrida shares Foucault's drive to dissolve the current conception of "humanity". In "Derrida", Christopher Norris suggests that *"Derrida has done much to encourage the view of deconstruction as collaborating cheerfully in the overthrow of 'man' and all his works."*³⁵³ But Derrida is not blind to the reality that this deconstruction takes place in a setting designed by "man" and which reinforces the current conception of "humanity". Derrida perhaps more than others realises that by entering the "game of the subject" we lose. Pronouncements such as Foucault's fail to some extent to interrogate the root assumptions, which colour the themes and motifs which they utilise. The paradoxical problem is that no position can be argued in reference to the "nature"/"culture" dualism, which structures the conception of "humanity", without utilising the conceptualisations of "humanist" language. It is an impossibility to enter into a radical critique, such as Levinas's without using the conceptualisations which contradict our own

³⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 157

³⁵⁰ Silverman, K., *The Subject of Semiotics*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 129

³⁵¹ Roth, M.S., *Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France*, London: Cornell University Press, p. 208

³⁵² Norris, C., *Derrida*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 218

³⁵³ *Ibid.*, p. 219

position, and betray our intentions. Derrida recognises that the best contradictory critique is one which is done in silence.

For Foucault, in the beginning there is only multiplicity, devoid of dichotomous oppositions; a radical heteronomy. This state has been concealed and rationalised through the imposition of orderly theoretical fictions which polarise reality into cognisable dualities. These dualities, such as those of Self and Other, and "nature" and "culture", are but imaginary constructs of discourse.

It is the act of differentiation, out of the differenceless fluid medium, that the subject, as a construct of artificial symbolic systems, is structured. The subject being characteristically unstable, uses various strategies to escape its inevitable insubstantiality. Butler asserts that for Lacan, Deleuze and Foucault, the *"projected Self is a false construct imposed upon an experience that eludes it"*.³⁵⁴ At its most general level the subject is merely a postulation which endeavours to overcome the insubstantiality of its own being, by projecting a symbolically fabricated unity on the experience of desire.

It is therefore the notion of an eternal subject existing prior to signification and conceptualisation, which must be challenged. The idea that meaning precedes the structuring of symbolic systems, and exists independently of it, is the accomplice to the notion that the Self is universally conceptualised in one form or another. Butler stresses *"The subject is a subject to the extent that it effects a relationship to exteriority, but once that nonrelationship becomes recognised as the constitutive difference of all signification, then the subject is revealed as fiction language gives itself in an effort to reveal its own ineradicable structure."*³⁵⁵

One option which we have available, in order to attack the subject, is to enter into the discourse of the subject, and work within it in disguise. Vincent Descombes suggests that we must *"pretend to speak the master's language in order to kill him"*³⁵⁶ But the problem is that in pretending to speak the master's language, we must actually speak the language, *"the only way of pretending to speak Chinese when speaking to a Chinese citizen is to address him in Chinese."*³⁵⁷ This is the root of Derrida's criticism of philosophers such as Levinas, who reject Hegel's totalising philosophy. Since *"philosophy is irremediably Hegelian"*, *"As soon as he speaks against Hegel, Levinas can only confirm him, has already confirmed him."*³⁵⁸ Descombes suggests the only option for Levinas, is to dispute the Hegelian totality in silence.

³⁵⁴ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p.185

³⁵⁵ Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987, p.179

³⁵⁶ Descombes, V., Modern French Philosophy, Cambridge 1980, p. 139

³⁵⁷ Ibid, p. 139

³⁵⁸ Ibid, p. 140

Rousseau found himself in a similar impasse. His aim was to articulate a state of "nature" in which humans lived in perfect harmony with their natural surroundings, and thus where the distinction between "nature" and "culture" would hardly have made sense. But as Derrida identifies, this articulation sets up the very distinction which it wishes to make redundant. Norris makes this clear, "*The distinction between "nature" and "culture" is prerequisite to any kind of anthropological theory. So there is always already a concept of "nature". . . . Such is the law which operates not only in Rousseau's text, but whenever thinking tries to hark back to some authentic preconceptual) state of "nature".*"³⁵⁹ This preconceptual state of "nature" is just that "preconceptual". Not only cannot it be defined, we cannot even conceptualise it.

Although as suggested, it is to some extent, self defeating, we must return to the nature of that which has no "nature", that is, being as non-(Self/Other). The state of continuity, cannot be adequately conceptualised. It cannot be conceptualised, for it is a past, which when present, was neither past nor present. When present, it is not a presence, for presence, relies on a absence. This state of being which is neither a presence or absence, is threatening to us, as the presence of an absence. In Descombes words, it signifies "*the impending threat of a being that is nothing for ourselves.*"³⁶⁰ Although we cannot conceptualise it, this does not mean it is inaccessible to us, for "*the return to origins is always possible.*"³⁶¹ Once again we are contradicted. As Derrida states, "*it is a non-origin which is originary.*"³⁶²

The difference which we must overcome or disrupt is not so much the difference between Self and Other, or between "nature" and "culture", but the difference between difference and non-difference. The difference in question, is not a specific difference, but the grounding or foundation of difference. Our objective then is the "*abolition of the difference between difference and nondifference.*"³⁶³ Gilles Deleuze suggests, it is not the difference between two concepts, which is paramount, but that which obliges thought to introduce difference.³⁶⁴ It is the difference between the continuity intuited, and the discontinuity conceptualised.

The difficulty in disrupting the symbolic order of the Self, the order of difference, is in the reinforcement which it gains from "culture". Although we continually move toward continuity, we are forced back into discontinuity by "culture". The effect is that the Self and "culture" mutually reinforce each other. Self creates "culture", and "culture" perpetuates Self.

³⁵⁹ Norris, C., *Derrida*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987, p. 107

³⁶⁰ Descombes, V., *Op. cit.*, p. 143

³⁶¹ Descombes, V., *Modern French Philosophy*, Cambridge 1980, p. 143

³⁶² Derrida quoted in Descombes, V., *Modern French Philosophy*, Cambridge 1980, p. 145

³⁶³ *Ibid*, p. 152

³⁶⁴ Descombes, V., *Op. cit.*, p. 155

It is by "challenging" and deconstructing the existing order from the periphery, that it may be possible to disrupt the symbolic system which perpetuates the separation of the subject from their world. By working against the current order, it may be possible to dismantle the dualisms and dichotomies which constitute that order. The aim is to replace it by a non reflective, non alienated fluid multiplicity.

It could be argued that what feminist philosophy refers to as "the phallographic order", is at least similar, if not parallel or identical with the metaphysical ideological foundation which could be expressed as the "subjective order" or the "order of the subject". Like the phallographic order, it imposes an entire logic and set of rules of its own, which dictate how the game is played.

Irigaray suggests that to reject or negate, the phallographic order, is merely to act in accordance with its terms and logic. By negating the order which is founded on, and characterised by, negation, we enter into the game on the terms of the male subject (in this case simply the "subject"). To reject this order, and to offer in its place a new order, we untowardly reaffirm the existing order. If we enter into traditional philosophical debate, on the grounds of traditional philosophical logic, and assert that the traditional logic is flawed, we are logically inconsistent. We have already lost, as soon as we enter the debate. Similarly, to negate the subjective order, by asserting our own new conceptualisation in its place, we contradict our own intentions. In playing the game of the subject, we are up against a master who always wins. If we play the game we lose, for in playing the game we have accepted defeat. The master's victory is concluded as soon as we accept the challenge, as soon as we agree to the umpire's rules, for the umpire is the master. To beat the master, we must change the rules of the game, or upset the order of the game. We must accept that we do not wish to win the "subjective game", for it is the game itself which is at fault.

Since the similar rules apply, it is worthwhile to briefly follow Irigaray to see what techniques can be used to bring about a new game. In "The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine", Irigaray asserts, "*what is important is to disconcert the staging of representation according to exclusively "masculine" parameters, that is, according to a phallographic order.*"³⁶⁵ We must attempt to unsettle the order, by concentrating on the logic or rules of the game to avoid the game taking its usual course. The aim is not to negate the rules of the game, for that would itself amount to the same thing, but to supplant ambiguity for clear definition. The outcome of this ambiguity, will be a multiplicity, rather than dualities and dichotomies.

Irigaray goes on to suggest, "*It is not matter of toppling that order so as to replace it - that amounts to the same thing in the end - but of disrupting and modifying it, starting from an outside that is exempt, in part, from phallographic law.*"³⁶⁶ To overthrow the order by offering a new conceptualisation of Self

³⁶⁵ Irigaray, L., The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine, p. 68

³⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 68

and Other, of "culture" and "nature", we leave the basic rules of the game untouched. Domination and desire, may be redistributed, but not dissipated. It is the logic and metaphysics of the game which must be disrupted. Irigaray makes a similar point with reference to the "masculine order", *"the issue is not one of elaborating a new theory of which woman would be the subject or the object, but of jamming the theoretical machinery itself, of suspending its pretension to the production of a truth and of a meaning that are excessively univocal."*³⁶⁷ For us it is not a question of a new conceptualisation of Self/"nature", but of jamming the metaphysical and psychological mechanism, which inevitable has that as the outcome. To truly win, we must formulate new rules, rules which are non-rules. We must step outside the order in which we exist, to find a new way of being, which is not subject to the old rules. To do this we must not set about winning the game, but at destroying the discursive mechanism which structures the laws of the game.

In "Speculum", Irigaray attempts to write without adhering to the logic of the subject. The book has no beginning or end, and no clear progressive architectonics. The subject, as subject posits a beginning as an origin, a progression and finally a conclusion or Hegelian arrival. The traditional Western way of writing is a construct of the subject. By not assenting to the traditional rules, Irigaray hopes to shatter the reinforcement gained by the subject (in her case more narrowly, the masculine subject), by the power of discourse. She hopes to withdraw from the speaking subject, the nourishment which it uses in order to reproduce itself, and to shore up its subjectivity.³⁶⁸ The disruption of the rules of subjective discourse, may allow an opening for an alternate way of being.

Since the counterpart of the "order of the subject", is not able to be conceptualised by the current logic which is set by the subject, we can only refer to it as the "non-order", the order which is a non-conceptualisation. Irigaray stresses a similar understanding, *"Its style resists and explodes every firmly established form, figure, idea or concept. Which does not mean that it lacks style, as we might be led to believe by a discursively that cannot conceive of it. But its "style" cannot be upheld as a thesis, cannot be object of a position."*³⁶⁹ Although, this is also to some extent a creation of reflection, and thus the subject, therefore existing as an internal contradiction; it is as a contradiction, that it disrupts the logic of the subjective order.

Thus, although it must be conceded that by entering into the discussion as to which way of being should be adopted, we do that which we wish not to do; it is to some extent never-the-less a necessary evil, and may actually have a beneficial outcome. To argue by way of reflection, that it is reflection on ways of being as a transcendence above being, as opposed to immanence in being, which is that which must be disrupted, we contradict ourselves. But it is in contradicting our Self, that we may be able to reverse or dissipate the

³⁶⁷ Ibid p. 78

³⁶⁸ Irigaray, L., The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine, p. 75

³⁶⁹ Ibid, p. 79

"order of the Self". By contradicting our Self, we contradict that which we are not, and therefore make some ground toward that which we are. But by talking of "making ground", we once again enter into subjective linguistics: but by entering into the "order of the subject", with a contradiction of our Self, we may rupture the very logic which conceptualises it as a contradiction.

In the project of disrupting the order which produces the subject, and thus the subjective order, the danger of being re-consumed by that order, always looms ready to strike. It is possible to argue that the environmental philosophies of Deep Ecology and Eco Feminism fall into the trap of being dictated to by the current order. It seems that a few Eco Feminists recognise this conflict. In claiming that the links between the oppression of "nature" and women are conceptual, *"they (ecofeminists) are embedded in a patriarchal conceptual framework which reflects the logic of domination"*³⁷⁰ To get out of this dilemma Eco-Feminists suggests we should reconceptualise ourselves in nonpatriachal ways. Unfortunately this reconceptualisation is couched in the language of the Self. Irigaray makes a similar point, *"when these same movements aim simply for a change in the distribution of power, leaving intact the power structure itself, then they are resubjecting themselves, deliberately or not, to the phallographic order* (in this case the subjective order).³⁷¹ It is the order which produces the order. By working within the present order we are unconsciously dictated to be that order. Since, it is the order which produces the subject/other dualism, and with this the energy of power and desire, the dissipation of power and desire is impossible within that order. Rather than working within the order, we must work at it from the edges, in particular by digging away its metaphysical and ontological foundations.

The "game of the Self", is a Bacchian revel in which no member is not drunk. By entering the game we are immediately intoxicated. The intoxication appears in the form of the permeation of being by subjectivity. The "revel of the Self" is preoccupied by the intoxication of subjectivity. If we are to avoid getting "drunk", we must stay outside the revel. To disrupt the revellers party we must "spice their drinks".

Each of us in our own way can but attempt to *"undertake the impossible task of thinking that which exceeds, escapes, and eludes philosophical reflection."*³⁷² Our victory in the "game of the subject", is our loss as members of the community of Life. What we gain by playing the game of the Self, is; the desire for perfection; the drive to domination; and general insecurity of being. What we lose, is the richness of pure experience, and the satisfaction of desire. The "Self game", is one in which, the loser, is the winner.

³⁷⁰ Warren, K.J., "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections", in Environmental Ethics, Spring 1987, p. 87

³⁷¹ Irigaray, L., The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine, p. 81

³⁷² Taylor, M.C., Altarity, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press, p. "Encore"

THE WAY OF BEING

In 1854 President Franklin Pierce in Washington made an offer for a large area of Indian land and promised a "reservation" for the Indian people. Chief Seattle's reply is perhaps one of the most profound and beautiful environmental statements ever made.

"The air is precious to the red man, for all things share the same breath - the beast, the tree, the man, they all share the same breath. The white man does not seem to notice the air he breathes. Like a man dying for many days, he is numb to the stench. But if we sell you our land, you must remember that the air is precious to us, that the air shares its spirit with all the life it supports. The wind that gave our grandfather his first breath also receives his last sigh. And if we sell you are land, you must keep it apart and sacred, as a place where even the white man can go to taste the wind that is sweetened by the meadow's flowers.

So we will consider your offer to buy our land. If we decide to accept, I will make one condition: The white man must treat the beasts of the land as his brothers.

I am savage and do not understand any other way. I have seen a thousand trotting buffalos on the prairie, left by the savage white man who shot them from a passing train. I am a savage and I do not understand how the smoking iron horse can be more important than the buffalo that we kill only to stay alive.

What is a man without a beast? If all the beasts were gone, man would die from a great loneliness of spirit. For whatever happens to the beasts, soon happens to man. All things are connected.

You teach your children that the ground beneath their feet is the ashes of our grandfathers. So that they will respect the land, tell your children that the earth is rich with the lives of our kin. Teach your children what we have taught our children, that the earth is our mother. Whatever befalls the earth befalls the sons of the earth. If men spit upon the ground, they spit upon themselves.

This we know: the earth does not belong to man; man belongs to the earth. This we know. All things are connected like the blood which unites one family. All things are connected.

Whatever befalls the earth befalls the sons of the earth. Man did not weave the web of life: he is merely a strand in it. Whatever he does to the web, he does to himself.

Even the white man, whose God walks and talks with him as friend to friend, cannot be exempted from the common destiny. We may be brothers after all. We shall see. One thing we know which the white man may one day discover - our God is the same God. You may think now that you own Him as you wish to own our land: but you cannot. He is the God of man, and His compassion is equal for the red man and the white. This earth is precious to Him, and to harm the earth is to heap contempt on its Creator. The whites too shall pass; perhaps sooner than all other tribes. Contaminate your bed, and you will one night suffocate in your own waste.

But in your perishing you will shine brightly, fired by the strength of God who brought you to this land and for some special purpose gave you dominion over this land and over the red man. That destiny is a mystery to us, for we do not understand when the buffalo are all slaughtered, the wild horses are tamed, the secret corners of the forest heavy with the scent of many men, and the view of the ripe hills blotted by talking wires. Where is the thicket? Gone. Where is the eagle? Gone. The end of the living and the beginning of survival.

We know that the white man does not understand our ways. One portion of land is the same to him as the next, for he is a stranger who comes in the night and takes from the land whatever he needs. The earth is not his brother but his enemy, and when he has conquered it, he moves on. He leaves his father's graves behind, and he does not care. His father's graves and his children's birthright are forgotten. He treats his mother, the earth, and his brother, the sky, as things to be bought, plundered, sold like the sheep or bright beads. His appetite will devour the earth.

I do not know. Our ways are different from your ways. The sight of your cities pains the eyes of the red man. But perhaps it is because the red man is a savage and does not understand.

There is no quiet in the white man's cities. No place to hear the unfurling of leaves in spring, or the rustle of an insect's wings. But perhaps it is because I am a savage and do not understand. The clatter only seems to insult the ears. And what is there to life if a man cannot hear the lonely cry of the whippoorwill or the arguments of the frogs around a pond at night? I am a red man and do not understand. The Indian prefers the soft sound of the wind darting over the face of a pond, and the smell of the wind itself, cleansed by a mid-day rain, or scented with the pinion pine.

How can you buy or sell the sky, the warmth of the land? The idea is strange to us.

If we do not own the freshness of the air and the sparkle of the water, how can you buy them?

Every part of this earth is sacred to my people. Every shining pine needle, every sandy shore, every mist in the dark woods, every clearing and humming insect is holy, in the memory and experience of my people. The sap which courses through many trees carries the memories of the red man.

The white man's dead forget the country of their birth when they go walk among the stars. Our dead never forget this beautiful earth, for it is the mother of the red man. We are part of the earth and it is part of us. The perfumed flowers are our sisters; the deer, the horse, the great eagle, these are our brothers. The rocky crests, the juices in the meadows, the body heat of the pony, and man - all belong to the same family.

So, when the Great White Chief in Washington sends word that he wishes to buy our land, he asks much of us. The Great White Chiefs sends word he will reserve us a place so that we can live comfortably to ourselves. He will be our father and we will be his children. So we will consider your offer to buy our land. But it will not be easy. For this land is sacred to us.

The shining water that moves in the streams and rivers is not just water but the blood of our ancestors. If we sell you land, you must remember that it is sacred, and you must teach your children that it is sacred and that each ghostly reflection in the clear water of the lakes tells of events and memories in the life of my people. The water's murmur is the voice of my father's father.

The rivers are our brothers, they quench our thirst. The river carry our canoes and feed our children. If we sell you our land, you must remember, and teach your children, that the rivers are our brothers, and yours, and you must henceforth give the rivers the kindness you would give any brother."

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works referred to in the text

Balbus, I. D., "A Neo-Hegelian, Feminist, Psychoanalytic Perspective on Ecology" in Telos, 52, 1982 pp 140-155

Bataille, G., Erotism: Death and Sexuality, San Fransico: City Lights Books, 1957

Baxter, B., Alienation and Authenticity, London: Tavistock Publications, 1982

Benjamin, J., Master and Slave: The Fantasy of Erotic Domination

Berman, M., The Rechantment Of The World, New York: Bantum Books, 1984

Biehl, J., "It's Deep, But is it Broad?": An Ecofeminist Looks at Deep Ecology" Kick It Over Special Supplement, No 20, Winter 1987, pp 2A-4A

Brown, N., Life Against Death, London: Sphere Library, 1959

Brown, N., Love's Body, New York: Vintage Books, 1968

Butler, J.P., Subjects of Desire, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987

Callicott, J. B., "Non-Anthropocentric Value Theory and Environmental Ethics, in American Philosophical Quarterly, 21, October 1984, pp 299-310

Carrithers, M., Collins, S., and Lukes, L., (eds.), The Category of The Person: Anthropology, Philosophy History, London: Cambridge University Press, 1985

Cheney, J., "Eco-Feminism and Deep Ecology" in Environmental Ethics, 9, Summer 1987, pp 115-145

Cohen R. (ed.), Face To Face with Levanis, State University of New York Press

Cook, J., The Voyage of the Endeavour 1768-1771

Deleuze, G., and Guatteri, F., A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987

Derrida, J., Writing and Difference, Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1978

Descombes, V., Modern French Philosophy, Cambridge 1980

Devall, B. and Sessions, G., Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered, Salt Lake City: Peregrine Smith Books, 1985

Elster, J. (ed), The Multiple Self,

Feuerbach, L., Principles of the Philosophy of the Future, New York: Bpbbs Merrill, 1966

Foucault, M., Language, Counter-Memory Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977

Freud, S., Civilisation and its Discontents, Freud Library, Vol 12, Penguin, 1985

Freud, S., The Essentials of Psychoanalysis, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1986

Freud, S., The Interpretation of Dreams, New York: Avon Books, 1965

Gadamer, H.G., Essays on Hegel's Dialectic, Yale University Press, 1970

Habermas, J., "Modernity - An Incomplete Project" in Foster, H. (ed), Postmodern Culture, London: Pluto Press, 1983

Habermas, J., The Philosophical Discourse Of Modernity, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987

Hamilton, V., Narcissus and Oedipus: The Children of Psychoanalysis, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

Hegel, F. The Difference between Fichte's and Schelling's System Of Philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977

Hegel, F., Early Theological Writings, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press

Hegel, F., Phenomenology Of Spirit, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979

Heidegger, M., Identity and Difference, New York: Harper and Row, 1969

Heidegger, M., The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, New York: Harper and Row, 1977

Hyppolite, J., Genesis and Structure of Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974

Irigaray, L., The Power of Discourse and the Subordination of the Feminine

Irigaray, L., The Sex Which is not One

Keller, E.F., Reflections on Gender and Science, New Haven, Yale University Press

Kojeve, A., Introduction to the Reading of Hegel, London: Cornell University Press

Lacan, J., Ecrits, Tavistock Publications

Levin, D. M., The Body's Recollection of Being, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

Lloyd, G., "Masters, Slaves and Others", in Radical Philosophy, Summer, 1983

Lloyd, G., The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy, Methuen

MacCormack, C.P. & Strathern, M., (eds.), Nature, Culture and Gender, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

McCloskey, H.J., Ecological Ethics and Politics, Ottawa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1983

Muller and Richardson, Lacan and Language

Naess, A., "Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement" in Inquiry, 16, 1973

Norris, C., Derrida, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987

Passmore, J., Man's Responsibility for Nature: Ecological Problems and Western Traditions, London: Duckworth, 1974

Pfuetze, P., Self, Society, Existence, New York: Harper, 1954

Plumwood, V., Ecofeminism: An Overview and Discussion of Positions and Arguments, in Australasian Journal Of Philosophy, Supplement to Vol. 64: June 1986

Rosen, S., G.W.L. Hegel: An Introduction to the Science of Wisdom, New Haven, Yale University Press

Roth, M.S., Psycho-Analysis as History: Negation and Freedom in Freud, London: Cornell University Press

Routley, R., A Critique of Deep Ecology, Department of Philosophy, ANU, 1985

Salleh, A., "Stirrings of a New Renaissance" in Island Magazine, No. 38, Autumn, 1989

Salleh, A.K., "Deeper than Deep Ecology: The Eco-Feminist Connection" in Environmental Ethics, Vol 6, Winter 1984

Sessions, G., (ed) Deep Ecology and Ecophilosophy, Utah: Peregrine Smith Books, 1987

Silverman, K., The Subject of Semiotics, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Stoodley, B.H., The Concepts of Sigmund Freud, Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe

Taylor, M.C., Alterity, Chicago: The University Of Chicago Press

Tugendhat, E., Self-Consciousness and Self-Determination, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986

Westen, D., Self and Society, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985

White, L., The Historical Roots Of Our Ecological Crisis, Science 155

White, S.K., The Recent Work Of Jurgen Habermas, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988

Other works consulted and general Bibliography

Adorno, T., Dialectics of Enlightenment

Adorno, T., Prisms, Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967

Alvarez, J., "Gaia: The Greening of Thomas Malthus?" in Arena 89, 1989

Attifeld, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983

Barthes, R., The Responsibility of Forms, New York: Hill and Wang, 1985

Barthes, R., The Rustle of Language

Bataille, G., Inner Experiences, SUNY Press, 1988

Becker, E., The Birth And Death Of Meaning, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1962

Benjamin, A., (ed), The Problems of Modernity, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1989

Benjamin, J., The Bonds Of Life,

Benn, S., "Personal Freedom And Environmental Ethics", in Dorsey, G.,(ed.), Equality And Freedom, New York: Oceania Publishers, 1977

Berger, P., & Luckman T., The Social Construction of Reality, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1966

Berger, P., Berger, B., & Kellner, H., The Homeless Mind, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1974

Berger, P., Facing up to Modernity, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1977

Berger, P., Pyramids of Sacrifice

Berger, P., The Homeless Mind

Berry W., The Unsettling Of America,

Birnbacher, D., "Ethical Principles Versus Guiding Principles in Environmental Ethics" in Philosophica, 39, 1987, pp 59-75

Bookchin, M., "Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology" in Green Perspectives, Nos 4 and 5, 1987

Bookchin, M., Toward an Ecological Society, Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1980

Borrelli, P., "The Ecophilosophers" in Amicus Journal, 10: 2, Spring 1988, pp 30-40

Brubaker, B., To Live On Earth, New York: Mentor Books, 1972

Caldecott, L., and Leland, S., (eds), Reclaim the Earth: Women Speak Out for Life on Earth, London: The Women's Press, 1983

Callicott, J. B. "Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics", in Environmental Ethics, 7 Fall 1985, pp, 257-76

Callicott, J. B., "Tertium Organum and Mankind's Role in Future Evolution" in Philosophica, 39, 1987, pp 101-102

Callicott, J.B., In Defense of the Land Ethics: Essays in Environmental Philosophy, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988

Campbell, J., The Power Of The Myth, New York: Doubleday, 1988

Capra, F., The Turning Point, London: Wildwood House, 1982

Capra, F., Uncommon Wisdom, London: Fontana, 1988

- Carlson, A., "Nature And Positive Aesthetics", in Environmental Ethics
- Carncross, H., The Escape From The Primitive, New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1926
- Chaloupka, W., "John Dewey's Social Aesthetics as a Precedent for Environmental Thought" in Environmental Ethics, 9, Fall 1987, pp 243-260
- Clement, R., "On the Relationship of Conservation and Preservation" in Environmental Ethics, 9, Fall 1987, pp 285-286
- Collard, A., and Contucci, J., Rape of the Wild, Women's Press, London, 1988
- Colwell, T., "The Ethics of Being Part of Nature" in Environmental Ethics 9, Summer 1987, pp 99-113
- Coser, L.A., Georg Simmel, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965
- Cox, H., The Secular City, New York: Macmillan, 1966
- Daly, M., Gyn/Ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism, Boston: Beacon Press, 1978
- De Beauvoir, S., The Second Sex, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972
- De Chardin, T., Man's Place In Nature, New York: Fontana, 1966
- De Roose, F., "Towards a Non-Axiological Holistic Ethic", in Philosophica, 39, 1987, pp 77-100
- De Vore, I., & Lee's, R., Man the Hunter, New York: Aldine Publishing Co, 1969
- Derrida, Difference
- Derrida, Ends of Man
- Devall, B., and Sessions, G., "The Development of Nature Resources and the Integrity of Nature" in Environmental Ethics, 6, Winter 1984, pp 293-322
- Diamond, S., The Search For The Primitive, in Montagu, A., (ed), The Concept of the Primitive, New York: Free Press, 1968
- Dodson Gray, E., Green Paradise Lost, Wellesly, Massachusetts: Rountable Press, 1981
- Drengon, A., "A Critique of Deep Ecology: Response to William Gray", in Journal of Applied Philosophy, 4, October 1987, pp 223-227

- Dubos, R., & Ward, B., Only One Earth, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1972
- Dubos, R., A God Within, London: Abacus, 1976
- Dubos, R., Man Adapting, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965
- Dubos, R., So Human An Animal. London: Abacus, 1970
- Eckersley, R., The Paradox of Ecofeminism, A paper delivered at the Ecopolitics Conference, University of Adelaide, September 23, 1989
- Eckholm, E., Down To Earth, London: Pluto Press, 1982
- Ehrlich, P., & Ornstein, R., New world New Mind, London: Methuen, 1989
- Elgin, D., Voluntary Simplicity,
- Elliot, R., & Gare, A., Environmental Philosophy, St. Lucia: University Of Queensland, 1984
- Federns 1926 and 1927
- Fenton, J., "The Ecology of Environmentalism: Some Ideas for Discussion", in Ecos, 8: 4, Autumn 1987, pp 28-33
- Ferenczi, Stages in the Development of Sense and Reality 1913
- Feuerbach, L., The Essence Of Christianity
- Fields, R., Chop Wood Carry Water, New York: Tarcher, 1984
- Fisher, F., (ed), Sustaining Gaia, Contributions to Another World View, Papers from a 1984 Conference: Environmental, Ethics and Ecology, Monash University, 1987
- Foltz, B., "On Heidegger and the Interpretation of Environmental Crisis" in Environmental Ethics, 6, Winter 1984, pp 323-328
- Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish
- Foucault, M., History Of Sexuality
- Fox, W., Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan's Critique of Deep Ecology, University of Tasmania, 1986
- Fox, W., "The Deep Ecology-Ecofeminism Debate and Its Parallels: A Defense of Deep Ecology's Concern with Anthropocentrism", in Environmental Ethics, 11 (11) 1989, pp 5-25

Fox, W., Toward a Transpersonal Ecology: The Context, Influence, Meanings and Distinctiveness of the Deep Ecology Approach to Ecophilosophy PhD Dissertation, Murdoch University, 1988 (to be published as a book by Shambhala Press in 1990)

Frisbee, D., Fragments of Modernity

Fromm, E., Beyond the Chains Of Illusion, London: Abacus, 1962

Fromm, E., The Crisis Of Psychoanalysis, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970

Fromm, E., To Have Or To Be, London: Abacus, 1979

Gadamer, H.G., Reason and the Age of Science

Geertz, G., The Interpretation of Cultures,

Golley, F., "Deep Ecology from a Perspective of Environmental Science", in Environmental Ethics, 9, Spring 1987, pp 45-55

Goodpaster, K., "From Egoism To Environmentalism", in Ethics And Problems of 21st Century, Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1979

Grey, W., "A Critique of Deep Ecology" in Journal of Applied Philosophy, 3, 1986, pp 211-216

Griffin, S., Woman and Nature: The Roaring Inside Her, New York: Harper and Row, 1975

Griffith-Jones, E., The Dominion of Man, London: Hodder And Stoughton, 1926

Hallen, P., "Making Peace with the Environment: Why Ecology Needs Feminism", in Canadian Woman Studies, Spring 1988, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp 9-18

Hampson, N., The Enlightenment, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968

Hardin, G., Exploring New Ethics For Survival, New York: Viking Press, 1972

Hardin, G., Nature and Man's Faith, New York: Mentor Books, 1959

Haught, J., "The Emergent Environment and the Problem of Cosmic Purpose", in Environmental Ethics, 8, Summer 1986, pp. 139-150

Heffernan, J., "The Land Critic: A Critical Appraisal" in Environmental Ethics 4: 3, Fall 1982, pp 235-247

Hegel, F., Lectures of History Of Philosophy

Hegel, F., Philosophy Of Nature in Encyclopedia

- Howarth, W., The Book Of Concord, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1982
- Howell, J., (ed.), Environment and Ethics: a New Zealand Contribution, Christchurch: Centre for Resource Management, 1986
- Huxley, A., The Doors Of Perception, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1971
- Huxley, A., The Human Situation, Frogmore: Panther, 1969
- Huxley, A., The Perennial Philosophy, New York: Harper, 1944
- Illich, I., Tools For Conviviality, New York: Fontana, 1973
- Joad, C.E.M., Guide to Philosophy, New York: Dover Publications, 1957
- Johnson, L., A Morally Deep World, Department of Philosophy, ANU, 1987
- Katz, E., "Organism, Community, and the 'Substitution Problem'" in Environmental Ethics, 7 Fall 1985, pp 241-256
- Katz, E., "Searching for Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism and Despair in Environmental Ethics" in Environmental Ethics, 9, Fall 1987, pp231-241
- Kristeva, J., Tales of Love, New York: Columbia University Press, 1987
- Kumar, S., (ed.), The Schumacher Lectures, London: Blond & Briggs, 1980
- Laing, R.D., Self and Others, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1969
- Laing, R.D., The Divided Self, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1965
- Laing, R.D., The Politics Of Experience, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1967
- Laplanche, J., Life and Death in Psychoanalysis, Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press
- Lee, D., Freedom and Culture, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1959
- Leiss, W., The Limits to Satisfaction, Toronto: University Of Toronto Press, 1976
- Liedloff, J., The Continuum Concept, London: Future, 1975
- Lloyd, G., "Spinoza's Environmental Ethics", in Inquiry, 23
- Lombardi, L., "Inherent Worth, Respect, and Rights" in Environmental Ethics, 5: 3, Fall 1983, pp 257-70
- Lovelock, J., The Ages Of Gaia, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989

Low, B., The Nirvana Principle, 1920

Lowith, K., From Hegel to Nietzsche

Mannison, D., McRobbie, M., & Routley, R., (eds.) Environmental Philosophy, Canberra: Australian National University, 1980

Marcuse, H., Eros And Civilisation, London: Abacus, 1969

Marcuse, H., Negations: Essays in Critical Theory, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1968

Marks, R., The Meaning Of Marcuse, New York: Ballantine Books, 1970

Mathews, F., "Conservation and Self-Realization: A Deep Ecology Perspective" in Environmental Ethics, Vol 10, Winter 1988

Mathews, F., "Conservation and the Politics of Deep Ecology" in Social Alternatives, Vol 6, No 4, 1987

Mathews, F., "Deep Ecology: Where All Things Are Connected" in Habitat, Vol 16, No 5, 1988

McCumber, J., "Is a Post-Hegelian Ethics Possible?" in Research in Phenomenology, Vol 18, 1988

McKibben, The End Of Nature

McMillan, C., Women, Reason and Nature, Oxford: Blackwell, 1982

Meadows, D., The Limits To Growth, London: Pan Books, 1974

Mercer, C., Living In Cities, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1979

Miller, P., "Value as Richness: Toward a Value Theory for an Expanded Naturalism in Environmental Ethics" in Environmental Ethics, 4, 2, Summer 1982, pp 101-114

Mitchell, R., "How "Soft", "Deep", or "Left" Present Constituencies in the Environmental Movement for Certain World Views" in Natural Resources Journal, 20: 2, April 1980, pp 345-359

Monro, D. H., Ethics and the Environment, Melbourne: Monash University, 1984

Monro, D.H., Ethics and the Environment, Melbourne: Monash University Press, 1984

Mumford, L., The Pentagon Of Power, London: Secker And Warburg, 1970

- Murchie, G., The Seven Mysteries Of Life, London: Rider, 1978
- Nasr, Seyyed Hossein, The Encounter of Man and Nature, London: George Allen and Unwin, 1968
- Norton, B. (ed), The Preservation of the Species: The Value of Biological Diversity, Princeton University Press, 1986
- Norton, B. "Environmental Ethics and Rights of Future Generations" in Environmental Ethics, 4: 4, Winter 1983, pp 319-37
- O'Brien M., The Politics of Reproduction
- Passmore, J., The Perfectability Of Man, London: Duckworth, 1972
- Pluhar, E., "The Justification of an Environmental Ethic", in Environmental Ethics, 5: 1, Spring 1983, pp 47-61
- Porritt, J., Seeing Green, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984
- Regan, T., Earthbound, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984
- Reinhardt, K., The Existentialist Revolt, New York: Ungar Paperbacks, 1952
- Rich, A., Of Women Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution, London, Virago, 1977
- Robin, A., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983
- Rolland, R., La Vie de Ramakrishna
- Rolland, R., La Vie de Vivekanada
- Rolston, H., Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1988
- Rolston, H., Is There An Ecological Ethic?, Ethics 85,
- Rose, H., & Rose, S., Science And Society, Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1969
- Roszak, T., Person/Planet, St Albans: Granada, 1981
- Roszak, T., The Making Of A Counter Culture, London: Faber, 1970
- Roszak, T., Where The Wasteland Ends, London: Faber & Faber, 1972

Roth, M.S., Knowing and History: Appropriations of Hegel in Twentieth-Century France, London: Cornell University Press

Rousseau, J.J., The Confessions, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1781

Rousseau, J.J., The Social Contract and Discourse, London: J.M. Dent & Sons Ltd

Routley, R & Routley, V., "Human Chauvinism and Environmental Ethics", in Mannison McRobbie and R. Routley(eds) Environmental Philosophy, ANU Press, Canberra

Routley, R., "Is There a Need for a New, an Environmental Ethic?" in Varna 17-22 September 1973

Routley, V., Critical Notice Of John Passmore, "Man's Responsibility To Nature", in Australasian Journal Of Philosophy 53

Sale, K., Human Scale, London: Secker & Warburg, 1980

Satre, J.P., Being And Nothingness

Schaffer, R., Mothering, London: Fontana, 1977

Scherer, D., "Anthropocentrism, Atomism and Environmental Ethics", in Environmental Ethics, 4: 2, Summer 1982, pp 115-24

Schumacher, E., A Guide For The Perplexed, London: Abacus, 1977

Schumacher, F., Small Is Beautiful, London: Abacus, 1974

Sheldrake, R., The Presence Of The Past, New York: Vintage Books, 1989

Silverman, H.J., Derrida and Deconstruction,

Simmel, G., The Metropolis and Mental Life

Simmel, G., The Sociology of Georg Simmel, New York: The Free Press, 1964

Skolimowski, H., Eco-Philosophy, London: Marion Boyars, 1981

Smart, B., Michael Foucault

Smith, H., Beyond The Post-Modern Mind, London: Quest Books, 1982

Smith, H., The Religions Of Man, New York: Mentor Books, 1958

Spitler, G., "Do We Really Need Environmental Ethics?", in Environmental Ethics, 7, Spring 1985, pp 91-92

Spitler, G., "Justifying A Respect for Nature" in Environmental Ethics, 4: 3, Fall 1982 pp 255-260

Sprigge, T., "Are There Intrinsic Values in Nature?" in Journal of Applied Philosophy, 4, March 1987, pp 21-28

Stone, C., "Legal Rights and Moral Pluralism" in Environmental Ethics, 9, Autumn 1987, pp281-4

Stone, C., Should Trees Have Standing: Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects, California: William Kaufman, 1974

Susuki, D., & Knudtson, P., Genethics, Sydney: Allen And Unwin, 1988

Tawney, R. H., The Acquisitive Society, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1921

Tawney, R.H., Religion And The Rise Of Capitalism, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1948

Taylor, C., Hegel

Taylor, W., Man And Nature, New York: Regency Press, 1974

Thomas, W.L. (ed.) Man's Role In Changing the Face Of The Earth, London: University Of Chicago Press, 1956

Thoreau, H.D., The Natural Man, New York: Quest Books, 1978

Thoreau, H.D., Walden, New York: Signet Classic, 1960

Thoreau, H.D., Walking and The Wild

Tobias, M., (ed) Deep Ecology, San Diego: Avant books, 1985

Toffler, A., Eco-Spasm, New York: Bantam Books, 1975

Toffler, A., Future Shock, London: Pan Books, 1970

Toffler, A., The Third Wave, London: Pan Books, 1980

Torgerson, D., "The Paradox of Environmental Ethics", Alternatives, 12: 2 Winter 1985, pp 26-36

Turnbull, C., The Forest People, London: Paladin, 1984

Tyrrell, G., The Personality Of Man, West Drayton: Pelican Books, 1948

Van Den Berg, J.H., Divided Existence and Complex Society

Vesey, G., Personal Identity

Ward, B., The Home Of Man, London: Deutsch, 1976

Warren, K.J., "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections", in Environmental Ethics, Spring 1987

Watson, R., "A Note on Deep Ecology" in Environmental Ethics, 6, Winter 1984, pp 377-380

Watts, A., Creative Meditations from Alan Watts, California: Celestial Arts, 1980

Watts, A., Nature, Man & Woman, London: Abacus, 1976

Watts, A., The Wisdom Of Insecurity, New York: Vintage Books, 1951

Weston, A., "Beyond Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism in Environmental Ethics" in Environmental Ethics, 7, Winter 1985, pp 321-339

White, L., Machina Ex Deo, Boston: MIT Press, 1969

Williams, B., Sex Power Destruction

Willis, Global Mind Change: The Problem of the Last Years of the Twentieth Century

Wilson, C., The Outsider, London: Pan Piper, 1956

Wittbecker, A., "Deep Anthropology: Ecology and Human Order" in Environmental Ethics, 8, Fall 1986, pp, 261-270

Wood, H., "Modern Pantheism as an Approach to Environmental Ethics" in Environmental Ethics, 7 Summer 1985, pp 151-164

Zimmerman, M., "Feminism, Deep Ecology, and Environmental Ethics" in Environmental Ethics, 9 Spring 1987, pp 21-44

Zimmerman, M., "Implications of Heidegger's Thought for Deep Ecology", in Mod. Sch. 64, November 1986, pp 19-43

Zimmerman, M., "Quantam Theory, Intrinsic Value, and Panentheism", in Environmental Ethics, 10, Spring 1988, pp 3-30